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PREFACE 
 
 
Is it possible to control the trade and misuse of one of the most widely used weapons through 
international cooperation? This is not only the fundamental question that attracted my interest 
to the small arms issue, but it also guided the UN Small Arms Conference that took place 
between 9 and 20 July 2001 in New York. Much has been written about the deadly 
consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction, i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, but it gets too easily forgotten that the real weapons of mass destruction – on a slow 
but constant pace – are small arms and light weapons. The Geneva-based and Swiss 
government sponsored Small Arms Survey estimates that annually at least 200,000 deaths 
occur from homicide and suicide in the industrialized world alone, and that more than 
300,000 people are killed during armed conflicts in developing countries. 
I have started to become interested in the small arms and light weapons topic, when I 
participated in a larger research project in which we analyzed Switzerland’s foreign and 
security policy after the end of the Cold War. Arms Control in general and small arms policy 
in particular are domains were Switzerland can provide specific inputs due to its expertise and 
niche-position. My initial research interest grew steadily and expanded into the international 
arena in the following years. While I spent one year as a visiting researcher at Georgetown 
University, I could attend the preparatory activities and the actual UN 2001 Small Arms 
Conference in New York. Even though the Conference had a very broad approach by bringing 
the small arms problem ‘in all its aspects’ on the negotiation table, I focused on a particular 
aspect of the whole small arms issue: the role and impact of non-state actors. Given the 
primacy of states in security affairs, it is quite astonishing which role non-state actors play in 
the whole process. This influence cannot only be revealed by the number of attending non-
governmental organizations and industry lobby groups – however impressive 119 registered 
organizations might be – but also by showing the specific contribution to the negotiated 
outcome. 
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The aim of this book is to show the specific impact of non-state actors. I hope that it helps 
deepen the knowledge and understanding of academics, government officials and NGO 
activists by exploring the impact of NGOs and private company in a complex negotiation 
context. More specifically, it shows that there is not only room at the negotiation table for 
nation states, but that also non-state actors can provide important contributions in the problem 
solving process. But in the end, it is up to the states to live up to their responsibility – for their 
societies and the whole international community. 
Various people have made this dissertation possible. First and foremost I am indebted to a 
good friend and colleague, Kenneth Rutherford, Co-Founder of Landmine Survivor Network, 
Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Landmine Studies at the Southwest Missouri State 
University (SMSU), Springfield, USA. He truly influenced and encouraged my work on this 
topical issue. My longstanding teachers, Thomas Bernauer und Dieter Ruloff, Professors at 
the Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) of the Federal School of 
Technology, Zurich, and the University of Zurich, respectively, also deserve special credit. 
They provided a stimulating research and working environment. During my research stay in 
Georgetown, I profited from the very inspiring academic environment and the ‘open door 
policy’ of the Department of Government’s faculty and graduate students. I would 
particularly like to thank George Shambaugh who not only shared one of his office walls with 
me, but also provided valuable input for my various research activities. Joseph Lepgold, who 
was my mentor at Georgetown, was very helpful with his thought-provoking and intriguing 
comments. Unfortunately, he died in a hotel fire in Paris in late 2001 shortly before he 
planned to visit the CIS in January 2002.  
Earlier versions and parts of this publication have been presented at various Political Sciences 
conferences and in research panels. I would like to thank the participants for their valuable 
comments and inputs. I particularly want to thank Robert Lieber and Morten Mærli, panel 
discussant and participant, respectively, at the 2001 International Studies Association (ISA) 
conference in Chicago; Richard Matthew as panel discussant at the 2001 American Political 
Science Association (APSA) conference in San Francisco; Ed Laurance, Director of the 
Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, as panel discussant, Keith Krause, Programme Director of the Small 
Arms Survey in Geneva, Suzette Grillot, and Cassady Craft as participants at the 2002 ISA 
conference in New Orleans. 
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 III 
I am grateful to Lars Held for his support in finalizing the editing work of the original 
dissertation. Especially, I would like to thank my parents for their long-time support. Last, but 
not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my wife Sandra for her continued 
encouragement and support. She deserves great credit that I kept up pace and finished this 
dissertation. However, all the persons mentioned – and unmentioned – are not responsible for 
any flawed arguments or conclusions of this research. But I think that they helped me to 
reduce many weaknesses that existed before. 
 
Zurich, October 2006 
Stefan M. Brem 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
All too often it is small arms, rather than the weapons 
systems targeted by disarmament efforts, that cause the 
greatest bloodshed today. In the hands of terrorists, 
criminals and the irregular militia and armed bands 
typical of internal conflict, these are the true weapons of 
mass terror.1 
─Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Minister, 
Speech at the UN General Assembly, 
September 25, 1997. 
 
In this chapter I develop the intuition that innovative partnerships between non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and middle power states can vigorously and, at times, very effectively 
address an expanding set of transnational and global challenges. In making this argument, I 
elaborate this intuition and apply it to the issue of small arms regulation. These ideas about 
the relationships between state and non-state actors have gained considerable acceptance in 
the field of international relations in the past decade.2 In 1990, James Rosenau articulated 
these ideas clearly, and influentially, in his study, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of 
Change and Continuity. In his publication, Rosenau makes three related arguments: 
One involves the present era as a historical breakpoint. The second concerns 
a bifurcation of macro global structures into what is called the two worlds of 
                                               
1  Speech by Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy, UN General Assembly, September 25, 1997. 
http://www.un.int/canada/html/s-25sepe.htm, last checked December 2004. 
2  See, for example, James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., 1992, Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paul Wapner, 
1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, New York: SUNY Press; Stefan Brem, Ken 
Rutherford and Richard Matthew, eds., 2003, Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle 
Power Cooperation in International Security Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 
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world politics. The third focuses on the micro level and the hypothesis that 
the analytical and emotional skills of adults in every country are increasing.3 
Rosenau elaborates upon each of these ideas and concludes with a description of four 
scenarios of possible futures for world politics: 1) states and non-state actors (NSAs) merge 
into a global society with shared norms;4 2) states regain the upper hand insofar as the 
distribution of power is concerned resulting in a restored state-system; 3) NSAs become 
predominant producing a pluralist world; or 4) the struggle between states and NSAs 
continues, a condition Rosenau terms ‘enduring bifurcation’ (Rosenau 1990, 447). 
Two of these scenarios are of special relevance to this dissertation. The first, which Rosenau 
refers to as the Global-Society Scenario, assumes that forms of interdependence between the 
state and non-state worlds will deepen and widen to the point where explicit ties develop that 
bind communities together. These ties derive from aspirations, procedural norms, and 
loyalties that are globally shared (Rosenau 1990, 446). In this scenario, states and non-state 
actors are politically autonomous, but agree to respect and act in accordance with a rich 
framework of shared values and practices.  
The counterpart to global-society is the condition of enduring bifurcation. In this scenario, the 
clashes between centralizing and decentralizing dynamics will not be resolved. As a result 
neither the state-centric nor the multi-centric world loses its autonomy and becomes 
subordinate to the other (Rosenau 1990, 453). Nor do the two worlds agree to operate within 
the framework of a shared system of values and norms. Although both types of actors comply 
on some transnational issues, on many others they act independently of, and at times in 
opposition to, each other (Rosenau 1990, 447). 
Given the historical conditioning of the state, it is hard to imagine that it would willingly 
share political space, including power, authority and legitimacy, with non-state actors, and 
then develop a regulatory framework on equal terms with them. At the same time, as 
Rosenau’s third general argument suggests very strongly, a skills revolution has taken place 
that cannot be reversed.5 It has had the effect of empowering non-state actors, allowing them 
to form extensive transnational networks, and giving them the upper hand on some global 
                                               
3  James N. Rosenau, 1990, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 5. 
4  This dissertation focuses on non-governmental organizations, a type of non-state actor (NSA) composed of 
a group of people working within the context of a defined structure, identity and purpose. 
5  See Rosenau 1990, chapters 12 and 13. 
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issues. They are a force to be reckoned with. Hence one might conclude that Rosenau’s 
arguments imply a preference for the enduring bifurcation scenario. 
This dissertation suggests another way of thinking about the interaction between the two 
spheres of world politics. I suggest that a hybrid of Rosenau’s scenarios one and two may 
actually be evolving. In this case, a global framework of values and norms has not been 
accepted by all states and non-state actors, and does not seem to be taking shape. In fact, 
superpowers such as the United States and great powers such as China have been highly 
resistant to any reinterpretation of sovereignty or any generalized legitimization of the non-
state realm (scenario 2). At the same time, the interaction between states and non-states is not 
well-captured by the notion of enduring bifurcation. This is because extensive forms of 
cooperation within the context of a shared value framework are taking place between some 
states such as Switzerland as well as others on the one hand and the non-state world on the 
other hand (scenario 1). Specifically, I refer to states as middle powers who are developing 
beyond their strained historic role as henchmen of the great powers on the one hand and as 
referees of peace and justice on the other hand, and are entering creative high-impact 
partnerships with powerful coalitions of non-state actors. This is especially visible in specific 
areas of the security realm, which are examined in detail in this thesis. 
I believe this partnership embodies many implications for the future of world politics. The 
extensive resources and powerful ambitions that Rosenau observed in the non-state world are 
being fused to the legitimacy, authority and institutional core of the state world through the 
good offices of middle powers. 
There are several reasons for this. Middle powers are the ones that experience great internal 
and external pressure to do something when the non-state realm mobilizes an effective 
transnational campaign, as it has done in the cases of landmines, International Criminal Court 
and child soldiers. Middle powers have a legacy of moral stewardship in the global arena. 
Therefore, to correspond with their own identities they cannot ignore compelling arguments 
about moral failures. They also have a legacy as mediators in world affairs. Today, they 
recognize that there are pressing global issues that great powers are refusing to address. The 
middle powers appreciate that in a divided world in which serious global problems are not 
being solved, they have an opportunity and perhaps an obligation to serve as interlocutors 
between states and non-state actors in ways that solidify their international position, are 
lauded by transnational actors, and may even bring real improvements to the security and 
welfare of people at home and abroad. In short, for a variety of reasons, middle power states 
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are motivated, capable, and historically primed to play this important role as enablers, 
supporters and facilitators of global problem-solving.6 
Unfortunately, the dominance of great power identity of the academic field of international 
relations has historically sidelined the study of middle powers. I believe that just as more and 
more attention has been focused on the significance of the non-state world over the past few 
decades, leading to a far richer analysis of the general character of world politics, it is 
important also to reconsider familiar arguments about middle powers that depict them as 
wholly bound to the goals and preferences of great powers except in areas that are largely 
trivial from the perspectives of security and economics. To the contrary, I contend that middle 
powers, in alliance with non-state actors, are playing roles in the security realm that are 
gaining momentum and altering the very nature of world affairs. 
To demonstrate the validity and value of the argument outlined above, and to further develop 
and clarify it, I examine a series of different aspects of the small arms problems, basically 
focusing on the process that led to the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference. By analyzing these 
different aspects, I try to explain where and why great powers and superpowers have not acted 
to neutralize these urgent global threats; why middle power-NGO partnerships have emerged 
to fill this void; how they have acted to change values, attitudes and behavior; and what 
measurable successes they have had. In doing so, I will bring together insights from two 
vibrant literatures that, since the 1970s, have developed largely independently of each other. 
Weaving together themes and concepts from both the scholarship on NGOs and the 
scholarship on middle powers, I will contribute towards understanding an important 
contemporary phenomenon. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter I will: 
· briefly review key concepts and insights in the literatures on middle powers and 
NGOs that have provided the theoretical foundation for this research; and 
· summarize each of the chapters. 
Middle Powers 
Theories of world politics have not, for the most part, been very generous towards countries 
that are neither great powers nor superpowers. Indeed, the world described by such influential 
                                               
6  See also Stefan Brem, 2001, “Middle Powers Tackling Big Problems: New Coalitions to Control Trade in 
and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons?” Paper prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting. San 
Francisco, CA, 29 August – 2 September, 2001. 
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realist thinkers as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Walt, and John 
Mearsheimer is shaped mainly by the preferences of great powers and superpowers acting 
under conditions of anarchy.7 Such states have little incentive to accept constraints on their 
behavior. Therefore they are generally resistant to international law and many forms of 
multilateralism if they see them as constraints.8 Self-interest, concerns about relative power 
and position are among the prominent forces that together create a world in which there is 
little basis for optimism about the prospects for peace, justice or even reliable, concerted 
action to tackle complex global issues such as poverty, small arms, nuclear weapons or 
climate change.9 In such a world, realists suggest, middle powers are well-advised to adapt 
their foreign policies to the preferences of the great powers, and to limit their independent 
initiatives to areas of minor significance. 
Variants of realist theory do imply that some distributions of power across states may provide 
more opportunities for middle power activity than others. For example, the logic of structural 
realism suggests that in a multipolar world middle powers might be able to use allegiance as 
an effective bargaining chip. In the bipolar world of the Cold War era, however, most middle 
powers would be expected to toe the line behind one or the other superpowers at best, 
allegiance could be negotiated once. In a system dominated by a single superpower, as is 
currently the case, bargaining leverage might be expected to disappear, but refusing to toe the 
line might not have dire consequences, but rather opening up some areas for independent 
action. Ultimately, however, from a realist perspective, the net impact of middle powers on 
the character and politics of any anarchic world system is likely to be small. 
The school of liberal theories associated with scholars such as Michael Doyle, Robert 
Keohane and John Ruggie is more receptive to the possibilities of pluralism and 
multilateralism in world affairs, and hence to significant political roles for middle powers.10 
                                               
7  Hans Morgenthau, 1973, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf; 
Kenneth Waltz, 1959, Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press; Robert Gilpin, 
1986, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stephen Walt, 1996, 
Revolution and War, Cornell: Cornell University Press; John Mearsheimer, 2001, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
8  Joseph M. Grieco, 1988, “Anarchy and the Limits of International Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42(3), Summer, 485-507. 
9  See, for example, Robert Kaplan, 2001, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold 
War, Vintage; and Samuel Huntington, 1998, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
New York: Touchstone. 
10  Michael Doyle, 1986, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80(4), 1151-
1169; Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, 1977, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston: Little, Brown; John Ruggie, ed., 1993, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form, New York: Columbia University Press. 
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But while liberal theories create more space for middle powers, this has not inspired many 
scholars to explore this space. The literature on middle powers is the product of a handful of 
researchers, predominantly from Australia, Canada, and Scandinavian countries. It has not 
had much impact on thinking in the field of international relations as a whole, although it has 
been a persistent perspective since the 1960s. 
But before assessing the utility of the concept of middle powers, it needs to be explained in 
greater detail. For while the term middle power is evocative, it is also imprecise. It may evoke 
general images of mediocrity (middle of the road), playing it safe (middle course of action) or 
centrality (right in the middle of things). It does not, however, immediately suggest a set of 
states identified by simple, measurable criteria such as population, size and GDP. In the 
literature on middle powers one finds that, while the label is not used with complete 
consistency, it nonetheless conveys a distinctive perspective. It is a perspective that cannot, 
however, readily be reduced to an empirical measure. Canada’s Global Security Institute 
captures this perspective well in describing its new Middle Power Initiative: “Middle powers 
are countries that are politically and economically significant, internationally respected 
countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant 
political credibility.”11 The ideas that middle powers are significant in world politics and 
respected by other states echo throughout the literature, although little effort has been made to 
define significance or respect. 
Within the discipline of international relations, the concept of middle power received its most 
important early treatments in the work of Jon McLin, Annette Baker Fox and Carsten 
Holbraad, whose analysis of middle power/great power relations is often acknowledged as 
foundational by contemporary scholars.12 In those studies we find preliminary arguments 
about which states qualify as middle powers and suggestions that these states have distinctive 
roles in the international system by virtue of their special ties to principal powers, and 
especially to the United States. Holbraad (1984: 125) describes them as the supporters and 
lieutenants of the great powers, and also as countries that occasionally are able to play an 
important mediating role in world affairs. 
                                               
11  Information on the Middle Power Initiative can be found at <http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/>. 
12  Jon B. McLin, 1967, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in 
Alliance, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Annette Baker Fox, 1977, The Politics of Attraction: 
Four Middle Powers and the United States, New York: Columbia University Press; and Carsten Holbraad, 
1984, Middle Powers in International Politics, London: Macmillan. 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the concept and implications of middle powers were 
discussed primarily by scholars from middle powers. During this period, middle powers were 
widely portrayed as good international citizens with the resources and motivation to focus on 
complex global issues such as persistent conflicts and poverty in the third world.13 In their 
well regarded study, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal brought greater 
conceptual clarity to this literature by arguing that middle powers share several distinctive 
features. In particular, they tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, 
embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and embrace notions of good 
international citizenship.14 More recently, Cooper has edited a volume that explores the niches 
in the world system that middle powers can and do fill, largely with the objective of making 
the world a better place.15 As the concept of middle power has attracted attention in the field, 
various scholars have suggested candidates for middle power status, including Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, South Africa and Switzerland.16  
To summarize, the unifying themes of this literature include notions of the significant 
capacity middle powers possess; the international respect they command; the ideals of good 
global citizenship that guide their foreign policies; the niches neglected by the superpowers 
that are available to them; and the special roles they play in world politics as lieutenants of 
great powers, mediators of conflict, supporters of international organization and advocates of 
international norms and multilateralism. 
These arguments have not motivated realists to reconsider their claims about the predominant 
impacts of principal powers. They have not added much to the general arguments advanced 
by liberals about world politics, or shifted much attention away from the United States (and 
its main transatlantic partner Great Britain) as the focus of most international relations theory. 
In this light, it would not be difficult to develop an argument, guided by constructivist and 
postmodern ideas, suggesting that the identity of middle power has been constructed by a 
                                               
13  Olav Stokke, (ed.), 1989, Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid 
Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, Uppsala: Scandinavia Institute of 
African Studies. 
14  Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, 1993, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada 
in a Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 19. See also Cranford Pratt 
(ed.), 1990, Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, and Bernard Wood, 1993, The World’s Stakes in Canada: The Achievement and the 
Potential of a Middle Power, Toronto: Editions du GREF. 
15  Andrew Cooper (ed.), 1997, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
16  Jan Rudengren, 1995, Middle Power Clout: Sweden and The Development Banks, Ottawa: North-South 
Institute; Iver B. Neumann (ed.), 1992, Regional Great Powers in International Politics, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
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small group of states, mainly because such an identity serves their interests in several specific 
ways. It allows them to distance themselves conceptually from the United States or from any 
regional hegemon. It is an identity rich with positive associations, an identity that suggests 
that this group of states has moral authority and prestige because its members are good world 
citizens. Most importantly, perhaps, the concept emphasizes the extent to which middle 
powers are the ones willing to tackle tough, long-term problems like small arms, landmines, 
child soldiers, poverty and environmental change.  
Non-Governmental Organizations 
The history of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that act across borders is a long one. 
In the Middle Ages, the transnational Catholic Church acted to place constraints on the 
conduct of war.17 In the early modern era, transnational coalitions worked to abolish slavery.18 
The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of world environmental activism, as groups in 
Europe, North America and elsewhere cooperated to protect wetlands, study migratory birds, 
and regulate international trade in skins and feathers. The twentieth century witnessed an 
enormous volume of transnational activism, especially after World War II, through campaigns 
focused on promoting world peace, eliminating nuclear weapons, protecting the planet from 
environmental change, advocating human rights, and gaining the women right to vote. More 
recently, campaigns were started to ban antipersonnel landmines and child soldiers, and to 
regulate small arms. 
The study of NGOs was not a prominent feature of the discipline of international relations in 
its early years,19 but it received a considerable boost in 1977 from the publication of Power 
and Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who helped move such research 
from the periphery to the core of the field of international relations. The end of the Cold War 
also created opportunities for scholars to look beyond the state and rethink the character and 
requirements of central themes such as security and development.20 At the same time, the 
Rosenau study cited earlier underscored the various ways in which the knowledge and 
expertise of NGOs had increased. Technological innovations in information, communications, 
and transportation, for example, gave individuals and groups unprecedented access to 
                                               
17  See Richard Matthew, 2002, Dichotomy of Power: State versus Nation in World Politics, Lanham: 
Lexington Press. 
18  Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, Activists Beyond Borders, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
19  See Kalevi Holsti, 1985, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, 
London: Allen & Unwin. 
20  See, for example, Richard Ullman, 1983, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8(1), 129-153; and 
Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 1989, “Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs 68(2), 162-177. 
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knowledge and resources and a once unthinkable capacity to move and communicate 
worldwide at relatively low cost.21  
As a new generation of scholars further developed this research area, different approaches to 
characterizing the phenomenon emerged. For example, Peter Haas explored epistemic 
communities – networks of experts bound by shared norms and methodologies. Thomas 
Rochon examined critical communities, transnational groups who shared critical perspectives 
on global issues.22 Throughout the 1990s, various scholars wrote about world civic activism, 
governance without government, transnational networks, coalitions and movements.23 They 
examined practices of direct confrontation, permanent critique, dissidence, agenda framing 
and setting, education, lobbying and community empowerment. This literature contains many 
subtle differences that serve as the foundation for a set of interesting research questions. More 
importantly, perhaps, is what unifies this broad and often contentious literature: a firm 
commitment to the antirealist claim that actors other than states affect and shape world 
politics in ways that are significant. 
The literature on NGOs and transnational politics is rich with examples of success and 
innovation. It has paid remarkable little attention, however, to the extent to which success has 
involved partnering with states. For reasons noted at the beginning of this chapter, I believe 
that this partnering is often essential, and that, at least in the security realm, it often involves a 
group of middle powers. The success of these partnerships suggests that far more may be 
attempted and achieved in the years ahead. 
Overview of Chapters 
This thesis includes – after this general introduction – an analytical framework, six empirical 
chapters on the small arms issue and conclusions in the final chapter.  
In the ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, I develop a theoretical argument that structures the analysis of 
the empirical chapters. To start with, conventional explanations are given why there has not 
been more ‘success’ in establishing a regulatory framework to tackle the small arms problem 
                                               
21  For a discussion of some of the implications of increased access and mobility, see Richard Matthew and 
George Shambaugh, 1998, “Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National 
Vulnerabilities,” Security Dialogue 29(2), 163-176.  
22  Peter Haas, 1992, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 
International Organization 46(1), 1-35; and Thomas Rochon, 1998, Mobilizing for Peace: The Antinuclear 
Movements in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
23  See, for example, Wapner 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cecelia Lynch, 
1999, Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
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on the one hand, and why there has been at least some ‘success’ at all on the other hand. 
Derived from the conventional wisdom and the alternative explanations a research puzzle will 
be developed to come to grips with the small arms issue. Evidence of importance of the topic 
is presented and the literature review shows the research gap. In a next section the general 
idea of the theoretical concept is developed, followed by the basic analytical framework. In a 
next step, the key concepts of analysis are introduced and the methodology presented. Finally, 
the case selection is elaborated. 
In Chapter 3, I approach the problem of small arms and light weapons from a broader 
perspective. To show the different facets of the small arms issue the multi-dimensionality of 
the problem is illustrated in general terms. This chapters concludes by analyzing small arms 
activities in and outside the UN framework and mapping out the road to the UN Small Arms 
Conference. 
In Chapter 4, I take a closer look at the production side of small arms in a global perspective. 
By introducing the world’s largest small arms producers, I assess the role of the arms industry 
and examine whether it alleviates or aggravates the small arms problems. 
In Chapter 5, I trace the creation of the global network of NGOs that deals with the small 
arms problem. In this chapter I argue that the creation of a small arms action network was 
only possible in a changed international context. In a next step, I show the important role the 
creation of expert knowledge played to gain a critical mass for the network’s advocacy 
activities. Furthermore, I assess the lobbying and networking activities of the NGOs during 
the UN Conference on Small Arms. In the remainder of this chapter, I evaluate a possible 
future role of NGOs in the implementation of the Programme of Action. 
In Chapter 6, I explore in more details the UN Small Arms Conference that took place in July 
2001 in New York. The chapter shows how the three Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) led 
the road to the Conference. The shortcomings and benefits of the preparatory process and the 
negotiation framework are sorted out before the negotiation itself is analyzed that led to a 
consensus document – the Programme of Action. This chapter also provides an in-depth 
analysis of the Programme of Action, looks at how the various contentious issues were 
resolved – or deferred – and evaluates the future road of the follow-up process. 
                                                                                                                                                   
University Press; and Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds.), 1997, Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
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Chapter 7 focuses on the US small arms activities before, during and after the UN Small 
Arms Conference. I start with an assessment of the specific domestic setting of the United 
States and the current state of the US arms industry. In the context of the pre-negotiation 
stage, I review the US small arms policy before the UN Conference. In a next step, I analyze 
the US position during the UN Conference (Level I). The different domestic non-state actors 
(Level II) are introduced in the next two sections. First, a general distinction is made between 
domestic non-state actors favoring regulations and restrictions on the possession and use of 
small arms on the one hand, and domestic non-state actors rejecting any kind of restrictions 
on the other hand. Second, a further distinction is made between ‘real’ domestic non-state 
actors (domestic gun control groups) and US NGOs with an international agenda (human 
rights groups as well as Fund for Peace, BASIC and others).  
In Chapter 8, I analyze Switzerland’s small arms policy and activities. First, I set out the 
specific domestic setting of Switzerland and review the Swiss small arms activities before the 
UN Conference. In a next step, I assess the situation of the Swiss arms industry. The different 
domestic non-state actors (Level II) are introduced in the next two sections. First, the 
influence and organizational structure of the domestic non-state actors that reject any kind of 
restrictions is presented. Second, it will be explained why there is almost no domestic 
movement that actively tries to promote stricter small arms regulation (lack of organizational 
power). In a next step, I analyze the Swiss position during the UN Conference (Level I). The 
Swiss delegation tried to establish informal and formal links with other ‘like-minded’ states to 
overcome the disadvantage of not being member of a major political regional (EU) or 
international (United Nations) organization. Therefore, Switzerland tried to launch a small-
arms marking and tracing initiative together with France, which is both an influential EU 
member and a veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Finally, I assess the Swiss 
small arms policy after the Conference and trace the further development of the Swiss-French 
initiative. 
Finally, in the CONCLUSIONS I re-assess the analytical power of the theoretical framework and 
the empirical results. Furthermore, I develop scenarios for the future role of middle power and 
NGOs, and conclude with some thoughts on directions for further research. 
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2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Domestic politics and international relations are often 
somewhat entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted 
out the puzzling tangle. It is fruitless to debate whether 
domestic politics really determine international relations, 
or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly 
“Both, sometimes” The more interesting questions are 
“When?” and “How?24 
─Robert D. Putnam, 1988. 
 
This chapter develops the theoretical argument for the analysis of the UN small arms 
negotiation process. To start with, I provide conventional explanations why there has not been 
more ‘success’ in establishing a regulatory framework to tackle the small arms problem on the 
one hand, and why there has been at least some ‘success’ at all on the other hand. Derived 
from the conventional wisdom and the alternative explanations I develop the research puzzle 
of this dissertation: Given the contradicting signals and circumstances how can the consensus 
reached at the Conference be explained? What were the relevant actors and how did they 
interact with each other to influence the emerging action framework? In the literature review, 
I elaborate on the relevance of the topic and establish a research gap. In a next section, I 
develop the general idea of the theoretical concept by combining three different branches of 
theoretical literature: Putnam’s two-level game, Olsen’s approach on ‘domestic collective 
action of political groups’ and transnational politics. In the reminder of this chapter I 
introduce the methodology and explain why I have selected the United States and Switzerland 
in the case studies. 
 
 
                                               
24  Robert D. Putnam, 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 43(3), Summer, 427-460, esp. 427. 
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2.1  Conventional explanations 
Conventional explanations for developments in the area of small arms and light weapons 
basically fall into two different theoretical approaches: On the one hand, scholars who respect 
the progress made so far draw primarily on the arguments provided by regime theory. On the 
other hand, Realist scholars are rather pessimistic whether there has actually been any 
remarkable progress. A third way to explain the ongoing interaction between actors favoring 
more regulations on the small arms issues and those who oppose any restriction would be to 
rely on game theory thinking. Finally, it is also possible to apply a global public policy 
approach to the problem.25 Each of these approaches will be assessed in this section, before I 
develop the research puzzle.  
In the perspective of traditional regime theory, regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”26 Even though we can find 
all the defining elements to a certain extent in the global small arms policy, the crucial aspect 
of effectiveness is not really developed at this stage. Other important components of a regime 
as described by Keohane are the establishment of jointly elaborated rules, the production of 
information which strengthens the expectation of behavior and the reduction of transaction 
costs.27 This approach is certainly helpful to describe the current status of the small arms 
regime on different levels, but it hardly provides any evidence how it came about and what 
the influence of the involved actors was. 
Realism is even more pessimistic. Not even the Programme of Action as we have it now, 
would have been possible under traditional Realist assumptions. Since states are generally 
reluctant to engage in permanent international arrangements,28 it would – under the Realist 
paradigm – be even more unlikely that states actually would start to discuss restriction in their 
defense and security policy. Since they do not trust each other their primary goal is to 
                                               
25  In Simmons and de Jonge Oudraat (2001) several global issues – including conventional weapons and 
WMD – are analyzed with a global public policy perspective. See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and PJ 
Simmons (eds.), 2001, Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment. 
See also Wolfgang Reinicke, 1998, Global Public Policy: Governing without Government? Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution. 
26  Stephen D. Krasner, 1984, International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2. 
27  Robert Keohane, 1984, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 85-109. 
28  In a 2001 APSA conference paper, Ken Rutherford analyzes the reluctance of major powers to join the 
Ottowa Landmine Treaty by applying realist theory. Ken Rutherford, 2001, “Collaboration against Major 
States: The Role of Mid-Size States and NGOs in Banning Landmines,” Paper presented at the 2001 APSA 
Annual Conference, San Francisco, 2 September 2001. 
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maximize their security, mainly through self-help measures such as defense. 
Game theoretical approaches seem attractive, but the real-world intricacy in the case of the 
small arms issue is generally too complex. There are too many actors, too many possible 
coalitions. But there are useful aspects of game theory that help to explain one-to-one 
interactions29 where small arms regulations proponents are confronted by pro-gun lobbyists. It 
is also useful if actors can be assembled to larger groups with similar interests. But most of 
the time, the interests even in very small groups are not homogeneous on a particular aspect 
of the small arms problem. There would not be enough ‘levels’ to map out these interactions. 
From a theoretical perspective, the important issue is whether state positions on any aspects of 
small arms and light weapons changed as a result of participation in the multilateral 
negotiating process. Changes, if they pass a certain threshold of significance, would provide 
evidence for a key constructivist claim that state interests evolve throughout negotiation and 
dialogue.30 By contrast, if the outcome of the conference can be explained simply by 
examining the initial position of states, plus their relative power (either as bargaining power 
or within the international system), then rationalist explanations should be privileged. In 
either case, a careful study of documentary record (supplemented by other sources such as 
interviews) is indispensable to resolving the debate between rationalist and constructivist 
claims. A major problem in such a research endeavor is that one often does not have sufficient 
access to the documentary record. Hence the fallback is to post facto impute interests from 
outcomes, a move that privileges rationalist over constructivist explanations, and effectively 
closes off other historical possibilities. 
When one examines some of the major issues that the Programme of Action addressed (or 
failed to address), it becomes clear that certain states or groups of states had relatively fixed 
negotiation positions reflecting their pre-defined interests. In most of the cases, the 
negotiation positions are expressed in the opening statements to the UN Small Arms 
Conference.31 Indeed, some positions did not evolve much throughout the actual negotiation 
process. For example, the US insistence as early as the second PrepCom (January 2001) on 
the exclusion of two crucial issues – civilian possession of military-style small arms as well as 
                                               
29  R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, 1989, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey, New 
York: Dover Publications Inc., esp. 56-154. 
30  For an overview of this debate, see Thomas Risse, 2000, “’Let’s argue!’ Communicative Action in World 
Politics,” International Organization 54(1), Winter, 1-39; Ted Hopf, 1998, “The Promise of Constructivism 
in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23(1), Summer, 171-200. 
31  This phenomenon can be particularly seen in the case of the United States. 
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small arms transfers to non-state actors – would seem to confirm the Realist principle that 
strong states do what they wish. With respect to the issue of marking and tracing of small 
arms, states such as China made clear their opposition to any mandate for negotiating an 
international instrument. Members of the Arab League expressed their opposition to increased 
transparency. They also opposed any measures that could infringe upon national sovereignty 
in such areas as the definition of surplus stocks or export criteria that might restrict their 
ability to import weapons. 
But an exclusive focus on the way in which specific issues were resolved – or postponed or 
omitted – during the actual negotiations in the PrepCom sessions and the UN Conference is 
incomplete. The multilateral negotiation process includes not only the actual UN Conference 
and preceding PrepComs, but the entire process of mobilization and policy-formulation within 
and between states. An adequate analytical account must therefore operate on two levels: It 
must not only analyze multilateral interactions to see if state interests (and actions) change, 
but it must also examine the construction and evolvement of interests at the domestic level. In 
that sense, a redefined construction of a two-level game setting is very helpful to explain the 
evolvement of an international action framework. In the case of small arms, a variety of 
regional and national workshops and conferences were convened to influence the formulation 
of state policies on small arms – and to mobilize domestic non-governmental actors and 
interests. Many states were on a relatively steep learning curve, not even having a clearly 
defined policy on small arms before the mid-90s. In that regard, the annex to the Programme 
of Action provides a significant list of more than 50 high-level seminars and conferences in 
the three years preceding the conference. In some cases, these meetings were crucial in 
identifying important issues, shaping state and international organization policies, and 
formulating regional positions in such areas as for example the regulation of arms brokering, 
destruction of surplus stocks, and international assistance. 
Under these conditions, it is difficult to claim that state interests can be deduced from a 
straightforward assessment of a state’s relative position in the respective policy arena. There 
are not even clear criteria by which such a position could be determined: Should it focus on 
the most negatively affected states (i.e. expect active engagement from those states affected 
by illicit arms trafficking or by high levels of firearms violence), or on the economic and geo-
strategic benefits of arms exports and imports (i.e. assume that major exporters and importers 
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would oppose restraints)?32 
2.2  The Research Puzzle 
The research puzzle prepares the way for the analytical framework to be developed later in 
this chapter. The phenomenon (outcome of the negotiations during the UN Small Arms 
Conference) analyzed in this dissertation is puzzling for two reasons: One would actually 
expect higher regulation given the sensitive issue of civilian casualties, child soldier, human 
rights abuses that could mobilize a lot of people. As a matter of fact, there has been an 
emerging NGO coalition and a group of like-minded states. Furthermore, there have been 
clear signs of cooperation between NGOs and committed middle powers. These are clearly 
benevolent conditions for an effective outcome of the UN Small Arms Conference. It even 
seems that similar starting points were present as in the successful negotiation of a mine ban 
treaty.33 However, this line of argument does not discount for two key groups in the analysis: 
The role of the small arms (defense) industry and the gun lobby/legitimate users. Researchers 
so far have mainly focused on the ‘good’ NGOs and assume that this is sufficient to explain 
the outcome – or are at least astonished why the small arms campaign is not more successful. 
But differently to, for example, the landmine case, there are strong interest groups that have a 
big stake either in the business of small arms or see the possession of small arms as a 
fundamental right. 
On the other hand, one could expect lower regulation (no regulation at all or small arms 
policy even as a ‘non-issue’) since the small arms issue is not very attractive for negotiations. 
A major reason would be that the topic is too complicated which means that there is hardly 
any prospect for compromise. Its multi-faceted characteristics make it very difficult to 
assemble all the relevant actors around the negotiation table. In addition, political actors 
mostly see negotiations in the security and defense area as lose-lose situation, dominated by 
the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma. An arms race would be the logic outcome, where there is 
hardly any room for compromise. Pragmatists would argue that the small arms issue has just 
appeared on the international agenda and that it takes more time until a higher level of 
cooperation and regulation can be achieved. Others still say, as long as major countries 
oppose a negotiated solution there will not be an agreement. 
All these – sometimes ad-hoc – arguments seem to be partially true, and yet there was a 
                                               
32  Chapter 3.2 shows how this process of interest formation has worked. 
33  Ken Rutherford. 1999, “The Hague and Ottawa Conventions: A Model for Future Weapon Ban Regimes?” 
The Nonproliferation Review 6(3), Spring-Summer, 36–50. 
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substantial outcome negotiated in the global framework of the UN Small Arms Conference.  
Given these conflicting and contradicting signals and circumstances why do 
we have this kind of consensus after the end of the Conference? How can 
the outcome (Programme of Action) of the Conference be explained? What 
were the relevant actors and how did they interact with each other to 
influence the emerging action framework? 
2.3 Literature review 
The key question is how and to what extent did pro- and anti-regulation NGOs as well as 
small arms producers affect the process and outcome of the broader development of the small 
arms debate and the UN Small Arms Conference in particular? The answer depends on how 
influence is defined and on what aspect one focuses. NGO (and industry) influence can be 
exercised either directly as an input into a particular outcome (bargaining power), or 
indirectly as the power to frame or structure the debate around a particular issue (agenda-
setting or structural power).34 NGO influence can also be exercised at the grassroots, 
domestic, regional or global level. 
These examples highlight phenomena that have been raised in other studies of NGO influence 
and the uncertainty over how to study transnational NGO activity. Cases from the 
environment, human rights, land mines and other issues show that there is currently no 
consensus on which conceptual framework is most appropriate for studying NGO influence. 
The analytical tools range from transnational social movement theory to epistemic 
communities, principled issue-networks, or interest group analysis.35 The experience of the 
UN Small Arms Conference process does not clarify this choice since virtually all of these 
dimensions were present: NGOs, individually and as network, were active in providing 
research and expert analysis (‘epistemic communities’) that played an important role in the 
                                               
34  Stefano Guzzini, 1993, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” International 
Organization 47(3), Summer, 443-478. 
35  Key works include Richard Price, 1998, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Land Mines,” International Organization 52(3), Summer, 613-644; Ann Florini, ed., 2000, The Third 
Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., 1997, Transnational Social Movements 
and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; Peter Haas, ed., 
1997, Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press. On small arms see Keith Krause, 1999, “Norm-Building in Security Spaces: The Emergence of the 
Light Weapons Problematic,” Paper presented at the ISA annual Conference, Washington, DC, 17-20 
February 1999; Suzette Grillot, 2001, “Small Arms, Big Problems: IANSA and the Making of a 
Transnational Advocacy Network,” Paper presented at the ISA Annual Conference, Chicago, 20-24 
February 2001. 
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framing of the problem. They were linked as part of broader issue-networks such as public 
health and crime prevention or humanitarian advocacy. Additionally, they pursued traditional 
interest-group lobbying strategies where the firearms community was particular strong – 
supported by the small arms industry. 
Aspects of multilateral diplomacy, and the entire domain of ‘global public policy’ 
formulation,36 will likely remain an understudied and under-theorized area of research for two 
main reasons, one practical and one conceptual. The practical reason is quite evident: 
Multilateral policy-making processes are difficult to track. The analysis needs to incorporate 
not only multilateral interaction, but also domestic policies of interest and policy formulation. 
The information needed to draw reasonable conclusions (or even to undertake process tracing) 
is difficult to obtain. The negotiating forums are usually closed to researchers. Key 
participants are not easily available for interviews.37 On the conceptual aspect: Tangible 
outcomes (through national or regional implementation, or the establishment of multilateral 
instruments or mechanisms) that reflect the impact of norm development may only follow 
years or decades after the actual negotiations.  
For scholars of International Relations, the terms ‘NGO’ and ‘transnational’ share the same 
conceptual and analytical problems. Both expressions are very weakly defined which may 
explain the highly diversified ways in which they are used. The ‘NGO’ category is often 
analyzed as a global, homogeneous phenomenon where, in fact, it encompasses different 
categories of very heterogeneous actors.38 Both concepts (NGO/transnational) share the 
particularity of being defined in relation to the nation-state model, either in terms of a 
centralized exercising power or of the national system and its territorial and jurisdictional 
frontiers. 
This may explain why transnational NGOs are generally perceived to constitute the most 
                                               
36  See Wolfgang Reinicke, 1998, Global Public Policy: Governing without Government? Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution. 
37  The problems of limited access to the negotiation forum and interview opportunities with key participants 
were mitigated at the UN Small Arms Conference by the fact that some nations included outside experts in 
their negotiation delegation. Furthermore, I could directly participate at the Conference (without access to 
the closed sessions) where the imbedded experts briefed a group of NGOs and researchers and where I had 
access to some of the national delegates and UN representatives. See also section on methodology in this 
chapter. 
38  A consensual definition is lacking, but it is usually possible to distinguish two basic criteria in the existing 
literature. The term NGO refers to a freely constituted group of persons or private collectivities for non-
profit purposes. According to UN criteria, NGOs operating in at least three countries are considered to be 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The Union of International Associations adds a 
collateral criteria: the membership and financial resources of the organization must also originate from at 
least three countries. 
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serious challenge to the Realist theory of International Relations. If most scholars approach 
transnational advocacy networks in terms of ‘opposition’ and ‘resistance’ to the State,39 some 
even consider the new world designed by these ‘new social actors’ to constitute a valid 
counterweight to a collapsing state system deeply affected and disoriented by the end of 
bipolarity.40 Whereas it attempts to explain the resistance of the State – or its retreat – in 
reality, the literature illustrates the difficulty inherent in the use of such paradigms. 
Additionally, most NGO studies are either not empirically grounded or focus on a very 
limited number of NGOs within a single-issue area.41 A study published by a research team at 
Stanford University and a standard reference on this issue is a good example of this 
temptation to stick to very broad ideas or generalize findings without sufficiently challenging 
their bases.42 The idea that “non-state actors are getting increasing autonomy” is a concrete 
example of the wide-spread ideas that may be found in most studies, although referring to 
patterns that are not always true for most NGOs in the same way. For all these reasons, I 
suggest to contribute to the understanding of the role of NGOs as possible transnational 
forces, not simply in terms of their opposition to the State, but in their different interactions. 
As it is difficult to encompass the plurality of the situations in global analysis,43 I base this 
research on a comparative analysis of two types of domestic and transnational NGOs in the 
field of small arms control. On the one hand, NGOs actively supporting and working for 
stricter regulation and, on the other hand, NGOs opposing – in company with the weapons 
industry – tighter regulation in this area. NGO action can be observed in their interaction with 
states and on the international level.  
Two main reasons explain this choice. Firstly, considering the difficulty in capturing 
                                               
39  See for instance Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, 1992, “The New Social Movement,” J.A. Camilleri and 
J. Falk, The End of Sovereignt? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented World, Edward Elgar 
Publications, 199-235. 
40  See in particular James N. Rosenau, 1990, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and 
Continuity, Princeton: Princeton University Press; James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Cszempiel, 1992, 
Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
41  While I also focus on just one issue area, i.e. the small arms issue, I consider a larger number of NGOs with 
quite different, if not opposing agendas and analyze their role in relation to each other and to the 
negotiating countries. 
42  John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., 1999, Constructing World Culture: International 
Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
43  Some studies have tried to bridge empirical and theoretical analysis, for instance by studying UN world 
conferences, which are considered to provide a microcosm of global state-society relations. See for instance 
Ann-Marie Clark, Elizabeth H. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstettler, 1998, “The Sovereign Limits of 
Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, 
Human Rights, and Women,” World Politics 51, October, 1-35. 
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phenomena beyond the categories of sub-disciplines and spaces (local – national – regional – 
international – transnational and supranational), we need to understand what happens in the 
in-between. One interesting and important consequence of this kind of research is to bridge 
the divide between International Relations and comparative politics. Scholars have often been 
quick to pick up on different events, frequently making generalizations based on a few 
spectacular episodes. This approach is particular prominent in the analysis of the anti-
globalization movement. Various examples given in this study will show that by observing 
activities of different actors, one can at least minimize this effect. Secondly, despite the 
necessity of proposing a diagnosis at the global level, it should not be forgotten that what is 
on the negotiation table has concrete and sometimes contradictory implications in the field. 
Global action can also have unintended consequences on the local level where people are 
affected by small arms proliferation and use. 
In the following sections I will assess the existing literature on NGOs and transnationalism 
that is relevant to this dissertation more thoroughly and highlight key elements of the NGO-
government relationship. 
Transnationalism and Non-governmental Organizations 
According to a common perception, “group and individuals more and more often interact 
directly across frontiers without involving the State”.44 The term ‘transnationalism’ would 
portray this evolution as it is used to characterize regular activity across national borders that 
involves at least one non-state actor.45 In the literature, an additional pattern is often added: 
transnationalism would suppose that various individuals and agencies, operating at different 
levels of authority, are connected to each other by “shared values, a common discourse, and 
dense exchanges of information and services.”46  
According to the criteria proposed by Sidney Tarrow, Greenpeace and Amnesty International 
are among the rare real transnational organizations in the sense that their members are “both 
rooted in domestic social networks and connected to one another more than episodically 
through common ways of seeing the world, or through informal or organizational ties.” But 
                                               
44  See for example UN Secretary-General’s Millenium Report, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United 
Nations in the 21st Century,” Executive Summary, 1. The same idea is at the basis of the declaration of the 
“We the Peoples Millenium Forum Declaration and Agenda for Action” issued on 26 May 2000 after 
around 1,350 individuals from NGOs gathered at the UN Headquarters. 
45  See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1995, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction,” in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, ed. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and 
International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3. 
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both organizations are quite far from the usual vision we have of transnational organizations 
as informal and decentralized networks of action. Both are very centralized and even 
hierarchical. Most of the time, the campaigns are decided at the headquarters and the different 
sections mainly apply the instructions. This leaves the local units a very limited space for own 
initiatives. Other cases correspond more to what Tarrow calls “transnational political 
exchange,” that is “temporary forms of cooperation among essentially national actors that 
identify a common interest or set of values in a particular political configuration.”47 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) may be considered as an intermediary 
case as it has been organized across borders. The ICBL was not alone in this campaign. It was 
mainly the umbrella organization covering and sometimes coordinating a lot of other 
organizations, activities and initiatives. Other organizations such as Handicap International, 
the International Movement of the Red Cross and many smaller NGOs (almost one thousand 
at the end) also participated in the campaign. ICBL remained in the core of a smaller network 
based on strong personal linkages. In many mine-affected countries (e.g. Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Angola, etc.) the campaign was mainly based around US citizens who were 
distributing information and lobbying. There was very little local dynamics. Local 
populations mainly participated as victims in the process who were solicited to give their 
testimony at international conferences.48 
A third characteristic of these mobilization activities is to target authorities which are situated 
outside of the domestic arena. In human rights and environment areas, NGO actions are often 
directed against a specific government (or a private company).  
Transnational actions have also been favored by the existence of specific political opportunity 
structures at the international level: the existence of structures and rules which encourage their 
participation in the process. Different international institutions encourage the participation of 
NGOs by giving them opportunities for consultation and subsidies.49 The increasing 
participation in UN thematic conferences has been spectacular. These conferences and other 
forms of international contacts create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. Besides 
                                                                                                                                                  
46  See in particular Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics, London/Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2. 
47  Sidney Tarrow, ed. 1998, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 184-5. 
48  See David C. Atwood, 1999, “Mise en œuvre de la Convention d’Ottawa: Continuité et Changement dans 
le Rôle des ONG,” UNIDIR, ed., Forum du Désarmement: Vers un Monde sans Mines 4, 21-34. 
49  See Roger A. Coate, Chadwick F. Alger, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 1996, “The United Nations and Civil 
Society: Creative Partnership for Sustainable Development,” Alternatives 21(1), January-March, 93-122. 
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sharing information, NGOs can create frames within which they base their campaigns.50  
Thematic UN conferences and rounds of preparatory meetings usually provide mobilization 
opportunities to bring different NGOs together in order to collectively engage in a common 
cause to achieve a common end. They facilitate the constitution of transnational networks and 
the initiation of common international activities. This is particularly clear amongst 
environmentalists and human rights advocates, but can also be found in the small arms 
community. In human rights, the effectiveness of a transnational action may be ensured by a 
clear identification of the objectives.51 A majority of the international campaigns focus on 
very limited objectives such as the release of (political) prisoners. By doing so these NGOs 
create interconnections between universality (human rights) and different evolving local 
contexts (imprisoned political activist).52 Very similar elements of transnational activism can 
be found in the experience of Ken Rutherford53 and David C. Atwood.54 Both are victims of 
landmine explosions. They have worked in order to help the victims to organize themselves 
and be active in their respective countries whereas they had been largely considered as objects 
and not as actors in the international campaign. 
Exploring the NGO-government relationship 
A common view holds that NGOs’ action directly challenges the authority of the state. But 
when analyzing concrete situations, the reality appears to be much more complex. NGOs do 
not challenge the authority of the state in general. State sovereignty is eroded only in clearly 
delimited circumstances. Of course, much pressure may be put on the state, but it is still in 
charge.55 This is due to the fact that governments continue to dominate procedures and the 
                                               
50  Ann-Marie Clark, Elizabeth H. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstettler, 1998, “The Sovereign Limits of 
Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, 
Human Rights, and Women,” World Politics 51, October, 1-35, esp. 9; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 10. 
51  This pre-requisite is underlined by Chadwick F. Alger, 1994, “Varieties of Transnational Cooperation: The 
Pursuit of Profit, Development and Human Rights by TNC, NGO and the UN System,” Paper presented at 
the ISA annual Conference, Washington, DC, 29 March – 1 April 1994, 12-17. 
52  Béatrice Poulingy has analyzed this phenomenon in the context of UN peacekeeping missions, see Béatrice 
Poulingy, 2000, “Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions and the Promotion of the Rule of Law: the 
Intersection of Universal Norms and Local Contexts,“ International Peacekeeping. 
53  Ken Rutherford has been severely injured by a landmine in Somalia in 1993. In the beginning of the 
landmine campaign he had been shown around ‘as a poster child’, when he realized that this was the wrong 
approach to help the landmine victims. As a consequence, he co-founded the Landmine Survivor Network 
to provide guidance for self-help for victims and their relatives. Discussion with Ken Rutherford, Zurich, 
10 January 2003. 
54  See David C. Atwood, 1999, “Mise en oeuvre de la Convention d’Ottawa: Continuité et Changement dans 
le Rôle des ONG,” UNIDIR, ed., Forum du Désarmement: Vers un Monde sans Mines 4, 21-34. 
55  Thomas Bernauer, 2000, Staaten im Weltmarkt, Leske+Budrich. 
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substance of interaction on key sovereignty-related issues,56 such as security and arms control. 
On the other hand, some scholars consider the most significant impact of NGO efforts in the 
environmental field has been to encourage the convergence and strengthening of national 
regulation among states.57 
Looking specifically at the attitude of different NGOs, significant differences appear in their 
views on the issue of sovereignty. For analytical purposes, the North-South cleavage may be 
revealing on this issue. For northern NGOs, the decrease of state sovereignty seems to be 
generally seen as positive for human rights and environmental issues, but not necessarily for 
economics and trade issues. In the South, NGOs are more worried about decrease of 
sovereignty because they expect negative consequences from the fragility of the state.58 Even 
when activists oppose the policies of their own government, they normally share their concern 
about the erosion of state sovereignty. Some scholars have explained this attitude of southern 
NGOs by the fact that they would be state-sponsored whereas the ‘Western world’ would 
have NGOs sponsored by society at large. But this assessment might only be true in very 
general terms. 
We all know the diverse acronyms created around this distinction: GONGOs 
(Governmentally Organized Non-Governmental Organizations), MANGOs (Manipulated 
Non-Governmental Organizations) and even GRINGOs (Governmentally Regulated and 
Initiated Non-Governmental Organizations).59 But such distinctions are not very satisfying. 
Indeed, when looking at specific situations, the explanations of the ambivalent vision of the 
state promoted by the NGOs seem common on the organizations, whatever their geographic 
origin. Two main convergent and combined factors appear in the process: 
Firstly, in many instances, governments continue to be important producers of information 
and providers of (financial) resources. With regard to information, this seems rather surprising 
because it contradicts our common viewpoint that NGOs are the main producers of particular 
information on a subject. In general, we find quite a large variety of information ‘producers’: 
                                               
56  See Ann-Marie Clark, Elizabeth H. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstettler, 1998, “The Sovereign Limits of 
Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, 
Human Rights, and Women,” World Politics 51, October, 1-35, esp. 6; Stephen D. Krasner, 1999, 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
57  See Angela Liberatore, 1991, “Problems of Transnational Policymaking: Environmental Policy in the 
European Community,” European Journal of Political Research 19(2-3), March-April, 281-305. 
58  Yet, the NGOs in the South are not interested in a strong state if this corresponds to a oppressive and 
power-abusing state. 
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On economic and security issues,60 governmental actors play a larger role whereas non-
governmental actors are more important in human rights and environmental issues. 
Secondly, the fact that the funding of NGOs activities comes largely from international 
governmental organizations and governments has important consequences. The sub-
contracting to NGOs is an increasing practice in all sectors of activity, despite differences in 
the magnitude of the phenomenon. This is an increasing issue for NGOs who depend on 
public funding for 80% of their income.61 This process may be related to ongoing logic of 
state ‘privatization’ which does not imply the disappearance of the state, but specific modes 
by which its functions are redeployed. 
2.4 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework of this thesis is rooted in three different areas and thus combines 
three different branches of theoretical literature: Putnam’s two-level game,62 Olsen’s theory of 
collective action,63 and transnational politics. In this sense, this framework fuses ideas and 
methodologies from IR theories, domestic politics and comparative politics. The basic logic 
of the framework is built around the two-level game. The collective action approach is added 
to shed light on the domestic decision-making and policy formulation processes which define 
the win-set – the core concept of the two-level game. To bridge the gap between the domestic 
and international level, a transnational perspective is integrated in the framework. Since the 
dynamics of the domestic decision-making process is underdeveloped in Putnam’s two-level 
game this lack is compensated by the integration of the concepts of collective action and 
organizational power of domestic (interest) groups. 
In the analysis, I focus on international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and 
                                                                                                                                                   
59  See for instance Richard Higgott, Geoffrey Underhill, Andrea Bieler, eds., 2000, Non-State Actors and 
Authority in the Global System, London/New York: Routledge, 2. 
60  However, there is also a huge variety of research institutes and think tanks that provide high quality 
information on economic and security issues. 
61  The privatization of services is particularly important in the humanitarian sector. See for instance Béatrice 
Poulingy, 2000, “Les acteurs non étatiques et la guerre: Réflexion à partir du cas des organisations non 
gouvernemental d’aide humanitarie,” Colloquium on War, CERI, Paris, 29/30 May 2000. <http.//www.ceri-
sciencespo.com/archive/mai00/artbp.htm> (last checked March 2003). 
62  Robert D. Putnam, 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 43(3), Summer, 427-460. See also for further expansions and applications of the 
concept Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., 1993, Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press. 
63  Mancur Olsen, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge 
and London: Harvard University Press. 
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transnational business interest groups as the main agents from the area of non-state actors. It 
is obvious that these transnational networks are influential in today’s complex and 
multifaceted world. But how can their influence be characterized and measured. The basic 
argument related to transnational groups is that they can be very influential. They can set and 
frame agendas and sometimes even participate at the negotiation tables. 
Figure 2.1: Two level game applied to the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference64 
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In this section I review the relevant literature for the analytical framework. As a general 
framework, this thesis is built on the idea of a two-level system. Putnam introduced this term 
in his seminal article published in 1988 where he developed the ‘logic of two-level games.’ 
He, thereby, tore down the analytical wall that kept researchers from domestic politics and 
International Relations apart. He claimed that “it is fruitless to debate whether domestic 
politics really determine international relations, or the reverse.”65 He argued that it is more 
important to ask when and how they determined each other. I will show, however, that 
Putnam has not tore down enough walls to explain the complex actor constellation and issue 
framing within the small arms topic. Therefore, by including transnational actors on the one 
hand, I will enlarge the two-level world to another analytical level. On the other hand, there 
                                               
64  In the figure only the main interactions are marked. It is obvious that there are also connections between 
SALW producers and lobbyists as well as pro-gun interest groups and pro-regulation NGOs on the one 
hand and governments other than the United States and Switzerland on the other hand. But only the 
connections highlighted are of primary interest in this study. 
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will be a closer look at the domestic level to disentangle the decision-making process and 
collective action problems of the actors involved. 
Within the broad literature66 of transnational non-governmental politics, one can distinguish 
two strands of scholarships, differentiated by their analytic orientation and focus. The first 
group, which includes scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink and Richard 
Price, tends to examine the role that normative understandings play in the determination of 
state interests and subsequent state actions. As Martha Finnemore argues, “we cannot 
understand what states want without understanding the international social structure of which 
they are a part.”67 The second group, including scholars such as Paul Wapner, Ronnie 
Lipschutz and Jackie Smith, is more interested in the role and place of non-state actors within 
this social structure. As Lipschutz puts it, “what I analyse here […] is better understood as a 
transnational system of rules, principles, norms, and practices, oriented around a very large 
number of often dissimilar actors”.68 Both groups (but to different degrees) take the existence 
of some form of international (transnational, global) society as an ontological given, and 
hence challenge methodological individualist or rationalist accounts of international politics 
associated with neo-realist and neo-liberal theories. 
Until recently, this scholarship remained outside of the empirical domain of rationalist work: 
it focused on ‘low political’ environmental or human rights issues, with case studies on 
international whaling, human rights in Latin America and Western Europe, protection of the 
ozone layer or the world’s forests, or the creation and activity of international institutions 
such as the ICRC or UNESCO.69 
                                                                                                                                                   
65  Robert D. Putnam, 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 43(3), Summer, 427-460, esp. 427. 
66  See, for example, Ronnie Lipschutz, 2000, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil 
Society,” Millennium 21(3), Winter, 389-420; Ronnie Lipschutz, 1996, Global Civil Society and Global 
Environmental Governance, Albany: State University of New York Press; Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, 
and Ron Pganucco, eds., 1997, Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the 
State, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; Paul Wapner, 1995, “Environmental Activism and World Civic 
Politics,” World Politics 47, April, 311-340; Richard Price, 1998, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational 
Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52(3), Summer, 613-644; Kathryn Sikkink, 
1993, “Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks and Sovereignty in Latin America,” International 
Organization 47(3), Summer, 411-441; Emanuel Alder and Peter Haas, 1992, ‘Conclusion: Epistemic 
Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,’ International 
Organization 46: 1 (Winter), 367-390. 
67  Martha Finnemore, 1996, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2. 
68  Ronnie Lipschutz, 1996, Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1. 
69  In addition to the works cited above, see M. J. Peterson, 1992, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists 
and the International Management of Whaling,” International Organization, 46(1), 147-186; Karen Litfin, 
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Only rarely did these authors tackle ‘high’ security issues.70 But the success of the 
International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL)71 suggests that transnational activism can 
challenge and even change how states determined their interests on issues of direct national 
security concern.72 Whether this was the result of a unique constellation of actors and 
circumstances or whether it reflects a durable change in the politics of security policy is one 
of the questions this dissertation tries to address.  
The aim of this dissertation is to study the emergent transnational coalition to combat the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, its collaboration with a group of like-minded 
middle powers, and the influence of the SALW producers and pro-gun lobbyists in alliance 
mainly with the United States to prevent the introduction of national and international 
restrictions on small arms possession and trade. This research brings another case study from 
the ‘high politics’ realm to bear on the question of how norms emerge in world politics. The 
dissertation focuses on four goals:  
· to highlight how changes in the ‘conceptual horizon’ of international 
security policy have been a necessary condition for the emergence of the 
issue of small arms and light weapons; 
· to chart the development of an international small arms campaign to 
address the issue and to examine the nature of the coalition that has 
emerged; 
· to show how different framings of the small arms issue have produced 
different (and conflicting) policy prescriptions by pro- and anti-regulation 
lobbyists; and 
· to highlight the leadership role of certain states and NGOs, and to examine 
the complex relationship between states and non-state actors, including the 
state strategies of cooptation and selectivity. 
                                                                                                                                                   
1994, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
70  For some exceptions, see Emmanuel Adler, 1992, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic 
Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International 
Organization 46(1), Winter, 101-46; Jackie Smith, "Social Movements and International Negotiations: 
Framing the Nonproliferation Debate," unpublished paper presented at the 1995 ISA conference, Chicago; 
David Atwood, “Mobilizing Around the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament,” in Smith, et al, 
141-158. 
71  This success is reflected in the process leading up to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning the use, stockpiling, 
production and transfer of anti-personnel land mines. See Ken Rutherford, 1999, “The Hague and Ottawa 
Conventions: A Model for Future Weapon Ban Regimes?” The Nonproliferation Review 6(3), Spring-
Summer 1999, 36-50.  
72  Of course, this was arguably the goal of anti-nuclear movements throughout the Cold War, but evidence of 
direct influence on state policies and interests is notoriously difficult to pin down in this area. A felicitous 
attempt has been made by Jeffrey Knopf in Jeffrey Knopf, 1998, Domestic Society and International 
Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Analytical Framework 
 29 
In the empirical parts it will be shown how coalition-building among and between states and 
NGOs challenges a simple picture of the relationship between states and non-state actors. 
2.5 Methodology 
This study presents the results of research based on data and experience which have been 
accumulated over the last five years regarding the action of NGOs, private companies and 
nations on small arms control on a global level. The data includes first and second-hand 
information gathered in various situations: investigations in different countries, situations in 
which I participated as an active observer, interviews with individuals who played specific 
roles in the process (especially during the PrepComs II and III as well as the UN Small Arms 
Conference itself), information provided by colleagues who have themselves investigated 
specific aspects of the issue, etc. I have tried to take into consideration the diversity of the 
data when analyzing them. 
In order to explain the formation of an international regime73 concerning small arms control, 
we must understand why key member states joined the regime. And in order to understand the 
actions of key member states, we must understand the domestic foreign policy process which 
led to these actions. In the 1970s and 1980s, academics focused on the role of domestic 
political institutions, especially bureaucracies, legislatures, and elections, in producing foreign 
policy.74 In the 1980s and 1990s, the study of foreign policy broadened to include the role of 
domestic preferences and interests, especially norms, public opinion, and interest groups.75 
However, the influence of information flows on domestic foreign policy-making has been 
largely ignored.76 NGOs, as carriers of information across state boundaries, have received 
                                               
73  International regimes are typically defined as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner: 1984, 1) therefore states cannot 
really join a regime per se, but behave in accordance. However, states can select to join the international 
institutions which are the formal manifestations or representatives of many international regimes.  
74  For example, see Graham Allison, 1971, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
HarperCollins Publishers; Peter J. Katzenstein, 1978, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States, University of Wisconsin Press; and Stephen Krasner, 1978, 
Defending the National Interest, Princeton University Press. 
75  On the role of preferences, see Jack Snyder, 1991, Myths of Empire, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 
Martha Finnemore, 1996, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. On 
the role of interest groups see Ronald Rogowski, 1989, Commerce and Coalitions, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Peter Gourevitch, 1986, Politics in Hard Times, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and 
Helen Milner, 1988, Resisting Protectionism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. On public opinion see 
Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1991, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies” World Politics 43(4), July, 479-512. 
76 Exceptions to this are, among others, Helen Milner, 1997, Interests, Institutions and Information, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Andrew Moravcsik, 1994, “Why the European Community 
Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation.” Center for European Studies 
Working Paper No. 52. Cambridge: Harvard University. 
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correspondingly little attention. This thesis attempts to incorporate information transmission 
by NGOs into an analysis of foreign policy-making and a model of international regime 
formation. 
A traditional political science study would not necessarily analyze the primary source 
material, but rather the contributions of the existing literature. With a few exceptions, 
however, this kind of literature does not yet exist in the area of small arms. Most of the 
existing literature is either descriptive or normative. Nevertheless, it is of some interest due to 
its informative content, but it mostly does not provide any conceptual explanation. For such a 
literature to develop it will require drawing upon research that is more fully developed in 
other issue areas (e.g. global environment and human rights policy), and making use of the 
available primary materials on small arms to advance a coherent research agenda. 
The focus on the Programme of Action as the centerpiece of multilateral small arms efforts is 
justified by the central role it plays in the creation and dissemination of new norms. My aim, 
however, is not to dissect the Programme of Action, but to show how such documents must be 
set in a rich empirical context. 
All the written material presented in this chapter is based on information obtained from open 
public sources, including official information, annual and specialized defense publications, 
corporate and non-governmental information services, company promotional information, and 
primary field research in selected countries (Switzerland, United States, Belgium). However, 
in most of the cases it is not possible to show direct links and lobby activities of the pro-gun 
groups and the industry. This is for a simple reason. They are very reluctant to talk about 
these issues. But there are clear signs of influence when the US delegates directly or indirectly 
refer to the NRA and/or their arguments. 
Most of the interviewed persons have requested not to be mentioned by name in this 
publication. In order to get this information which is so far not publicly available I have 
agreed not to disclose their name. I have, however, tried to keep as much as transparency as 
possible by mentioning at least date and location of the conducted interviews.  
2.6 Case selection 
Generally, it would be helpful to conduct as many case studies as possible to test the 
explanatory power of the analytical framework. Since this is not possible for practical 
reasons, it is useful to cluster the states in different characterizing groups related to their small 
arms policy and behavior. In principal, we can make the distinction between producing / 
Analytical Framework 
 31 
exporting countries and importing / affected countries. Even though, this distinction seems 
quite attractive and seems to follow the logic of supply and demand, its explanatory power 
does not cover the problems related to the question at hand. I therefore choose to limit the 
focus of the study on Western supply side states. Those countries actually represent those 
actors and phenomenon I am mostly interested in and where I assume the largest explanatory 
power for the outcome of the UN Small Arms Conference. Even with that restriction I would 
have ended up with more than 20 countries. 
I therefore chose to select Switzerland from a group of states which is usually tagged as ‘like-
minded states’ and belongs to the middle powers. These countries were already very active in 
the Ottawa process that led to the Mine Ban Treaty. But in the area of small arms, Switzerland 
is rather a ‘hard case.’ Given its constitutional structure, militia system, widespread civilian 
ownership of firearms, decentralized regulations and cantonal laws, the relatively easy access 
to weapons, and high rate of distribution, production and (re-) export, it is rather unlikely to 
assume (without knowing much else about its real small arms control activities) that 
Switzerland was an active player in the negotiations leading to the Programme of Action. 
A second ‘hard case’ is the United States. As the only remaining superpower it is the most 
important country, not only in the current world politics in general, but also in the area of 
small arms control in particular. It is the largest producer of both civilian and military-style 
small arms, it is one of the largest exporters and the largest importer of small arms. The US 
market for civilian firearms is the largest in the world and it has also a high rate of private 
small arms possession. Last but not least, the domestic gun lobby is famous for its influence 
on domestic gun regulation. It seems to be intriguing to analyze their impact on the 
international level, given a strong counterpart in the form of a transnational network of NGOs 
who want to tackle the international illicit trade of small arms following the highly successful 
example of the campaign that led to a total ban of landmines. 
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3 TARGETING THE PROBLEM 
 
The world is awash with small arms […]. While states 
bear most of the responsibility for controlling these 
weapons, no one can deny the global scope of the human 
tragedy […]. These weapons have […] aggravated 
conflicts, produced massive flows of refugees, undermined 
the rule of law, and spawned a culture of violence and 
impunity.77 
─Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
March 2002. 
 
3.1 Multi-dimensionality of the problem 
Measures to stem small arms proliferation on a global scale depend on a consensus that the 
problem is indeed global, a consensus that did not emerge prior to the UN Small Arms 
Conference in July 2001. While some progress has been made at the regional level, there were 
still key regions that lacked a regional framework to tackle the small arms problems. 
Therefore, global efforts were critical to fill these gaps. It was in this context that the UN 
Small Arms Conference was held. The negotiated Programme of Action is a consensus 
document that reflects worldwide agreement that the problems of small arms are multi-
dimensional and global. Its multi-dimensionality is characterized by the fact that the small 
arms issues cover a variety of other policy fields such as disarmament and international 
security, development, transnational crime, public health, humanitarian and domestic law. 
Therefore, international action concerning SALW has to go far beyond conventional arms 
control measures on the supply side. In that sense, the Programme contains specific measures 
for implementation by national governments, regional and international organizations as well 
                                               
77  Kofi Annan, 2002, Foreword to the Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost, Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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as civil society. In addition, it establishes a minimal follow-up process, ensuring that the issue 
will stay on the international agenda. 
Two of the major characteristics of the global small arms problem are that it needs both a 
multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary approach.78 This characterization is not only typical 
for small arms and light weapons, but also for other ‘new’ topics of the 1990s such as 
environmental problems that are inexorably linked with development, while the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic cannot be tackled without also addressing the question of education. In other words, 
global problems of this type require expertise from a variety of disciplines.  
In the run-up to the UN Conference, it was civil society and the emerging NGO network that 
first emphasized the multi-dimensional nature of the threat arising from the proliferation and 
misuse of small arms and light weapons. From the earliest days of the International Action 
Network on Small Arms (IANSA) in the second half of the 90s, it was clear that the presence 
of too many small arms in the wrong hand was creating problems across many dimensions. 
Following the example of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),79 the 
problem was presented as a humanitarian issue. IANSA cited the some 500,000 deaths 
occurring annually from these weapons as primary evidence. Human rights NGOs stressed 
that the availability of small arms was linked to human rights violations. Development NGOs 
pointed to the impact on development resulting from the violence and instability 
accompanying these weapons. Advocates of the well-being of children noted that in weapons-
abundant societies children not only become physical casualties through death and injury, but 
also suffer psychologically from the weapons abundant environment. In addition, the 
phenomenon of child soldiers was being fuelled by the abundance of lethal, yet user-friendly, 
military weapons. Public health advocates pointed out that small arms-related injuries 
qualified as a pandemic and began to treat the problem accordingly. And those concerned 
with crime, both nationally and transnationally, saw the uncontrolled trade in both legal and 
illicit arms as a major factor in its increase. 
National governments, however, have been slow to accept the multi-dimensional reality of the 
small arms problem. Since the countries took up the issue at the global level within the 
framework of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, it was predictable that the 
                                               
78  Even though necessary, this comprehensive inclusion makes it also more complicated because there is a 
abundance of interest groups involved and there is a lack of prioritization and coordination among them. 
79  The ICBL successfully mobilized a global campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines in 1997. See Ken 
Rutherford, 2000, “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning 
Antipersonnel Landmines,” World Politics 53(1), 74–114. 
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primary focus for states would be on arms control and traditional security – leaving aside the 
various other aspects of the problem. This narrow view was reinforced by the fact that every 
state legitimately produces, stockpiles, exports, and/or imports small arms and light weapons 
for its own defense and international security needs. The result at the 2001 UN Small Arms 
Conference was resistance by the United States and other influential negotiating countries to 
recognizing small arms as anything other than a military or security problem.  
In developing an effective framework to deal with small arms as a multi-dimensional 
problem, two obstacles have to be overcome: First, there are several aspects of the issue that 
have been ignored at the state level, including, most notably, the human rights and 
humanitarian dimensions. A combination of factors has led to the down-playing of the 
humanitarian aspects of the small arms problem. As was demonstrated in both the efforts to 
ban anti-personnel landmines and to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
focusing on the humanitarian aspects of global issue enhances the prospect of a greater 
number of governments signing on.80 And yet, there is still no effective coalition of states, 
international organizations (IOs), and NGOs resembling the NGO-middle power movement 
that led to the ban of landmines in the course of the Ottawa process. 
Despite the work of such IOs as the UNDP,81 most states pay only lip service to the link 
between small arms and development. This is especially true of some developing countries, 
who do not want their development priorities dictated or shaped by policies designed to 
control or manage the small arms problem. States in general remain reluctant to take a multi-
dimensional approach to the small arms issue, with very few governments integrating 
departments and ministries for the various policy areas into the overall national effort to 
address the problem. 
A second challenge is to develop a structure in which these various areas can be combined at 
the international level. While many meetings continue to be held at the regional and global 
levels, participants, especially those representing governments, are mostly specialists in arms 
control and national security. To date, the only global forum dealing with small arms on a 
regular basis is the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, a situation that is not very 
conducive to the development of an effective international action framework for small arms.  
                                               
80  See Don Hubert, 2000, The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, Occasional Paper 
No. 42, Providence, RI: Brown University, Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International Studies. 
81  The UNDP has in fact led the way in making the link quite explicit between small arms and development. 
See also http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/pubs.htm. 
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3.2  Small arms activities outside the UN framework 
Before the UN Small Arms Conference, there have already been a lot of different activities 
initiated. Most of them have a national or regional origin, but some also attempt to have a 
global reach. Regional and international governmental organizations as well as governments 
have launched most of the initiatives. Others have their origins from NGOs and business 
sector.82 In general, the problems of small arms can be approached by legal and political 
measures and/or practical disarmament measures in the field.83 Thereby, the first approach 
rather focuses on the supply side, whereby the second deals more with demand side problems. 
Legal and political measures range on a continuum from the national to the global level and 
from arms register to embargo. Arms registers increase transparency on the flow of weapons. 
Some experts have advocated an extension of the existing UN Register of Conventional 
Weapons to include also SALW,84 while others propose the creation of a separate global 
register (Brown, 1998). Still others think that a regional approach may be more effective since 
it can address more specific problems and is not dependent on the consent of non-regional 
third parties basically unwilling to cooperate.85 Codes of conduct establish export principles 
for certain kinds of weapons.86 Normally, they are only politically binding and include rather 
weak consultation mechanisms. More stringently formulated are export control mechanisms; 
even though in most cases they are not legally binding.87 At the other end of the scale, 
                                               
82  For recent developments and regional initiatives see Sarah Meek, “Combating Arms Trafficking: Progress 
and Prospects,” in Lora Lumpe, ed. Running Guns: the Global Black Market in Small Arms, London: Zed 
Books, 2000, pp. 183-206 and Chapter 7 on “Tackling the Small Arms Problem: Multilateral Measures and 
Initiatives,” in Small Arms Survey, ed. Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp. 251-291. 
83  Practical disarmament was introduced together with the term micro-disarmament in Supplement to an 
Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the UN. UNGA Document A/50/60, 25 January 1995. 
84 Mitsuro Donowaki, “The Expansion of the Scope of Register: Background and Future Prospect,” Chapter V 
in Malcolm Chalmers, Mitsuro Donowaki, Owen Greene, eds. Developing Arms Transparency: The Future 
of the UN Register. University of Bradford, UK, 1997. Edward J. Laurance opposes an extension of the UN 
Register of Conventional Weapons, since much of the small arms flow is illicit and, therefore, needs other 
tracking methods. Edward J. Laurance, “Dealing with the Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons: A 
Progress Report and the Way Forward.” Paper presented to the Conference on Controlling the Global Trade 
in Light Weapons. Washington, DC, December 1997. 
85  Susanne L. Dyer and Natalie Goldring, 1995, “Analysing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons 
Transfers,” Jasjit Singh, ed. Light Weapons and International Security. Indian Pugwash Society and 
BASIC, New Delhi, 128. 
86  Under these principles fall the respect for the international commitment of the provider state, the respect of 
human rights in the recipient state, the internal situation in the recipient state with respect of tensions or 
armed conflicts, preservation of regional peace, security and stability, the national security of the provider 
state, the behavior of the buyer country with respect to the international community and others more. 
87  Joseph Smaldone, “Mali’s proposed Arms Moratorium: A West African Regional Arms Control Initiative.” 
Paper presented at the Workshop on Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons. Cambridge, MA, 
December 1997. 
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embargoes are considered the strictest non-military action against states that violate certain 
principles. They are normally declared after the outbreak of a conflict or serious violation of 
international law. In most cases, they are only used for a limited period of time.88  
Table 3.1: Actual and Potential Initiatives at Different Geographical Levels 
Level of 
initiative 
Measures 
National Regional Global 
Arms Register National licensing and 
domestic registers89 
OAS Convention90 (planned) international 
register of SALW91 
Code of conduct US Code of Conduct92 EU Code of Conduct93 (proposed) Framework 
Convention on International 
Arms Transfers94 
Export control National export 
regulations 
West African Regional 
Arms Control Initiative95 
(expanded and modified) 
Wassenaar Arrangement96 
Embargoes Unilateral Sanctions 
against States in war or 
violation of 
humanitarian law 
EU embargo against 
States in war or violation 
of humanitarian law97 
UN sanctions against States 
in war or violation of 
humanitarian law98 
 
                                               
88  Loretta Bondì, “Arms Embargo.” Paper presented at the Symposium on Targeted Sanctions, 7 December 
1998 (http://www.iansa.org/documents/research/1999/oct_99/bondi_article.pdf). Last checked September 
2002. 
89  To date, 11 countries have adopted laws on brokering, however with various degrees on strictness, 
comprehensiveness, and specificity. See Loretta Bondì. Expanding the Net: A Model Convention on Arms 
Brokering. Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2001, p. 6; Loretta Bondì and Elise Keppler. Casting the Net? 
Implication of the US Law on Arms Brokering. Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2001, p. 52. 
90  The Inter-American Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) in Washington, DC, 13 November 1997. See text on http://www.iansa.org/documents 
/regional/reg5.htm. Last checked September 2002. 
91 See model register as proposed in Angus Brown. An International Register of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons: Issues and Model. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada. Ottawa, 
October 1998. 
92  See for information on International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act of 1999 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/code/intlcodetext.html. Last checked September 2002. 
93  The EU Code of conduct was adopted by the European Parliament on 14 May 1998. See text on 
http://www.iansa.org/documents/regional/reg2.htm. Its scope was expanded with the adoption of EU 
Council Joint Action (2002/589/CFSP) on 12 July 2002. See text on http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_191/l_19120020719en00010004.pdf. Last checked September 2002. 
94  On the background of the Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers see 
http://www.arias.or.cr/fundarias/cpr/code.htm. Last checked September 2002. 
95  On the background of the Moratorium on Light Weapons in West Africa see 
http://www.nisat.org/west%20africa/african.htm. Last checked September 2002. 
96  See Wade Boese, “Wassenaar Members Remain Divided on Arrangement's Scope,” Arms Control Today, 
(December 1999). Online version available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_12/wade99.asp. Last 
checked September 2002. 
97  As an example see the Common Position of 26 February 1996 defined by the EU Council of ministers on 
the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning arms exports to the former Yugoslavia 
(96/184/CFSP). See last amendment to this Common Position on 8 October 2001. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_268/l_26820011009en00490049.pdf) Last checked September 2002. 
98  As an example see the Security Council resolution of March 31, 1998 on the imposition of an arms 
embargo against Yugoslavia (S/RES/1160(1998)) (http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm). Last 
checked September 2002. 
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Micro-disarmament projects in post-conflict societies as the most prominent form of practical 
disarmament measures for small arms are often performed during – or shortly after – UN 
peace-keeping missions. There are different forms of gun-exchange programs conducted by 
NGOs and often funded by national governments.99 By providing incentives the willingness 
can be increased to turn in the weapons of soldiers and other armed individuals. Incentives 
can include cash, goods, services, education, work, land or housing facilities.100 
The interplay between regional and international processes was an important part of the 
politics surrounding efforts to develop concerted international action on small arms 
proliferation issues.101 Regional organizations provided an important focus for wider agenda 
setting and coalition building, while the planned Conference process helped to stimulate 
action at the regional and national levels.102 It is also important to recognize the important 
interactions between the Conference process and other international negotiations, particularly 
those resulting in the legally binding UN Firearms Protocol.103 In the following paragraph I 
will assess regional small arms initiatives, mainly focusing on the OSCE and EU activities. 
The OSCE 2000 Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
After two years of relative neglect of the small arms topic, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed at its November 1999 Istanbul summit to mandate the 
OSCE Forum on Security Co-operation to initiate discussions on the problem of small arms 
proliferation. The OSCE provided a framework within which Canada, Norway, Switzerland, 
the United States, and the EU member states could co-ordinate positions and aim to persuade 
                                               
99  The CIA also used financial incentives to take Stingers off the black markets they had originally distributed 
to the Mujahedin in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet invasion in the 1980s. Even though, these buy-back 
programs can be regarded as positive incentive to solicit reluctant parties to cooperate they pose moral 
hazard and legal problems. On moral hazard in arms control and on incentives in nuclear disarmament in 
general see Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds. The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999, esp. pp. 29-30. On CIA buy back see Michael Renner. 
Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge to Disarmament (Worldwatch Paper 137). Washington, DC: 
Worldwatch Institute, 1997, p. 39. On practical disarmament see Sverre Lodgaard, ed. Practical 
Disarmament. Conference Proceedings. Oslo: NUPI, 2001. 
100  See different forms of these programs in Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for 
Collection and Destruction. Bonn International Center for Conversion and Program on Security and 
Development (SAND, Monterey Institute of International Studies), February 2000, pp. 7-9. 
101  See Owen Greene, 2001, The 2001 Conference and Other Initiatives, Background Paper, Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey. 
102 See the events listed in the Annex to the final report of the UN Small Arms Conference (UNGA, 2001, 
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its 
Aspects. July. A/CONF.192/15. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/files/aconf192_15.pdf>.  
103  See United Nations General Assembly, 2001, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking 
in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Crime (‘Firearms Protocol’). Reproduced in UN document A/RES/55/255 of 23 
March 2001. 
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other OSCE member states – particularly Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the former 
communist block – to agree on substantial measures to deal with the small arms issue. Within 
a year, a document could successfully be negotiated. On 24 November 2000, the OSCE 
adopted the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.104 This comprehensive, 
politically binding document contains many measures that are directly applicable to both the 
national and regional level, with the added relevance of having been approved by 55 
countries. 
The OSCE Document contains such supply-side obligations as export controls. It also calls on 
states to exchange information on national small arms policy. As a result, the OSCE 
conducted a first information exchange on small arms in 2001. An assessment was 
commissioned for the first exchange, and a workshop held to discuss the results on 4-5 
February 2002. This led to the development of a reporting template for the second 
information exchange on small arms, conducted in June 2002. The 2002 exchange included 
information on imports and exports, destruction, surpluses, and seizures of SALW, as well as 
stockpile management and security procedures. Some OSCE members viewed the agreement 
as a source of measures to be adopted at the global level. Other states, particularly the United 
States and Russia, used the document as evidence that the basic work to solve the small arms 
problems should be conducted primarily at the regional level. 
The EU Plan of Action 
Cooperation among EU members to combat small arms proliferation is relatively recent.105 
However, since mid-1997, the EU has shown an increasing willingness to tackle the causes 
and effects of this problem. Several agreements have been concluded, focusing on the control 
of legal transfers, tackling illicit trafficking, and reducing levels of small arms in affected 
regions. The EU is thus well-placed to make a contribution to international efforts to control 
the spread and misuse of small arms. The first substantive EU initiative to control small arms 
was agreed by its member states in June 1997 in the form of the European Union Programme 
for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (EU Council 1997). 
This program translates the member states’ desire to “take concrete measures to curb the illicit 
                                               
104  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Forum for Security Co-operation. 2000. 
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (‘OSCE Document’). FSC.DOC/1/00 of 24 
November. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/fsc/2000/decisions/fscew231.html. 
105  Note that article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ex article 223 of the Treaty of 
Rome) stipulates that matters relating to arms production and trade remain in the hands of member states. 
As a result, arms related issues must be dealt with the Council of the European Union, the inter-
governmental body of the EU. 
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traffic and use of conventional arms” (Preamble, para. 5), mandating action in three main 
areas: 
1. strengthening collective efforts to prevent and combat the illicit trafficking (para. 1); 
2. assisting affected countries by building the capacity local authorities and by promoting 
cooperation (para. 2); and 
3. seeking to reduce the number of arms through weapons collection and destruction 
programs (para. 3). 
In June 1998, the Council of the EU agreed on a European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
(EU Council, Code of Conduct, 1998), marking a new phase on arms issues among EU 
members. Introduced as an initiative by the UK Presidency of the EU, the Code involved 
significant political movements on the part of EU governments and a recognition of the need 
for “high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management 
of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all Member States” (Preamble). The Code 
of Conduct governs transfers of all types of conventional arms – including small arms and 
light weapons – as well as the export of dual-use equipment destined for the armed forces or 
other security forces of the recipient state. The development of a Common Control List was 
identified as a priority when the Code was agreed in June 1998, though it was finalized only 
at the end of the Portuguese EU Presidency – two years later. 
Motivated by the German government’s desire for a comprehensive EU mechanism that 
addressed both control and reduction aspects of small arms proliferation, the EU Council 
agreed on a Joint Action on small arms in December 1998 (EU Council, Joint Action, 1998). 
Its stated objectives are: 
· to combat the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms; 
· to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons; and 
· to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations (article 1). 
An Annex to the Joint Action lists the equipment it covers, including a range of small arms 
and light weapons extending from machine guns to anti-aircraft missiles, but not ammunition. 
The Joint Action is premised upon the need for a partnership approach between the EU and 
affected countries – mainly in the global south – in order to effectively tackle the problem of 
small arms proliferation. While the Joint Action has received considerable support, including 
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from the EU Associate countries and the member of ECOWAS106, implementation thus far 
has focused on just a few countries, including Albania and Cambodia. The partnership 
orientation of the EU Joint Action represents a potentially productive means of tackling 
accumulations of small arms in affected regions. 
In May 1999, the Development Council of the EU Council of Ministers agreed on a small 
arms resolution that builds upon the commitments already made by EU members (EU 
Council, Emergency Aid, 1999). It asserts that 
An integrated and comprehensive approach is required by the international 
community which adequately addresses the complexity of the small arms 
problem and its political, economic and social causes and takes account of 
the aspect of security as a prerequisite for development. 
Measures deserving particular attention include encouraging countries to eliminate surplus 
weapons, combating illicit trafficking, ensuring effective demobilization, and challenging 
cultures of violence. Given the progress already made there on frameworks for combating 
small arms proliferation the Resolution also points to the SADC107 and ECOWAS sub-regions 
as especially worthy of EU attention. It also stresses the importance of continued consultation 
and cooperation with relevant agencies at global, regional, and national levels, as well as 
adequate coordination within the EU itself.  
In December 2000, the EU adopted a Plan of Action which was designed to be easily 
transferred to a global level. It contained many elements of the previous EU initiatives. Key 
elements of the EU Plan of Action, that were to surface as the EU position in the global 
negotiation process, included: 
· a strong commitment to international humanitarian law and human rights; 
· linking security and development; 
· restrictive national legislation; 
· support for regional moratoriums; 
· transparency of legal transfers; 
                                               
106  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Togo. For more information see the official website <http://www.sec.ecowas.int/>. 
107  Member states of Southern African Development Community (SADC) are Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For more information see the website of the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs <http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm>. 
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· universal standards for marking of weapons; 
· regional codes of conduct to control arms exports; and  
· capacity-building in support of national and regional actions (EU Council, 
Plan of Action, 2000). 
In the implementation section, the EU Plan of Action called for increased cooperation, 
extensive information exchange, effective tracing of weapons through the negotiation of an 
international convention, linking assistance to a state’s compliance with human rights and 
international humanitarian law norms, and the facilitation of the active involvement of civil 
society. Though they all agreed to the EU Plan of Action, there were important differences of 
opinion between EU members in some areas. While the regional declarations provided useful 
for the global negotiation process, many EU members warned that measures applicable to 
regions might not be suitable at the global level.  
3.3  Looking for the appropriate forum 
After being bypassed by NGOs and a core group of states during the Ottawa process, the 
United Nations wanted to re-assert control of future arms control processes. To better 
coordinate the UN activities, Secretary-General Kofi Annan pooled the UN policies on small 
arms and light weapons under the roof of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs in 
August 1998. The Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) helped to facilitate and 
harmonize different actions under the auspices of the United Nations ranging from different 
departments and branches responsible for political affairs, humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping 
operations, development program, economic and social affairs, crime prevention and criminal 
justice, refugee relief and children in armed conflict.108 
The reaction of the Secretary-General was long overdue since the most influential and 
primarily responsible UN body on disarmament issues, the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva, has never established a negotiating committee, even though conventional weapons 
have been on its agenda for years.  
The United Nations was criticized that it was too slow and would not be able to coordinate the 
different efforts of the UN subgroups and regional organizations.109 There was considerable 
                                               
108  See the report by the Department of Disarmament Affairs on http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/casa.htm. 
109  In a paper presented at a regional conference in November 1998, Paul Lansu discusses the role and 
activities of several regional and international organizations in the context of international regulations. Paul 
Lansu, 1998, “Light Weapons, the Question of International Regulations, and the Role of both Global and 
Regional Institutions,” London, International Action Network on Small Arms, November 1998. 
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displeasure by NGOs and some mid-size states, already active in banning landmines, about 
UN’s inactivity and blockade by the great powers. They wanted immediate action based on 
their analysis that more than 90 percent of casualties110 by small arms have been among 
civilians: 
Land mines are not the only complex, cross-cutting problem to be 
addressed if we are to reduce or prevent conflict. All too often it is 
small arms, rather than the weapons systems targeted by disarmament 
efforts, that cause the greatest bloodshed today. In the hands of 
terrorists, criminals and the irregular militia and armed bands typical 
of internal conflict, these are the true weapons of mass terror.111 
Actual UN action started in December 1995 when the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report with the assistance of governmental 
experts.112 On another UN track, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
requested the Vienna-based Centre for International Crime Prevention in 1995 to carry out a 
study on firearm regulation. Based on the ‘International Study on Firearm Regulation’ the 
General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1998 mandating the UN Commission for 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to work out a ‘Draft Protocol Against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials’.113 
Negotiations on that draft protocol began in Vienna in January 1999, and it makes part of the 
‘Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’. This so-called ‘Vienna process’114 is 
the first global measure regulating international (criminal) transfers of small arms by 
establishing enforcement mechanisms for crime prevention and the prosecution of traffickers. 
This protocol establishes internationally recognized marking, registration and traceability 
standards for firearms.115 Even though, the Vienna process does not directly apply to state-to-
                                                                                                                                                   
<http://www.iansa.org/documents/research/1999/sept_99/lansu_small_arms.pdf> (Last checked March 
2003). 
110  90 percent figure from Clegg. “NGOs Take Aim,” 50. 
111  Speech by Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy, UN General Assembly, September 25, 1997. 
http://www.un.int/canada/html/s-25sepe.htm, last checked December 2004. 
112  UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/70, adopted December 12, 1995, 2-3. 
113  David Biggs. “United Nations Contribution to the Process.” Disarmament Forum II/2000, 32. 
114  Information by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs on the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/ 
CAB/smallarms.bout.htm>. 
115 During its fifty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted the protocol with the Resolution 55/255 (31 
May 2001) and opened it for signature. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_ 
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state arms transactions, it shows close bonds between these issues. Experience in marking, 
registration and traceability of non-state weapons transfer could be useful in controlling the 
spread and misuse of military-style small arms and light weapons. This aspect was also 
highlighted in the ‘Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms’ presented in 
August 1997. The experts recommended studies on establishing a reliable system for marking 
small arms and establishing a database of authorized manufacturers and dealers to restrict 
such activities by unauthorized actors.116 The subsequent ‘Report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms’ emphasized this claim again and encouraged the 
United Nations to take into account the need to control ammunition and explosives in its 
activities relating disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the 
context of UN peace-keeping missions.117 Both reports highlighted the importance of 
convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects.118 
To prepare such a suggested event, three Preparatory Committees for the ‘UN Conference on 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’ were planned. The first 
session took place in New York from February 28 to March 3, 2000. At this first session, the 
governments set the date and venue of the actual UN Small Arms Conference. Other relevant 
matters of the conference such as the specific objective, draft agenda, draft rules of procedure 
and draft final document, were considered on the second session from January 8-19 and third 
session from 19-30 March 2001 (Biggs 2000: 34). 
At the first session, governmental officials submitted discussion papers, built coalitions with 
like-minded states and interacted with NGO delegates. 32 NGOs from 13 different countries 
were present at the first session and actively consulted with member states and the UN 
Secretariat on a number of issues such as the prospect of NGOs circulating and receiving 
documents and addressing the plenary sessions. Full participation of the NGOs would be in 
line with the Secretary-General’s remark that the preparatory process would gain from 
receiving the expertise and know-how of NGO representatives and academic community.119 
                                                                                                                                                   
firearms.html> See also Chris Smith. “The 2001 Conference: Breaking out of the Arms Control 
Framework.” Disarmament Forum II/2000, 41.  
116  Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298, August 27, 1997, 23. 
117  Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/54/258, August 19, 1999, pp. 18-19, 20. 
Another group of experts prepared a report on the ammunition issue for the Secretary-General in the same 
year. Report of the Group of Experts on the Problem of Ammunition and Explosives, A/54/155, June 29, 
1999. 
118  A/52/298, p. 23, A/54/258, 22-24. 
119  A/54/260, August 20, 1999, 3. 
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The UN Small Arms Conference took place after a decade during which a series of global 
problems was addressed by means of well-developed systems for the making of a regulatory 
framework. Was this Conference proof that the problems associated with small arms and light 
weapons were being addressed in a similar fashion? How does it compare to the other 
conferences held by the United Nations during the 1990s on other global issues? Was it a first 
step towards a general regulative framework or merely an opportunity for states to make 
political declarations devoid of real intent to address the problems in operational terms? 
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4 THE PRODUCTION SIDE 
 
[The domestic small arms industry in the United States is] 
like a pyramid in terms of companies, and an upside-down 
pyramid in terms of volume. […] A few giant companies 
make most of the guns [… and an] assortment of many 
other small manufacturers make the rest, some as few as 
one gun a year.120 
─Tom Diaz, 
Making a Killing, 1999. 
 
4.1 Small arms, big business 
The production of small arms is a big, and growing, business – at least in terms of the number 
of countries that produce them. Based on existing information, small arms are produced in 
more than 1,000 companies in at least 98 countries around the world. The number of countries 
would be certainly well above hundred if illicit and clandestine production were included. The 
problems – development, security, health and human rights – associated with the wide-spread 
availability, proliferation, and use of small arms are often linked to the circulation of existing 
stocks or the sale of surplus weapons. These effects cannot certainly be denied, but are only 
part of the whole picture. 
New small arms entering the global weapons market are also contributing to these problems. 
These weapons – more accurate, easier to operate, lighter, and also cheaper – are appearing on 
the international arms market at a significant rate. In addition, production of weapons and 
ammunition continues in a large and growing number of countries and companies. 
The small arms industry is the most widely distributed and fractioned sector of the global 
defense industry. While its absolute size, in terms of output and capacity, has declined in 
recent years, the number of actors, both in terms of companies and countries that manufacture 
                                               
120  Tom Diaz, 1999, Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in America, New York: The New Press, 23. 
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small arms, has increased since the end of the Cold War.121 Furthermore, after downsizing 
and privatizing manufactures run by government in the aftermath of the Cold War and 
emerging globalization and liberalization most production now takes place in private 
companies. These trends reduce the ability of governments to effectively control the 
production, possession, and trade in small arms and light weapons. 
The growing number of small arms product and producers, both legal and illicit, has far-
reaching consequences. First, in terms of straight numbers, the diffusion of small arms makes 
their accessibility, even to civilians, an issue of concern.122 Secondly, this almost uncontrolled 
growth – especially in the area of illicit production – threatens to undermine attempts to 
control their legal manufacture, possession and trade. Some of the countries allegedly active 
in the illicit proliferation of the small arms are also some of the world’s major producers.123 
Thus, it is important for governments to be held accountable for the production of small arms 
that takes place within their territories or conducted by their citizens. This also includes the 
active prosecution of illicit production and trafficking. 
This chapter attempts to provide a survey of the global small arms production. It analyzes the 
world’s small arms industry in terms of its geographic distribution, key trends, and patterns, 
and provides some estimates of the current value and volume of global production. It 
identifies the most important producer countries and offers a tentative ranking of the world’s 
known and assessed legal small arms producers. It provides information on some of the 
world’s most popular and widely-distributed small arms – specifically handguns, assault 
rifles, sub-machine guns, and machine guns – that are in the hands of government security 
and police forces, rebel groups and terrorists, and individuals.124 
The global small arms industry is all but homogeneous. This also explains why it is very 
difficult to find common standards and regulation that go beyond mere intents and promises. 
This is particular true on the global level. There are significant differences between the 
natures of production in different areas of the world. This chapter presents a number of 
regional and national examples, as well as information about particular companies and 
                                               
121  Including the newly independent countries explains part of the increase of countries producing small arms. 
But the number of new producers exceeds the number of the former. 
122  See Wendy Cukier and Antoine Chapdelaine. 2001. “Small Arms: A Major Public Health Hazard.” 
Medicine & Global Survival 7(2), April, 26-32. 
123  See report by Suzette R. Grillot, 2003, Central and Eastern Europe: A Regional Assessment of Small Arms 
Control Initiatives, Security and Peacebuilding Programme, Global Issues Department, International Alert. 
124  This chapter does not examine light weapons products in any detail such as portable anti-aircraft and anti-
tank guns, mounted grenade launchers, or the companies and countries that produce them. 
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products. This helps to illustrate some to the key characteristics of the global small arms 
industry. In particular, the following questions will be addressed: 
· What is the nature and scope of the global small arms industry? 
· Which countries legally produce small arms? 
· What are the world’s most popular legal and illicit small arms products in terms of 
numbers produced and distributed? 
· In which countries does illicit small arms production occur? 
 
4.2 The global production by the small arms industry 
Much has been written about the global defense industry, particular about the major producers 
of conventional weapons.125 However, far less attention has been paid on the global small 
arms sector, which is part of the defense industry in general, but is also distinctive in many 
ways. This is particular true for the production of non-military style firearms. 
Table 4.1: Acquisitions of small arms producers (selected) 
 
Target company Purchaser Date 
Heckler & Koch (Germany) BAE Systems/Royal Ordnance (UK) 1991 
SK Jagd- und Sportmunitions (Germany) Nammo Lapua Oy (Finland) 1992 
Carl Walther (Germany) Umarex Sportwaffen (Germany) 1993 
Suhler Jagd- und Sportwaffen (Germany) Steyr-Mannlicher (Austria) 1994 
Luigi Franchi (Italy) Beretta (Italy) 1995 
Mauser Werke (Germany) Rheinmetall DeTec (Germany) 1996 
Buck Werke (Germany) Rheinmetall DeTec (Germany) 1998 
Sako Ltd (Finland) Beretta (Italy) 1999 
Vursan (51%) (Turkey) Beretta (Italy) 1999 
Eurometaal (66%) (Netherlands) Rheinmetall DeTec (Germany) 1999 
Australia Defence Industries (Australia) Thomson-CSF (France) 1999 
Oerlikon Contraves (Switzerland) Rheinmetall DeTec (Germany) 2000 
SIGARMS Group (Switzerland) German investors group 2000 
Saco Defense (US) General Dynamics (US) 2001 
Santa Barbara (Spain) General Dynamics (US) 2001 
Primex Technologies (US) General Dynamics (US) 2001 
Smith & Wesson (US) Saf-T-Hammer Corp (US) 2001 
SIG Arms Ammo (Switzerland) Rheinmetall DeTec (Germany) 2001 
 
Source: Company reports in SAS 2002: 12 
The apparent increase in the number of companies, and countries, involved in some aspect of 
small arms production does not necessarily indicate an increase in the absolute size, or 
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also William W. Keller, 1995, Arm in Arm: The Political 
Economy of the Global Arms Trade, Basic Books. 
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production capacity, of the global small arms industry. What is clear is that the industry is 
more widely distributed than was previously known. However, the global small arms industry 
is smaller today than it was during the 1980s and 1990s in terms of the volume of production, 
and has also less production capacity. Furthermore, even though more than half of the world’s 
countries are currently engaged in the production of small arms, the international market for 
small arms is still dominated by only 13 countries (SAS, 2001, 15). 
Like the defense industry more generally, the small arms industry has become more 
concentrated in recent years through mergers and acquisitions (see table 4.1) in response to 
factors like cuts in defense spending and the decline in demand as a result of defense 
downsizing, particularly in NATO countries and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
This concentration has taken place mainly at the company level. For example, some of the 
world’s well-known small arms producers have been acquired either by larger companies (e.g. 
Saco Defense acquired by General Dynamics) or by other major small arms producers (e.g. 
Sako Limited acquired by Beretta). The diversity of countries and companies producing small 
arms makes it difficult to generalize about trends in the global small arms industry.  
In attempting to estimate more precisely the global value and volume of small arms 
production, this section makes a distinction between military-style small arms and 
commercial firearms, and associated ammunition. In the last few years more detailed data on 
small arms production, particularly production of commercial firearms, has become available, 
and it is now possible to provide more reliable estimates of the value and volume of global 
production. 
Volume of production 
Military-style small arms: The Small Arms Survey 2001 estimated that more than 815,000 
military-style small arms (pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, and machine guns) were produced 
worldwide during 2000 (SAS, 2001, 12-13). This figure was less than half the annual average 
production of 2.1 million during the period of 1980 to 1999. It appears that the volume of 
global production of military weapons has continued to decline in recent years, and it is 
estimated that approximately 720,000 weapons were produced worldwide during 2001 
(Forecast International, 2002); but these estimates of global production have to be treated with 
great caution.126 The acquisition of small arms for the US armed forces amounted to nearly 
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40,000 in 2000, representing five per cent of the global volume of production. No significant 
increase in domestic production for the US armed forces has been expected for 2001.127  
Commercial firearms: New information suggests that the global volume of production of 
commercial firearms in 2000 was approximately seven million. According to new estimates 
compiled by the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WSFA), 
approximately 6.9 million commercial firearms were produced worldwide during 2000.128 
Nearly three-quarters of the total were produced in the United States (four million) and in the 
European Union (1.1 million). The rest was produced in countries such as Brazil, China, 
Canada, Japan, and Russia (WSFA, 2001). While figures for US production can be confirmed 
by annual production figures form the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), 
there is no way of confirming the figures for other countries. According to the BATF, more 
than one million firearms are imported into the United States every year.129 Furthermore, the 
WSFA figures do not give any indication of long-term trends in the global production of 
commercial firearms. It is worth noting that the ratio of the volume of global production of 
commercial firearms to military-style small arms is approximately 9:1. In the United States 
the ratio is even 100:1. 
Ammunition: The Small Arms Survey 2001 estimated that at least 15 billion units of military-
caliber small arms ammunition, of all types and calibers, were produced worldwide during 
2000 (SAS, 2001, 14). This figure was significantly lower than the average annual production 
of 21 billion unites during the period of 1980 to 1999. The volume of global small arms 
ammunition production has remained relatively constant in recent years, and it is estimated 
that approximately 16 billion units were produced during 2001 (Forecast International, 2002). 
These estimates of global production likewise have to be treated with great caution.130 The 
acquisition of small arms ammunition for the US armed forces amounted to approximately 
one billion units in 2000, representing six per cent of the volume of the global production. No 
significant increase in domestic production for the US armed forces is expected during 2001. 
But these might be significantly higher in 2002 and 2003 in the follow-up of the ‘war on 
                                               
127  Information from Forecast International (2002) suggests that the US army procured 29,000 small arms in 
2000, and was likely to procure 25,000 in 2001. No figures are available for Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps procurement. 
128  WFSA, 2001, The Facts, Rome: WFSA. These figures are difficult to verify, although the figures for the 
US production can be confirmed by annual production figures from the BATF. 
129  BATF, 1999, Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export Report, Washington, DC: Department of the 
Treasury. 
130  Many of the countries and companies identified by other sources as current producers of military-caliber 
small arms ammunition are not included in the Forecast International estimates. 
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terrorism,’ especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. No information on the volume of production of 
ammunition for commercial firearms is available. These estimates for the volume of global 
arms production in 2000 are still preliminary, and are not directly comparable with other 
figures. Based on the information above, it seems that the volume of global small arms 
production, particularly military-style weapons, is declining, largely because of lower 
demand. The trends in the volume of global production of commercial firearms are, however, 
more difficult to determine. The volume of the production of ammunition, particularly 
military-caliber ammunition, seems to be relatively constant. Overall these trends in the 
volume of production seem to suggest that the current production capacity of the global small 
arms industry is smaller than during the Cold War era. 
Value of production 
Military-style small arms: If we assume that at least 815,000 military-style small arms were 
produced on a global scale during 2000, and using the average price of 410 US$ paid for an 
M16 rifle by the US armed forces during 2000 as a rough proxy, the value of global 
production of military-style small arms in 2000 can be estimated at US$ 335 million.131 
Commercial firearms: The total value of production of commercial firearms in the United 
States in 1997 was US$ 1.2 billion, and the total number of firearms produced in that year 
was 3.5 million.132 This means that the average price of each firearm was US$ 335. Using this 
figure, adjusted to 2000 prices (US$ 358) as a rough proxy, the value of global firearms 
production in 2000, based on the estimate of worldwide production of seven million 
commercial firearms, can be estimated to be at least US$ 2.5 billion. 
Ammunition: Information on the value of global small arms ammunition production is even 
more difficult to obtain. It is estimated that 1.06 billion units of military-caliber small arms 
ammunition, of all types, were produced by the US armed forces during 2000. The total value 
of the US armed forces’ contracts for small arms ammunition during the same year was US$ 
215 million (Forecast International, 2002). This means that the average price for each unit of 
ammunition produced in the United States in 2000 was 20 US cents. Given that at least 15 
billion units of military-style small arms ammunition were produced in 2000, and using the 
figure of 20 cents as a rough proxy, the value of global production of military-caliber 
ammunition in 2000 can be estimated to be at least US$ 3 billion. There are no reliable 
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estimates for the volume of production of ammunition for commercial firearms, which makes 
it difficult to estimate the value of production. In 1997 domestic production of commercial 
firearms ammunition in the United States were valued at US$ 859 million.133 Adjusted to 
2000 prices this is equivalent to US$ 917 million. Given that the United States accounts for at 
least 58 per cent of the global production of commercial firearms (WFSA, 2001), it can be 
assumed that the value of US ammunition production for commercial firearms vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world is of a similar magnitude. Therefore, it can be assumed that the value of 
global production of commercial firearms ammunition in 2000 was approximately US$ 1.6 
billion.134 
 
4.3 The world’s largest small arms producers 
There are at least three countries – the United States, Russia, and China – that can be 
identified as major producers. Some other 23 countries, mainly in Europe, can be classified as 
medium producers. The only medium small arms producing countries outside Europe are 
Brazil and Israel.135 Despite the fact that more than half of the world’s countries produce, or 
have the capacity to produce, small arms, and the emergence of ‘new’ producers such as 
India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and Taiwan, the global small arms market is still 
dominated by 13 countries (in alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Of these, all expect Austria and Switzerland are also the world’s most important 
producers of conventional weapons.136 This section provides detailed information on the most 
important small arms companies in the eleven countries that dominate the global small arms 
market.137 
                                               
133  US Census Bureau, 1997b, Small Arms Ammunition Manufacturing – 1997 Economic Census, Washington 
DC: Department of Commerce. 
134  The average price for a unit of commercial ammunition is lower than for military-caliber ammunition. The 
average price is likely to be 10-12 US cents a round (see <http://www.shooters.com/ammo.html>), 
compared with 20 US cents for military-caliber ammunition. 
135  Some countries in East and Central Europe, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania 
are significant exporters of small arms (often surplus or used arms). However, most of these countries are 
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Programme, Global Issues Department, International Alert.. 
136  Richard Grimmett, 2001, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1993-2000, CRS Report for 
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Major producers 
China: Even though there is almost no official or company information about the size and 
scope of domestic small arms production, China is widely regarded as one of the world’s 
major small arms producers and exporters.138 Recent estimates suggest that China was the 
fifth largest supplier of conventional arms to developing countries during the period from 
1993 to 2000, with sales of US$ 7.2 billion: an average of US$ 970 million a year.139 Between 
1987 and 1994, China was a major supplier of rifles to the US market, accounting for more 
than 40% of total US rifle imports, including military-style small arms.140 China is also a 
major supplier of small arms to Africa, and was the largest supplier, by volume, of civilian 
firearms to the South African domestic market between 1997 and 1999.141 
Defense production, including small arms production, in China is entirely controlled by the 
government. Production occurs either in large state-owned defense-industrial companies or 
factories owned and controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).142 The state-owned 
defense industry is guided by the civilian State Council and supervised by the Commission of 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND). COSTIND is also the 
clearing house for arms production and coordinates military needs directly with the PLA’s 
General Armament Department. China’s defense industry comprises large state-owned 
industrial corporations who also produce civilian consumer goods. They are civilian-run and 
profit seeking and have increasingly sought to diversify their activities beyond their core 
military business.143 
The major Chinese small arms producing company is the state-owned China North Industries 
Group Corporation (also known as Norinco). Norinco was established in 1980 as the official 
                                               
138  Information on China from Jörn Brömmelhörster, 2001, “China’s Small Arms Producers,” Background 
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arms trading company under the Fifth Ministry of Machine Building.144 In 1980, the company 
was transferred to the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics, incorporating 160 enterprises 
and more than 700,000 employees. Between 1980 and 1990 Norinco earned a total of US$ 12 
billion from arms sales, peaking at US$ 2.5 billion in 1986 and 1987. In the 1990s, its 
combined sales of military and civilian products averaged about US$ 2 billion annually. 
However, weapons account for only 20-30 per cent of overall production.145 Under a re-
organization of state-owned companies in July 1999, Norinco was divided into China South 
Industries Group Corporation (CSG) and China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGN). 
CSG has 260,000 employees in 64 companies and refocuses its activities almost entirely on 
civil production. CNGN will be the new weapons producer. It will produce most of China’s 
small arms, apart from some small-size PLA factories. Despite restructuring, CNGN is still 
large and difficult to manage. It consists of 131 companies, including 83 industrial 
enterprises, and 456,000 employees (Brömmelhörster 2001). It accounts for nearly all state-
controlled small arms production (besides ammunition and spare parts). State secrecy makes 
it impossible to provide exact figures for its small arms production. The bigger factories, 
however, are in Xian, Beijing, Wuhan, Dalian, Shijiazhuang, and Sehnyang. Small arms 
production accounts for probably less than five per cent of CNGN’s overall turnover, which 
includes the production of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery guns, missiles, bombs, and 
explosives.146 Prior to restructuring in 1999, most of the enterprises within Norinco made 
losses. Hence, Norinco has tried to get rid of unprofitable activities in recent years 
(Frankenstein 1999). 
Russia: The Russian Federation is one of the world’s major defense producers, and it is 
consistently ranked as one of the most important arms exporters in the world. In the period 
1993-2000, the country had official sales of US$ 30.5 billion – an average of US$ 3.8 billion 
a year – in conventional arms to developing countries, second only to the United States 
(Grimmett 2001). According to unofficial figures, total revenues from arms exports amounted 
to US$ 3.5 billion in 2000 (Moscow Profile, 7 May 2001). The Russian defense industry, 
including the small arms sector, has been drastically downsized and restructured since the end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, in recent years the 
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output of the Russian arms industry has been rising again. In addition, exports of military 
products now account for 34% of the total output of the Russian arms industry.147  
Russia’s military-industrial complex comprises about 1,700 enterprises. 30% are state 
enterprises (GUPs), another 30% joint-stock companies (JSCs) with state participation, and 
the rest (40%) is privately owned (Moscow Profil, 7 May 2001). According to the Centre for 
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST)148 a number of trends have become evident 
in recent years. The main centers for the production of both military-style and civilian small 
arms in Russia are Izhevsk (Udmurtia), Tula (Central Russia), and Kovrov (Vladimir region). 
More than 85% of all domestically produced small arms are manufactured in Izhevsk. JSC 
Izhmash is regarded as the leading domestic producer and exporter of small arms. There are 
currently more people employed with JSC Izhmash (25,400) than in the entire firearms 
industry in the United States. The production facilities in Tula, apart from the Instrument 
Design Bureau, have lagged behind the facilities in Izhevsk, in terms of both design and 
manufacture for domestic and export markets. As in the past, some firms (e.g. TsKIB SOO) 
still concentrate on design, while others focus on production (e.g. Izhmash). 
The Russian small arms industry is currently experiencing a process of product 
diversification. The Kalashnikov era is likely to end in the next few years, leading to a 
transition from the key types of small arms produced during the Soviet era. Currently, even 
the latest models of the Kalashnikov assault rifle are merely upgraded version of the basic 
AK-47, usually with a different caliber or higher fire rates (e.g. Izhmash Nikonov assault rifle 
AN-94). However, many companies are developing numerous new weapons, particularly for 
special and law-enforcement units. In addition, the Russian Defense Ministry has invited 
tenders for new small arms for the Russian armed forces. The final choice will be made in late 
2003 and supplies of new types of small arms to Russia’s armed forces will begin 
simultaneously. 
Since the end of centralized Soviet government orders for weapons, plants often develop and 
produce firearms in small batches to meet orders from security forces and paramilitary 
divisions of the Ministry of Interior. Such a flexible approach gives plants at least some 
chance to win orders for military-purpose goods, but it leads to de-standardization in small 
arms. Besides, the commercial availability and usefulness of producing so many varieties of 
                                               
147  Julian Cooper, 2001, “Russian Military Expenditure and Arms Production,” in SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 
2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 313-322, 
especially 317-9. 
The Production Side 
 57 
firearms with similar technical specifications is not always evident. A final trend is the 
production of hunting and sporting rifles as a way of raising total production volumes. Most 
of these civilian weapons have been derived from military-style small arms. 
Medium Producers 
Austria: Austria has a relatively small domestic defense industry. Local defense companies, 
unlike in neighboring Switzerland, have been largely excluded from the European-wide 
defense industry consolidation of recent years. The total turnover of the Austrian defense 
industry in 2000 was 174 million (US$ 164 million).149 However, the country is a major 
producer of small arms for both military and civilian markets. A number of local companies 
are involved in some aspect of small arms production.150 Two companies – Glock and Stey-
Mannlicher – are the most important domestic producers, for both military and civilian 
markets. They are also major exporters. Other local companies include Hirtenberger 
(ammunition), Dynamit Nobel Graz (ammunition), Andres & Dwonsky Karlstein (sporting 
pistols), and Voere Kufsteiner Gerätebau (hunting and sporting weapons).151 
Belgium: While Belgium is not a significant producer of major conventional arms, it is still 
one of the world’s most important small arms producers. At least 15 companies in Belgium 
are involved in some aspect of small arms production (Omega Foundation, 2001). However, 
domestic production of small arms and ammunition is dominated by one company, FN 
Herstal, which is part of the French-Belgium consortium Groupe Herstal.152 
Brazil: Brazil is one of the largest defense producers in the developing world and a major 
exporter of small arms, particularly for the US market (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 June 
2000). At least 18 companies are involved in some aspects of small arms production (Omega 
Foundation, 2001). The major domestic producers of small arms include the state-owned 
Industria de Material Belico do Brasil (Imbel) and a number of private companies. Imbel, 
which was established in 1974, is a non-listed public company and employed 2,220 people in 
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2000.153 The company producers a wide range of small arms and ammunition, mainly for the 
military market. Its products include pistols, rifles, and sub-machine guns.154 The company 
started producing the 7.62 FN FAL rifle under license in 1964 (250,000 have been produced 
until 2001), and currently produces the 5.56mm version.155 More than 90% of the 2,000 0.45 
caliber pistols that the company exports each month are bound for the US market. Springfield 
Armory is the distributor of Imbel products in the United States. Currently, between 40 and 
50% of the company’s production is exported (Gazetta Mercantil, 26 October 2001). 
France: While France is a significant producer and exporter of major conventional 
armaments, it pales by comparison with other European countries such as Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and Italy in terms of small arms production. The country was ranked as the third 
largest supplier of conventional arms to developing countries in the period from 1993 to 2000, 
with total sales for this period of US$ 24.7 billion, or US$ 3 billion a year (Grimmett 2001). 
More than 30 companies in France are involved in some aspects of small arms production, 
although most production is for domestic consumption (Omega Foundation, 2001). The state-
owned company, Giat Industries, is the most important domestic producer of small arms and 
ammunition. The other major domestic producer is a private company PGM Precision (sniper 
rifles). 
Germany: Germany is one of the world’s largest producers of conventional arms, ranking as 
the sixth largest supplier of major conventional arms to developing countries in the period 
from 1993 to 2000 with total sales of US$ 5.8 billion, an annual average of US$ 725 million 
(Grimmett 2001). The country has a long history of small arms manufacturing, and is one of 
Europe’s major producers of small arms for both the military and civilian markets. Currently, 
more than 30 German companies are involved in some aspect of small arms production 
(Lock, 2001). The most important domestic manufacturers of small arms and ammunition for 
military and police purposes include Heckler & Koch (owned by BAE Systems), JP Sauer & 
Sohn, Carl Walther (owned by Umarex Sportwaffen), Rheinmetall DeTec, Diehl, and 
Dynamit Nobel. 
Israel: Israel is one of the world’s most important arms producers and exporters. The country 
was ranked as the seventh largest suppler of conventional weapons to developing countries in 
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the period from 1993 to 2000 with sales of US$ 2.6 billion, an average of US$ 325 million a 
year (Grimmett, 2001). At least ten companies are involved in some aspect of small arms 
production (Omega Foundation, 2001). The state-owned company Israel Military Industries 
(IMI) is the most important domestic producer of small arms and ammunition. In addition to 
IMI, smaller private-sector firms, such as KSN Industries (pistols), Soltam (mortars), and the 
Kalia Israel Cartridge Company (ammunition) also manufacture small arms for domestic and 
export markets (Gander and Cutshaw, 2001). 
Italy: Italy was ranked as the eighth largest supplier of conventional arms to developing 
countries in the period from 1993 to 2000 with sales of US$ 2.5 billion, an average of US$ 
312 million a year (Grimmett, 2001). Nearly 40 Italian companies are involved in some 
aspects of small arms production (Omega Foundation, 2001). Beretta SpA is the country’s 
most important domestic small arms producer, and produces a wide range of products for both 
military and civilian markets. Other important domestic producers of small arms for the 
military market include Bernadelli (rifles), Franchi (rifles), Tanfoglio (pistols) and Benelli 
(pistols). Both Franchi and Benelli are owned by Beretta.156 
Spain: During 1996-2000, Spain was the 11th largest exporter of arms in the world and the 
sixth biggest exporter in Europe.157 More than 20 local companies are involved in some 
aspect of small arms production (Omega Foundation. 2001). Its accumulated debts pushed the 
Spanish small arms industry into a serious crisis during the 1990s. The country’s major small 
arms producer, the state-owned company Santa Barbara, was finally bought by the US-based 
company General Dynamics in March 2001. The deal could be settled after a protracted take-
over battle with Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei. Of the three largest private 
companies (Astra, Llama Gabilondo, and Star) only Llama Gabilondo has survived and is 
currently being transformed to a shareholder company, Fabrinor. The company had total sales 
of US$ 4.2 million in 2000 and manufactures about 20,000 small arms a year, mainly pistols. 
More than 80% of the company’s production is exported to the US market. The remaining 
part is exported to various countries. The Spanish army buys a rather small portion of the 
whole production (El Pais, 25 February 2001). Both Astra and Stare were previously the 
major domestic producers of pistols for the military markets.  
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United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is one of Europe’s largest defense producers, and the 
country was ranked as the world’s fourth largest supplier of conventional weapons to 
developing countries during the period from 1993 to 2000 with sales of US$ 8.9 billion, an 
average of US$ 1.1 billion a year (Grimmett, 2001). Although many companies are involved 
in various aspects of small arms production, the United Kingdom is not in the same league as 
other European producers such as Belgium, Germany or Italy in terms of the value and 
volume of its domestic small arms production.158 For decades, small arms production in the 
United Kingdom was concentrated at the small arms arsenal in Enfield. The arsenal was 
privatized in the late 1980s and transferred to a new site in Nottingham in the early 1990s 
(Lock 2001). The United Kingdom no longer produces pistols for the military market, and its 
armed forces are equipped with pistols manufactured in Belgium (FN Herstal) and 
Switzerland/Germany (SIGARMS). 
 
4.4 The Role of the Arms Industry in Alleviating (or Aggravating) 
the Small Arms Problem 
Some of the big players in the arms industry tried to play a constructive role in alleviating the 
small arms problem. They applied this strategy both for sincere reasons and business interests. 
Accepting some form of self-regulation, the initial pressure from gun control groups could be 
dampened down and the black sheep of the industry singled out. This approach allowed the 
regular small arms producers to stay in business and focus on new, legitimate markets. 
This chapter has provided an assessment of the state of the global small arms industry. The 
lack of reliable information about the value and volume of global small arms production 
makes it almost impossible to assess the industry’s precise current situation and predict its 
long-term trends. In the short run, certain factors that will determine the health of the industry 
can be identified based on the current available information. At the company level, factors 
such as market segmentation and concentration as well as internal production and marketing 
decisions (e.g. finding niche opportunities) will have a significant impact on the future 
condition of the firms. At the more general level, factors such as the economic and security 
environment in particular countries, negative public sentiment towards these types of 
weapons, and/or growing public pressure on government to implement stricter controls on the 
production of, trade in, and use of small arms are likely to have a significant impact on the 
strength of individual companies and the global industry. 
                                               
158  Omega Foundation, 2001, “UK Small Arms Producers,” Background Paper, Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 
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The information presented in this chapter demonstrates that global small arms production is 
widely distributed. Currently, more than 1,000 companies in at least 98 countries worldwide 
are involved in some aspect of the production of small arms or ammunition. The increase in 
the number of countries and companies that produce small arms does not necessarily indicate 
an increase in the size or production capacities of the global small arms industry, but in some 
cases simply better information. 
The value of global small arms production, including ammunition, can be estimated to be at 
least US$ 7.4 billion in 2000. In terms of volume, it is estimated that nearly eight million 
small arms, including commercial firearms, were produced during 2000. Of those eight 
million small arms more than 70% were produced in the United States and the European 
Union. The global volume of small arms production has declined in recent years, and is at 
much lower levels than during the Cold War era. There are also indications that the 
production of military-style small arms will continue to decline in the coming years. The 
long-term trends in the production of commercial firearms are currently unclear, but 
production volumes may start to increase as a result of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States159 as well as the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Despite its global distribution, small arms production remains economically fairly marginal, 
both in terms of its contribution to national economic activities and as a share of the value of 
global defense production. The production of small arms is a mature industry with few 
barriers to entry. It is not a significant source of employment. For example, in Austria the 
three most important small arms companies have combined total sales of US$ 57 million, and 
collectively employ fewer than 800 people. In the United States, only about 16,000 people are 
employed in the small arms industry. 
In the world’s three major producers – China, Russia, and the United States – the specific 
picture is difficult to assess because of a lack of detailed information, particularly with respect 
to China. In Russia, it is clear that a small number of companies are re-emerging as significant 
players in the global small arms market. This comes after nearly a decade of industrial 
downsizing and restructuring. The growing success of theses Russian firms is linked to 
product diversification (e.g. commercial firearms) and increasing export sales.160 
                                               
159  Lois Romano, “At Tulsa Gun Show, Searching for Safety: U.S. Sales on the Rise Since Sept. 11 Attacks,” 
Washington Post, 22 October 2001, Page A03. 
160  Marat Kenzhetayev and Lyuba Pronina, 2002, “Rocketing Up the Arms Sales Charts,” The Moscow Times 
15 April 2002, 12. 
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In the world’s ten most important mid-sized producers – Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom – the picture is also quite 
mixed. In some countries (e.g. Austria, Brazil, and Italy) privately-owned firms like Glock, 
Taurus, and Beretta are doing relatively well – they are witnessing either constant or even 
increasing sales and profits. In almost all cases these companies rely heavily on sales to the 
US market (both military and civilian). Total employment in most of these companies is 
usually less than a few hundred employees, and in some rather extraordinary cases a few 
thousand. In other countries such as France, Israel, and Spain, large state-owned defense 
companies (e.g. Giat Industries, IMI, Santa Barbara) which also produce small arms are 
experiencing significant financial problems. Most of these companies are currently making 
significant losses, have large numbers of employees, and low levels of labor productivity. 
Without continuing government support, it is unclear whether the small arms production 
activities in these firms will be maintained. 
Concentration and consolidation at the company level has been increasing in recent years and 
is likely to continue, particularly among European and US producers. The various segments 
of the global small arms market (both military and civilian) also continue to be dominated by 
a handful of companies in these 13 countries, despite the emergence of a few ‘new’ players in 
recent years (e.g. Pakistan, Singapore). Some countries, such as Brazil, have taken significant 
steps to protect their domestic small arms industry from foreign investors and competitors. 
Licensed production is a key feature of the global small arms industry particularly amongst 
developing countries. Altogether the products of just two companies, FN Herstal (Belgium) 
and Heckler & Koch (Germany/UK), have been produced under license in more than 35 
countries worldwide. This illustrates how licensed production can be used by licensees (e.g. 
Turkey) to develop and expand their domestic small arms production and export capabilities. 
Licensors (e.g. Heckler & Koch) use licensed production to increase their global market 
share. Additionally, they can evade strict controls and even facilitate exports to prohibited 
destinations. 
Overall, the information at hand presents a somewhat contradictory picture. At the company 
level, some firms appear to be prospering while others are in crisis. Some of the private firms 
(e.g. Beretta) appear to have a better chance of survival. In some cases, state-owned 
companies will continue to attract government support for political and strategic reasons (e.g. 
Giat Industries in France). At the global level, the small arms industry seems to be shrinking 
in terms of production capacity. The small arms industry is experiencing a significant decline 
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in demand, particularly in the military market and certain sub-sectors of the civilian market 
(e.g. handguns). 
Finally, what are the most important factors that will determine the industry’s trends in the 
near future? Certainly the events of 11 September 2001 and increasing US domestic civilian 
demand for firearms may provide some temporary relief for the US small arms industry as a 
whole. Certain firms in various countries (e.g. Austria, Brazil, and Italy) that are major 
suppliers to the US market can also profit from this increased demand. Other factors, such as 
the expansion of licensed production or increased export sales, might also improve the short-
term prospects for certain firms. But these prospects are highly dependent on the stringency of 
domestic export controls. However, in the longer term, factors such as a negative public 
sentiment concerning the impact of small arms on crime rates and violence or the growing 
national and international efforts (e.g. within the United Nations) to regulate and tighten 
controls over the production, possession, use, and transfer of small arms and light weapons 
could have a negative impact on the global small arms industry. 
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5 Creating the Network: IANSA 
 
Small arms are causing misery and destruction all over 
the world. […] The development of an International 
Action Network on Small Arms is an important initiative 
towards tackling one of the greatest humanitarian 
challenges in our times.161 
─Olara Otunnu, UN Secretary General’s 
Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts, 
Brussels, October 14, 1998. 
 
5.1 A new international context 
Despite the fact that small arms and light weapons account for the overwhelming majority of 
deaths in conflicts since 1945, they remained off the arms control agenda throughout the Cold 
War, for essentially three reasons. 
First, until the process of decolonization had been completed, military-style light weapons 
were not widely disseminated beyond national armed forces, and most post-colonial states did 
not possess large arsenals. There were exceptions: independence wars in such places as 
Algeria, civil wars in states such as Nigeria (Biafra), insurgencies in countries such as 
Malaysia, and of course the Vietnam War, illustrated the importance of light weapons in 
conflict. But in general their effects were confined to particular conflict zones, and not seen as 
a problem with spill-over effects and potentially harmful consequences regionally or globally.  
Second, the instruments of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament emerged to cope 
with the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Although these 
issues were not the exclusive preserve of the superpowers (witness the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin 
                                               
161  Speech by Olara Otunnu, UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts, 
international NGO meeting on small arms, Brussels, October 14, 1998. Quote cited from Liz Clegg, 1999, 
“NGOs take aim,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55(1), 49-51. 
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Weapons Convention and other multilateral instruments), progress in arms control was driven 
by superpower concerns with maintaining stability and reducing the risk that conflicts would 
escalate to a global level. Since the conflicts in which small arms and light weapons were 
used posed few such risks, they could be ignored.  
The third reason was a general reluctance to tackle conventional weapons (including light 
weapons) issues at all: many policy-makers argued up until the early 1990s that “conventional 
weapons are not a proliferation issue.”162 Behind this was the belief that states’ right to self-
defense (and to determine the means to achieve their security) legitimized the possession of 
most types of conventional weapons. This also prevented the conventional weapons from 
being “stigmatized” as nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction could be. Similarly, 
various types of small arms and light weapons were deemed to have legitimate civilian use, 
reflected in national regulation (gun control) policies.163  
The confluence of several factors in the early 1990s led to a realignment of these elements of 
the Cold War non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime, and allowed small 
arms and light weapons to emerge as a multilateral policy problem. Perhaps the most 
important stimulus was the changed matrix of conflicts in the post-Cold War world, in which 
internal conflicts assumed a much higher profile than inter-state ones. Internal conflicts are by 
no means new. But they have received greater attention due to the small arms and light 
weapons that fuelled them. Related to this was the expansion of multilateral peace support 
operations. In Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere, 
the UN and regional organizations launched peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building 
operations that differed radically from the Cold War supervisory model. The problems that 
weapon flows to combatants posed for such operations, and the problems that weapon stocks 
posed for post-conflict peace building, were made uncomfortably clear in many of these 
missions.164 
                                               
162  This argument was made directly to Keith Krause, Programme Director of the Geneva-based Small Arms 
Survey, by a senior Canadian official in 1992, and is relevant given the dramatic shift in Canadian policy 
on this issue in the following years. See Keith Krause, 2001, “Norm-Building in Security Spaces: The 
Emergence of the Light Weapons Problematic,” GERSI/REGIS Working Papers. 
163  Attempts to tackle conventional arms transfers also failed because of superpower and commercial rivalry. 
For an overview see Keith Krause, 1993, “Controlling the Arms Trade since 1945,” in Richard Dean Burns, 
ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. II, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1021-
1039. 
164  For example, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research undertook a major study, “Managing Arms in 
Peace Processes” that examined thirteen different case studies, including Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique, 
Liberia and the former Yugoslavia. See also Stefan Brem and Antonino Geraci, 2000, “Third-Party 
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In addition, large weapon stocks in private hands were seen as posing a serious threat to post-
authoritarian transition states. Behind this dangerous development lurked the apparent 
increase in the global traffic in small arms and light weapons. The end of the Cold War and 
many of its associated conflicts (such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, and the Horn 
of Africa) released a veritable flood of weapons that were easily available at extremely low 
cost.165 Weak control mechanisms in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe further contributed to this problem.166 With the steady rise of global trade and 
reduction of close customs controls on shipments and containers, the weapons became a 
profitable commodity.167 Transshipment, money-laundering and corruptions circuits were 
associated with sophisticated means of redirecting and concealing illicit inter-national trade. 
The success and failure of efforts to place small arms and light weapons on the international 
security agenda are mirrored in these changes. As far back as 1979, Amnesty International 
attempted to launch a campaign on small arms and light weapons – with little success. At 
various points, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) considered 
tracking small arms and light weapons flows, but decided against this due both to the 
difficulty of gathering information and the relatively small expected audience for it.168 By 
contrast, one can chart an explosion of interest in small arms and light weapons issues in the 
mid-1990s, beginning with the publication of various studies and reports detailing the scope 
and nature of the problem. 
Light weapons and human security 
Under the Cold War interstate arms control regimes, small arms and light weapons 
represented an insignificant threat: the risk of uncontrolled escalation of an interstate war due 
to light weapons proliferation was very low and the resources devoted to these arms were 
minimal compared to major conventional weapons systems. Those small arms did, however, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Intervention in War-Torn Societies: How Effective Are Micro-disarmament Programs?” Paper presented to 
the ISA Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, 14 - 18 March 2000. 
165  According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the trade in small arms and light weapons 
represents perhaps 13 percent of the total conventional arms trade, which would place it at about 2-3 billion 
dollars per year. According to some estimates, up to 40 percent of this might be black (or grey) market 
transactions. ACDA figures cited in the preface to Jeffrey Boutwell, et al, 1995, Lethal Commerce, 
Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. See also Abdel Fatau Musah and Robert Castle, 
1998, “Eastern Europe's Arsenal on the Loose: Managing Light Weans Flows to Conflict Zones,” BASIC 
Occasional Papers on International Security Issues No. 26, May 1998. 
166  Suzette R. Grillot, 2003, Central and Eastern Europe: A Regional Assessment of Small Arms Control 
Initiatives, Security and Peacebuilding Programme: Global Issues Department, London: International Alert. 
167  Ernie Regehr, 1997 “Militarizing Despair: The Politics of Small Arms,” New Routes 4(97), 3. 
168  Information on Amnesty International’s attempts from Brian Wood and on SIPRI’s considerations from 
Herbert Wulf. 
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probably account for the majority of conflict casualties. Already then did non-combatants 
constitute a very large percentage of these casualties.169 But attempts to reduce the 
destructiveness of conventional war were marginal and confined to such instruments as the 
Geneva Conventions and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Within the 
particular understanding of the purposes and motivations for arms control and non-
proliferation efforts (reducing the risk of war, reducing its destructiveness should it break out, 
and redirecting the resources devoted to armaments to other ends),170 the issue of small arms 
and light weapons had little chance to gain support or to win the attention of middle powers as 
‘moral entrepreneurs.’ The world’s (and the arms control communities’) attention focused on 
the nuclear threat.171 
The emergence of a set of ‘societal’ and ‘human’ security concerns that focus on communities 
or individuals within the state changed this situation.172 Many human security concerns173 are 
related to the small arms and light weapons issue including promoting and safeguarding 
human rights (security from state violence), protecting minorities (from repression), fighting 
organized crime and ensuring economic security (protection of property). These security 
concerns are often very different from the traditional security concerns of states such as 
security against a predatory state, combating terrorism, health care versus military spending 
(‘butter vs. guns’). For many contemporary policy-makers, ‘human security’ issues have 
come to rival inter-state security concerns. For example, some states in Latin America feel 
threatened by the nexus between drug and arms smuggling, in which the illicit traffic in 
armaments feeds the power of drug lords, who have supplanted state authority in some areas. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, as another example, the easy availability of weapons undermines post-
conflict reconstruction efforts and economic development. 
                                               
169  According to the most widely cited estimate, more than 80 percent of people killed in wars since 1990 have 
been civilians, almost all of whom died from small arms or light weapons. Figure from Oxfam, cited in 
“UK Aid Agencies Call on G8 to Control Arms Trade,” Reuters 13 May 1998. There are good reasons to 
think this estimate of civilian casualties is too high, but the number is unlikely to be below about 60 
percent. 
170  Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, 1961, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: The Twentieth 
Century Fund, 2; Special Issue on Arms Control 1960 Daedalus, 89(4) Fall. 
171  See also Jeffrey Knopf’s contribution on the impact of protest movements on US arms control policy. 
Jeffrey Knopf, 1998, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: the Impact of Protest on US Arms 
Control Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
172  This definition of human or societal security is not the same as used by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever et al., 
who focus on threats to the identity of a society, from whatever source. See Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, 
Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, 1993, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, 
London: Frances Pinter, chapters 1-3. 
173  Human security concerns are commonly understood as achieving freedom from fear by reducing the threat 
of violence from social, political and economic life at primarily the local and regional level. 
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Whether or not these human security concerns are more or less important than traditional state 
security concerns, and whether or not small arms and light weapons thus represent a 
legitimate object of state interest, is not an academic question: the test is how much attention 
an issue receives from policy-makers and how seriously decision-makers treat different 
threats. As I will discuss below, the greater attention that is being devoted to the 
consequences of unchecked light weapons proliferation can be used to illustrate how changed 
conceptions of security affect the definition of state interests.174 More importantly, however, 
this broader conception has opened up a space in which new coalitions of states and between 
states and non-state actors can form to pursue policies consonant with this new understanding 
of their security interests.  
 
5.2 The creation of expert knowledge 
An important factor for the emergence of collective action on any issue is the development of 
an ‘expert’ consensus that a problem exists. Beginning in the mid-90s, major national and 
international NGOs such as the British-American Security Information Council (BASIC), 
Human Rights Watch, Pugwash, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 
started to sponsor studies on small arms issues.175 A useful indication of the increased interest 
is a bibliography on small arms and light weapons by the Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade that identifies three publications on this topic in 1993, six in 
1994, 39 in 1995, 38 in 1996, 26 in 1997, and 37 up to September 1998.176  
Two ‘schools’ of expert knowledge were invoked by these various studies: that of arms 
controllers, and that of field researchers. Among the first contributions to the debate, for 
                                               
174  It is also interesting to note the way in which the discourse of human security is being used primarily by 
Canada, Norway, and Switzerland as a rallying point for a coalition of like-minded states around these 
issues. See also Lloyd Axworthy and Knut Vollebaek, “Now for a New Diplomacy to Fashion a Humane 
World,” International Herald Tribune, 21 October 1998; Daniel Trachsler, 2003, “Menschliche Sicherheit: 
Klärungsbedürftiges Konzept, vielversprechende Praxis,” Andreas Wenger, ed., Bulletin 2003 zur 
schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich, 69-103; and the 
text of the “Norway-Canada Partnership for Action” (Lysoen Declaration). A “Lysoen II” meeting with 11 
like-minded states took place in May 1999. 
175  Key contributions include Jeffrey Boutwell, et al, 1995, Lethal Commerce, Cambridge, MA: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences; Christopher Louise, 1995, “The Social Impacts of Light Weapons 
Availability and Proliferation,” Discussion Paper 59, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, March 1995; Jasjit Singh, ed., 1995, Light Weapons and International Security, Indian 
Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council (BASIC); the series of studies of the 
UNIDIR project, “Managing Arms in Peace Processes,” and the various BASIC occasional papers on light 
weapons issues. 
176  See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1998, Small Arms and Light Weapons: An 
Annotated Bibliography and Small Arms and Light Weapons. The ‘unit’ of counting is basically an article 
or book chapter. Hence edited collections are counted as many entries. The list may be incomplete, but it 
certainly gives an indication of a trend. 
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example, one finds an article by Aaron Karp in Arms Control Today in September 1993. He 
had previously worked on conventional weapons trade issues. The same is true of researchers 
such as Edward Laurance, Michael Klare, or Natalie Goldring.177 Many of their contributions 
were quite analytical. Their principle argument was that the paradigm governing our thinking 
about traditional arms trade was inappropriate to the case of small arms and light weapons. 
This approach would lead analysts to downplay the importance of the light weapons problem, 
overestimate difficulties in controlling them, or obscure the nature of the trade. 
The second kind of expert knowledge, that of field researchers, was advanced in the context 
of case studies of particular zones of conflict, such as Northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Colombia, Rwanda, or Southern Africa.178 Usually, these researchers were not 
members of the existing conventional arms trade and arms control ‘epistemic community.’179 
Their expert credentials rested on information gained in their field research. Their studies, 
although often anecdotal and rather unsystematic, highlighted the devastating consequences 
of the proliferation of light weapons in different areas of the world. 
Special note must be taken of the role played by the United Nations in preparing the terrain of 
small arms and light weapons, and contributing to the creation of ‘expert knowledge.’ Work 
in this area has its roots in Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s invocation of the 
problem of ‘micro-disarmament’ in his supplement to the Agenda for Peace, which called for 
exploration of “practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is 
dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people 
in the hundreds of thousands.”180 This in turn was catalyzed both by the difficulties the United 
Nations faced in dealing with post-conflict disarmament in the context of its peacekeeping 
missions as well as the specific initiative concerning demobilization, small arms collection 
and destruction in Mali, which began in August 1994. In November 1995, an expert group 
                                               
177  This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to offer important contributors to the field. See as early 
examples Edward Laurance, 1992, The International Arms Trade, New York: Lexington Books; Aaron 
Karp. 1993, “Arming Ethnic Conflict,” Arms Control Today September, 8; Michael Klare, 1995, “Light 
Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era,” and Susanne L. Dyer and Natalie 
Goldring, 1995, “Analysing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers,” both in Jasjit Singh, ed. 
Light Weapons and International Security. Dehli: Indian Pugwash Society and BASIC. 
178  Contributors to this literature include Chris Smith, Tara Kartha, Jacklyn Cock, Alex Vines, Kathi Austin, 
and Steve Goose. 
179  For the most important contributions on epistemic communities see the introduction and conclusions to the 
special issue of International Organization by Peter Haas, 1992. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46(1), 1-35 and Emanuel Alder and Peter 
Haas, 1992, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research 
Program,” International Organization 46(1), 367-390. 
180  Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN General Assembly document A/ 50/ 60, 25 January 1995, 14. 
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was created as a concrete follow-up initiative to examine the types of small arms and light 
weapons being used in conflicts as well as “the nature and causes of the excessive and 
destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit 
production and trade.” This report played a crucial role in defining the nature of the problem 
(i.e. what exactly are small arms and light weapons) and setting some of its parameters 
(linkage between security and development, distinction between illicit and licit transfers, 
emphasis on marking, tracing and destruction).181 
Three things are significant about this growing interest in small arms and light weapons 
issues: First, the reshaping of the arms control / international security discourse to deal with 
small arms and light weapons issues proceeded in parallel with attempts to uncover new 
‘facts’ about the world. Hence one cannot argue that the issue of small arms and light 
weapons rises on the international agenda solely because of a tangible change in the nature of 
weapons flows, in their use in conflicts, or in the impact of small arms and light weapons 
proliferation on the security interests of major international actors. Very little, if anything, 
objectively changes in the early 1990s. Furthermore, if one wanted to link the increasing 
interest in small arms and light weapons to such shifts as (relative) increases in communal 
conflicts or in UN interventions, it is impossible to explain therefore why the issue of small 
arms and light weapons has not lost ground from the international agenda as the number UN 
operations, or number of soldiers engaged in them, has declined again after mid-90s.182 
Second, the most important feature of the ‘new’ expert community, the broadening of the 
traditional arms control agenda, was evident from the outset. For example, one of the most 
important research studies was sponsored by Human Rights Watch, an internationally-
recognized human rights NGO that had hitherto done little work on arms and conflict issues. 
This study documented the role outsiders played in supplying arms to the Rwandan genocide. 
It received a considerable profile, if measured by the subsequent launching of governmental 
or UN inquiries into arms transfers to the Great Lakes region.183 
                                               
181  UN General Assembly Resolution 50/ 70B, 17 November 1995. The experts’ group report is UN General 
Assembly document 1/ 52/ 298. 
182  For example, at the peak in 1993, there were more than 78,000 military and related personnel engaged in 
UN operations. By mid-1998, this had declined to only about 19,000 (plus 1,300 military observers and 
2,700 civilian police). See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/yir97/charts.htm> (last visited March 2003). 
183  Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, 1994, “Arming Genocide in Rwanda,” Foreign Affairs 73(5), 
September/October), 86-96; Human Rights Watch, 1995, “Rearming with Impunity: International Support 
for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide,” Human Rights Watch Arms Project Report A704. Formal 
inquiries were launched by France and the United Nations Commission of Inquiry. See “Final Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda),” S/1998/1096, 18 November 1998. 
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Third, although many of the contributions to the discussion offer policy suggestions of one 
sort or another, almost none can be characterized as advocacy in the strict sense – they were 
not part of an organized campaign with defined goals and strategies. The only ‘expert’ 
contribution that comes close to this is the UN group of expert study, which played a key role 
in crystallizing the terms of the debate on various issues. In other studies and reports, policy 
suggestions ranged from promoting post-conflict weapons collection and destruction, 
tightening supplier states’ export controls, increasing customs and police controls, to focusing 
on local violence and criminality. There was no real consensus on which goals were priorities, 
or even on whether or not the problem could be successfully tackled.184 Traditional divisions 
between so-called supply-side (enhancing export controls and imposing more restrictive 
export policies) and demand-side strategies (post-conflict weapons collection programs and 
other peace-building efforts) emerged. The whole debate played itself out against a backdrop 
of very little concrete recommendations. In fact, one of the early issues identified as crucial to 
efforts to reduce small arms and light weapons proliferation was the lack of reliable 
information on the nature and scope of production, stockpiles and transfers of these arms.185 
 
5.3 The emergence of a campaign and the problem of issue framing 
Elements of an early campaign to address small arms and light weapons started to emerge in 
1997 and crystallized with the launching of the International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA) in October 1998. In this section I will trace the emergence of IANSA, the key actors 
in its creation as well as the breadth and the nature of the network. 
Probably the first formal steps towards the launching of an international NGO campaign were 
taken in December 1997, at a meeting in Washington, D.C., attended by representatives from 
23 different organizations.186 These organizations represented conflict / disarmament, human 
rights / humanitarian, gun control as well as development / refugee NGOs. Judged by their 
participation in subsequent NGO activities, the central actors covered at least three of the four 
                                               
184  See, for examples of the pessimistic perspective, David Morrison, 1995, “Small Arms, Big Trouble,” 
National Journal 3(18), 712; Daniel N. Nelson, 1999 “Damage Control,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
55(1), January/February <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1999/jf99/jf99nelson.html> (last visited March 
2003). 
185  See, for example, the discussion in Bronwyn Brady, 1995, “Collecting and Organizing Data on the 
Manufacture of, and Trade in, Light Weapons,” Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International 
Security, Delhi: British American Security Information Council and Indian Pugwash Society, December, 
140-151. 
186  Details of this meeting could be found on the Prepcom website, http://prepcom.org. In the meantime, this is 
out of service, but its content has partially been transferred to http://sand.miis.edu/. 
Creating the Network 
 73 
major interests implicated subsequently in the campaign coalition: human rights, 
humanitarian as well as conflict studies and disarmament groups were the most active, while 
the development community and faith-based groups were only weakly represented.187 A 
similar meeting was held two months later in London, which brought on board European 
NGOs, again with the overwhelming representation coming from the conflict resolution, 
disarmament and human rights communities, with only Oxfam and Pax Christi outside of this 
orbit. The first major ‘Southern’ meeting on the issue was held in Johannesburg in May 1998. 
Its representation was very different from those of the ‘Northern’ meetings.188 The conflict 
resolution and disarmament community was outnumbered by people from domestic and local 
‘gun control’ initiatives, and non-South African representatives were drawn almost 
exclusively from the development NGOs or faith-based groups.  
Figure 5.1: Membership in the Prepcom Network, 1998 
 
In the follow-up to the Washington meeting, Edward Laurance of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies (MIIS) established a website (http://prepcom.org) to serve as a clearing 
                                               
187  The major groups were: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi, International Alert, 
Saferworld, BASIC, World Vision and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). This was largely a 
function of costs and timing, although it does also give some indication about the interest and ability of 
different NGOs to assume a major role on the issue. 
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house for information on governmental and non-governmental small arms and light weapons 
activities and initiatives.189 On this website, a ‘membership’ list of interested individuals was 
posted that can be used to chart the development of the international campaign. Obviously, 
raw numbers do not tell much about the level of activities or importance of various members 
of the network, nor do they allow to unravel the relationships that might be implicated in such 
networks. This would require a detailed exercise of network mapping. Based on documents 
that emerged from these NGO meetings and interviews with a selection of participants it will 
be possible to trace the emergence of the NGO network on small arms. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates how rapidly interest in this issue spread among the NGO networks. If 
one parses the data further, and attempts to sort the different NGOs by their main orientation 
or activity, the following emerges:  
Table 5.1: Distribution of Prepcom Members by Area of Focus 
 Area of Focus Number of NGOs  
 
 
Humanitarianism / Human Rights 38  
Public Health and Criminality  20  
Economic Development / Governance 65  
Communal Conflicts  21  
Arms Control / International Security  49  
 
 
TOTAL  193  
Note: 38 NGOs with overlapping or mixed mandates have been double-
counted. The total number of NGOs observed is 155.  
Likewise, if one attempts to chart the geographic distribution of membership (organizations 
and individuals), one sees that the network does have ‘global reach,’ albeit with uneven 
                                                                                                                                                   
188  A meeting was also held in Guatemala City in May 1997, as a follow up to a conference on post-conflict 
weapons collection, but it was much smaller, and did not have a broad NGO reach. 
189  Edward Laurance’s role in advancing the small arms issue, especially as the founder of prepcom.org, 
should be particularly underlined. Laurance was present at all three of the meetings noted above 
(Washington, London, Johannesburg), offered opening “briefings” at two of them, and was the first to 
promote the idea of an international “Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use 
of Light Weapons.” This idea did not meet universal approval in the NGO world, and was subsequently 
dropped. He is the coordinator of the program on Security and Development at MIIS and has served as a 
consultant to the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs from 1992-2002 including the time 
before and after the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference. 
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coverage, especially in Southeast and East Asia, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East 
and North Africa.190 The fact that the main Southern outreach has developed in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be the result of two different factors: in Latin America the 
relative density of civil society networks and associations and in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
strong links (which have fostered NGOs) between many of these states and the international 
development community. The regional membership breakdown is as follows:  
 
Table 5.2: Geographic Distribution of Prepcom Members 
 Geographic Origin Number of NGOs  
 
 
North America  41 
Central / South America  26 
Western Europe  38 
East / Central Europe  9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  27 
Middle East and North Africa  1 
South Asia  8 
Southeast Asia and the North Pacific  3 
Former Soviet Union  4 
 
 
TOTAL  157 
 
These tables and figure partially capture the way in which the IANSA coalition was put 
together as well as its core membership. Two crucial turning points in the construction of this 
international campaign took place over the summer and fall of 1998, with two key meetings 
being held in Canada and Brussels. The first meeting, held in July 1998, was designed to 
hammer out a consensus draft of a campaign document that could 
“develop ideas for complementary, cooperative and coordinated 
international action to respond more effectively to the political, social 
                                               
190  A second (albeit somewhat overlapping) data set can also be used to chart the network: the participation in 
a large-scale international conference in Brussels in October 1998, which marked the formal launching of 
the IANSA network. It ‘piggybacked’ upon the Prepcom network, but also drew in a somewhat larger pool, 
and had a slightly different geographic focus. More than 200 individuals representing about 60 different 
organizations took part in the Brussels meeting. 
Creating the Network 
 76 
and humanitarian catastrophes wrought by the unrestrained diffusion 
of small arms around the globe.”191 
The Canadian government and the Ford Foundation had sponsored this meeting. Originally, it 
had emerged from the work of the US (non-governmental) small arms working group and 
included 38 NGO participants. They were almost equally divided between North and South. 
Also the four-person steering committee for this meeting was balanced and included two 
(Northern) academics, one researcher (Southern), and one ‘activist’ NGO – the Canadian-
based Project Ploughshares. The meeting represented the shift from “discussions” to 
“organizing” – as one participant put it, “we were told to lock ourselves in a room for a few 
days and come out with a campaign document.”192 
The next stage of the coalition’s creation was the Brussels meeting of October 1998. Based on 
the campaign document hammered out at the Canadian meeting, the International Action 
Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was launched there. The joint government-NGO 
conference included several hundred participants. A one-day NGO meeting followed that 
conference. The meeting involved more than 200 individuals from 60 different organizations. 
A draft document was discussed in several working groups, where several suggestions for 
amendments or improvements have been made. Beyond this ‘mapping’ of the emergence of 
an international coalition, there are at least five things that should be noted:  
First, it is important to note that one of the key impulses that pushed NGO activists to arrange 
a meeting in the summer of 1998, was the fact that the Belgian government had previously 
announced its sponsorship of a major international conference for governmental and NGO 
representatives to be held in October. The involved NGOs moved their agenda forward in 
order to lay the groundwork for the Brussels meeting for basically three reasons: 
1) It became clear that the Belgian government sponsored conference would 
become a large, and potentially significant, event. 
2) The size of this conference would not “permit the kind of focused work that 
needs to happen on conceptualizing a campaign.”193 
                                               
191  Information is taken from invitation letter to the meeting. For details of the planning, see meeting notes 
from the US small arms working group of 27 March and 1 May 1998, where the initiative to hold a summer 
meeting was discussed and approved. 
192  Interview with representative of US small arms working group, New York, 17 July 2001. 
193  Information from the notes of the US small arms working group meeting on 1 May 1998. 
Creating the Network 
 77 
3) There was a concern that the divisions with the Belgian government (and 
perhaps also within involved NGOs) over the nature and scope of the October 
meeting might create discord within the emerging small arms movement. 
Key NGO actors seized the initiative: They debated among themselves how best to proceed 
and established a ‘policy framework.’ The core NGO players were Saferworld, BASIC, 
International Alert, Federation of American Scientists, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, World Council of Churches, and Oxfam.194 
Second, the strength of the emerging coalition stems from its mobilization of some large 
NGOs that have not hitherto devoted a great deal of attention to ‘security’ issues – with the 
exception of the landmines campaign. The case of human rights organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch or Amnesty International illustrates this mobilizing power as well as the active 
participation of development or faith-based groups such as Oxfam, CARE, the World Council 
of Churches, Pax Christi and the Quakers. Each of these groups had to establish an explicit 
link between light weapons and conflict as well as to the group’s core mandate. Hence, the 
World Council of Churches sponsored work under a “Programme to Overcome Violence,” 
while Oxfam undertook a major study on UK export controls and exports of small arms to 
zones of conflict and development. According to Oxfam, the rationale for this ‘arms control’ 
formulation was that:  
Oxfam has worked with the victims of conflict on projects of relief 
and rehabilitation for most of its institutional life. In some countries 
Oxfam has also been invited to participate in initiatives to promote 
peace and reconciliation at both local and national level. One theme 
running throughout all of this work, whether in Asia, Africa or Latin 
America (and latterly in Eastern Europe), is that the ease of access to 
weapons, and in particular small arms, has helped to spark conflicts, 
prolong conflict, destabilise relief programmes, and undermine peace 
initiatives.195 
                                               
194  This list is based on two criteria: 1) regular appearance at the relevant NGO meetings; 2) membership in 
planning and steering committees. 
195  Oxfam, 1998, Small Arms, Wrong Hands: A Case for Government Control of the Small Arms Trade 
Oxford: Oxfam, April 1998, Foreword. 
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Similarly, for a human rights group such as Amnesty International, the core idea of 
“indiscriminate and unlawful use” of small arms and light weapons as a legal concept was 
essential to its engagement.196 
Third, each of these groups framed the issue of small arms and light weapons in a slightly 
different way. A quick summary of their positions can be found in Table 5.3. The table offers 
representative, but not necessarily exhaustive examples of how different NGOs lined-up on 
the problem of small arms and light weapons. What is important to note is that these different 
ways of framing the problem can generate very different visions and agendas for international 
action. For example, a focus on criminality and local violence leads to a strong emphasis on 
(national) gun control legislation. However, these gun control NGOs are less concerned with 
enhancing cross-border customs controls or tightening arms export legislation. Likewise, a 
focus on potential human rights violations causes an NGO to include both legal and illicit 
weapons transfer considerations in its campaign, since also legal transfers to states and non-
state actors can be the source of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. As will be 
seen those various agendas affect the effectiveness of the coalition to achieve coherence and 
common objectives. 
Fourth, it is obvious that the relatively broad nature of the IANSA network is a direct result of 
the different interests and orientations of the various stakeholders. The founding document 
gives equal weight to policies “which address controlling or limiting the trade in and diffusion 
of small arms, and those which are directed towards reducing the demand for them.” The 
overall framework could be called one of ‘human security’: It is “designed to enhance 
sustainable development and to promote the development of cultures of peace.”197 This broad 
roof covers a large number of possible policy initiatives. On the ‘supply’ side, they include 
measures such as enhancing domestic firearms control and regulation, collecting and 
destroying surplus weapons, strengthening police and customs cooperation, increasing 
international information exchanges and transparency, restricting the export of surplus 
weapons, and promoting inter-state agreements to prevent illicit trafficking. On the ‘demand’ 
side, they include promoting peaceful conflict resolution, reforming security institutions, or 
replacing cultures of violence by cultures of peace through education.  
                                               
196  Brian Wood, Amnesty International, made this point in both the Washington and London NGO meetings 
cited below, and it appears to have won broad acceptance. 
197  IANSA draft of founding document, Policy Framework <http://www.iansa.org/mission/m1.htm> (last 
visited March 2003). 
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Table 5.3: Different Ways of Framing the Small Arms and Light Weapons Problem 
Statement of Problem Description of Problem NGO Groups Implicated 
(representative listing only, 
not comprehensive) 198 
Humanitarianism and Human 
Rights 
culture of violence; child 
soldiers; personal insecurity; 
vulnerable groups (women, 
visible minorities; ethnic 
groups); excessively injurious 
weapons 
Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, ICRC 
Public Health  
and Criminality 
Drugs/terror/arms nexus; 
increase in petty criminality 
or ‘disorganized’ crime; 
‘contagion effect’ 
Gun Control Network UK, 
HELP, Viva Rio, Coalition to 
Stop Gun Violence, WCC, 
Gun Free South Africa 
Economic Development  
and Good Governance 
‘gun as livelihood’ problem; 
extortion; corruption; weak 
climate for investment 
Oxfam, Pax Christi, World 
Vision, World Council of 
Churches, CARE 
Communal Conflicts  
Extra-Regional 
flow of light weapons 
increases level of violence 
and intractability of 
communal wars  
Project Ploughshares, 
International Alert, Centre for 
Conflict Resolution (South 
Africa) 
Conflict Intervention 
and Regional  
Destabilization 
grey market transactions 
(govt. to govt. or insurgent) 
designed to affect course of a 
conflict, conflict spillover, 
recycling of surplus weapons 
BICC; Monterey Institute, 
CISD, GRIP, NISAT, FAS, 
Saferworld, BASIC, UNIDIR 
 
Fifth and finally, the problem with such an incoherent action plan is that it is difficult to trace 
how the results have been influenced by the efforts of the IANSA coalition. The simple 
assertion that a wide range of concerned NGOs thinks there is a small arms problem does not 
necessarily mean that concrete measures to address this problem can be traced to this 
assertion. Likewise, a broad agenda means that it is difficult to see how NGO efforts to 
influence state policies and negotiations have any impact. For example, in the case of the 
campaign to ban landmines, the clarity of ICBL’s goal, i.e. a total ban, provided a standard 
against which the success of the campaign and the evolution of state policies could easily be 
judged. The small arms movement is much less cohesive and focused. 
 
5.4 State leadership and NGO-middle power cooperation 
NGO activities become of any theoretical and practical relevance if they have an impact on 
how states or other actors in the international system behave and pursue their interests.199 But 
                                               
198  Several NGOs are also implicated in more than one of these framings; the grouping is to illustrate principle 
concerns only. 
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the influence of NGOs on state policies and practices is – for basically two reasons – often 
difficult to show: First, the generation of new international institutions does not necessarily 
mean that the ‘problem’ the NGO coalition has helped to highlight and address has actually 
been ‘solved.’ The relationship of the Ottawa Treaty to the actual elimination of the scourge 
of anti-personnel landmines is a good example. One could argue that many state policies are 
designed simply to give the appearance of having dealt with the problem, without taking 
further concrete steps.200 Second, the relationship between states and NGOs is usually very 
complex. Increased NGO activity can be as much a result of changed state policies as a cause 
of it. Evidence for the latter (i.e. change of states’ behavior) begins with the emergence of 
new topical NGO coalitions where none have been before. But the mere emergence of a new 
coalition and its success to publicize an issue does not by itself mean that governments have 
actually changed their behavior or the way in which a problem has been framed has 
fundamentally shifted.  
The last point hints at a deeper problem that is certainly not confined to the small arms and 
light weapons problematic: if the changes under investigation have to be directly connected to 
specific goals of NGOs or the international coalition (bargaining power), there is little room 
for examining the broader impact of NGO action (structural power), which would be directed 
at affecting the international security agenda in general.201 If one goal of IANSA is a global 
reduction in gun violence – as it is the case for some members of the small arms campaign –, 
then the pathways to such a goal are very complex to trace. Similarly, if the goal is simply to 
keep the issue of small arms and light weapons high on the international security agenda,202 
then the success or failure of these efforts will not be well-captured by looking for the 
creation of new interstate institutions or formal practices. 
                                                                                                                                                   
199  Hence the relatively great attention paid to such things as the Montreal Protocol on combating ozone 
depletion, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or implementation of international human rights 
instruments. See Richard Price, 1997, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 
Kathryn Sikkink, 1993, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 139-170. 
200  However, it is questionable whether a particular NGO or coalition of NGOs is to blame if states do not 
implement the rules they have committed themselves to. 
201  On the distinction between bargaining and structural power, see Steven Lukes, 1974, Power: A Radical 
View, London: Macmillan; Keith Krause, 1991, “Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and 
American Arms Transfer Relationships,” International Studies Quarterly 35(3), September 1991, 313-336; 
Stefano Guzzini, 1993, “Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Analysis,” International Organization, 
47(3), Summer 1993, 443-478. 
202  NGOs might not only be interested to keep the issue on the international (security) agenda to actually solve 
the problem, but also to receive more resources to launch a wide range of initiatives. Such initiatives can 
include additional information and awareness-raising campaigns, development assistance, buy-back 
programs, capacity building and grassroots work. 
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As Paul Wapner puts it: 
The conception and meaning of NGOs in world affairs [...] will 
remain problematic as long as scholars remain focused on the relations 
between NGOs and the state, and ignore the civic dimension of NGO 
efforts. NGO activities within and across societies are a proper object 
of study and only by including them can one render an accurate 
understanding of NGOs, and by extension, world politics.203 
In short, how one thinks about politics in general determines how one regards the activities 
and influence of NGOs. In this respect, a rationalist conception is not really adequate, because 
it can only insufficiently incorporate the structural dimension of NGO power.204 
All of the above mentioned difficulties appear in the small arms movement. Identifying the 
causal mechanisms and effects of NGO activities is particularly difficult. As will be shown 
below there are some important small arms initiatives in which NGO activities followed 
rather than preceded state or inter-governmental efforts. In those cases, state sponsorship has 
been critical to the ‘success’ of initiatives, where later on also NGOs have actively 
participated. This does not mean that the emergence of the IANSA campaign itself is simply a 
consequence of state efforts, but that some particular small arms initiatives have been 
basically launched by governments rather than by NGOs. Indeed, there are several examples 
of those initiatives into where initial NGO input appears to have been slow or even non-
existent.205 
First, with regard to UN activities there are at least three areas were governments and the UN 
itself have dominated the initial steps. In general terms, the emergence of the small arms issue 
on the UN agenda does not appear directly connected with activities of NGOs usually 
involved in promoting this issue. The UN advisory mission to Mali in August 1994,206 
                                               
203  Paul Wapner, 1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, New York: SUNY Press, 10. 
204  In more traditional IR theories such as Realism non-state actors are completely pushed to the margins of 
analysis. 
205  It is important to note that some small arms initiatives were solely launched by NGOs. Governments have 
only joined later these campaigns either by financing those activities or by actually engaging in an NGO-
state partnership. For example, the UN General Assembly picked up the Fund for Peace’s Model 
Convention on Arms Brokering after the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference in fall 2001. 
206  The original Malian request for UN help dated back to 1993. The first mission included two ex-generals as 
advisors. For details see Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Yousouf, 1998, A Peace of Timbuktu: 
Democratic Governance, Development, and African Peacemaking, Geneva: UNIDIR, 151-155. 
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repeated references to the small arms problems by the Secretary-General207 and the first UN 
experts' group study in 1997208 were all launched by government or UN authorities and the 
first measure has actually resulted in a small arms moratorium in West Africa. NGOs have 
only supported and joined these initiatives later by providing their expertise209 and particular 
‘NGO legitimacy’ in their subsequent role in the policy development.  
Second, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) was primarily borne out 
of Norway's involvement with the Mali disarmament and demobilization project. It was 
developed in conjunction with the Norwegian foreign ministry’s efforts to coordinating 
policy-relevant research by NGOs think tanks and NGOs in this area.210 The creation of 
NISAT was not a direct NGO response to the small arms problem. It was rather Norway who 
wanted to assume a leading role in the emerging coalition of like-minded states acting on this 
issue.211 
A third important state-sponsored initiative has been the Organization of American States’ 
“Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.” This 1997 regional convention 
focuses on the long-standing concern of many Latin American states with the illicit 
trafficking in arms. It also makes explicit links between drug cartels and other criminal 
activities such as arms smuggling. It has been widely cited as a regional ‘model,’ but its 
sources are not NGO concern, but rather state concerns over domestic security.212 
Finally, not much attention has been paid by criminal justice and firearms control NGOs to 
the activities of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. In early 1999, 
                                               
207  The most prominent document in this respect is UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s report 
”Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.” See United Nations General Assembly, 1995, Supplement to an 
Agenda for Peace, Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the United Nations, UNGA Document A/50/60, 25 January 1995. 
208  United Nations General Assembly, 1997, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
A/52/298 of 27 August 1997. 
209  The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) hosted by the International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) illustrates this NGO-state relationship. NISAT runs databases on small arms 
transfers and provides information on the ECOWAS small arms moratorium as well as monitors it. The 
Norwegian government provides most of the funding to support this initiative. 
210  With government support four NGOs, the Norwegian Red Cross, the Norwegian Church Aid, PRIO, and 
the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs launched NISAT in December 1997. 
211  Other partners in this emerging government coalition include Belgium, Canada, Japan, South Africa, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
212  Latin American concern over illicit trafficking goes back to the late 1980s. It was first expressed in a UN 
General Assembly resolution on illicit arms transfers of 1988. See UN General Assembly Resolution 43/ 
75I (1988). See also “Measures to Curb the Illicit Transfer and Use of Conventional Arms,” UN General 
Assembly Resolution 49/75M, 15 December 1994. 
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it had started preparatory work for negotiations on a ‘Firearms Protocol.’ NGOs and activist 
groups that usually deal with such problems were only marginally linked to this process. They 
did not appear to have contributed to the final protocol in a significant way.213 
State sponsorship has been essential to the development of many NGO activities. It could 
easily be argued that the path of ‘influence’ between states and NGOs has been reversed: In 
many cases NGO activism can be attributed to the heightened interest of particular states – 
mostly middle-powers – in pursuing international initiatives in this area.214 Prominent 
examples of this would include the Canadian sponsorship of the August 1998 NGO 
consultation, the Norwegian sponsorship of the NISAT project, the Belgian sponsorship of the 
October 1998 Brussels meeting, and the Swiss sponsorship of NGO seminars and workshops 
as well as the Small Arms Survey in Geneva. In most of these cases, sponsorship means 
basically funding NGO activities, but also includes genuine government activities in this 
area.215 This implies that the activities of NGOs are at least partially influenced by state 
leadership and not merely by their own priority setting. This also highlights the complex 
nexus of state-civil society interactions in a broader context of ‘global civil society.’  
 
5.5  Networking and lobbying during the UN Small Arms Conference 
Similarly as with the bilateral state-NGO relationship there has been a complex interplay 
between the various NGOs present at the UN Small Arms Conference and the government as 
well UN representatives. Just as the NGOs and various lobby groups have influenced the 
Conference, the Conference had also its impact on the NGOs. It is therefore important to look 
at the variety of roles played by NGOs both before and during the Conference. 
Two distinct NGO communities can be identified throughout the preparatory process and 
during the Conference itself.216 By far the larger community was the broad coalition of some 
                                               
213  See chapter 3.3 (Targeting the Problem: Looking for the appropriate forum) for further information on the 
negotiation process of the firearms protocol. 
214  On the motivations of middle-powers to be active in ‘niche’ policy areas such as small arms control and 
what particular roles they are trying to play see Stefan Brem, 2001, “Middle Powers Tackling Big 
Problems: New Coalitions to Control Trade in and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons?” Paper 
prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting. San Francisco, CA, 29 August – 2 September, 2001. 
215  It is worth noting that some foundations, e.g. the Ford Foundation, have also sponsored NGO in this area. 
There are a few NGOS such as the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International whose work has been 
almost free of state sponsorship.  
216  It would be wrong to use the term community in a sense of a coherent, strictly organized group or network. 
In the case of the small arms control movement it is rather a collection of NGOs loosely bound together by 
IANSA and a lowest common denominator – a fundamental concern about small arms. On the other hand, 
the pro-gun lobby groups were united in their attempt to avoid any kind of small arms restrictions and 
regulations on domestic and international level. 
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300 groups working to control the proliferation of small arms and their effects. They were 
brought together under the umbrella of the International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA). The second group represented the firearms community. It saw the Conference as a 
threat to the right of gun owners and sport shooters to carry their weapons. Under the 
leadership of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), this group 
worked vigorously to minimize Conference outcomes. However, its most outspoken member 
was the National Rifle Association (NRA) of the United States. It worked closely together 
with the US delegation – before and throughout the Conference. One issue both non-
governmental communities agreed was maximizing the official role of NGOs at the 
Conference. They have started to press this issue already during the PrepCom process.217 
It is not uncommon that NGO access to UN processes is controversial. This is especially the 
case when international security issues are discussed and negotiated. Yet one of the key 
functions of holding a UN conference is to draw greater public attention to the relevant theme. 
From the UN’s earliest days, NGOs have thus been seen to play an important public relations 
role for the global organization. In the case of the Small Arms Conference, states differed 
widely on the permissible degree of NGO participation. During the first two sessions of the 
PrepCom,218 there were differing views among states over the types of NGOs that should be 
allowed to participate. For example, states such as Algeria and China wished to completely 
restrict NGO participation because they feared they would highlight human rights issues. The 
modalities agreed at the third PrepCom in March 2001 gave NGOs a recognized role in the 
remainder of the preparatory process and in the Conference itself.219 
A number of NGOs were present during all three PrepCom sessions, and representatives of 
NGOs were allowed to address special meetings of the second and third sessions. These 
presentations were well received and helped to temper the fears of certain delegations (e.g. 
Algeria, China) that NGOs would ‘hijack’ the Conference or cause embarrassment to certain 
                                               
217  David Atwood, 2001, NGOs and the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms, Background Paper, Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey. 
218  All three Prepcom sessions were held in New York. The first session took place from 28 February to 3 
March 2000, the second from 8 to 19 January 2001 and the third from19 to 30 March 2001. 
219  United Nations General Assembly, 2001, Decision on the Modalities of Attendance of Non-governmental 
Organizations at the Sessions of the Preparatory Committee as well as the Conference, A/CONF.192/PC/39 
of 23 March 2001. 
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delegations. The NGOs themselves thought that their involvement had improved during the 
process.220 
A large number of NGOs were present at the Conference. Originally, almost 180 NGOs have 
requested accreditation to it.221 Ultimately, 119 organizations registered and 380 
representatives actually attended it.222 They represented domestic gun control groups, groups 
concerned by the humanitarian effects of SALW proliferation or their impacts on 
development or health, faith-based groups on the one hand and gun collectors, sport-shooting 
associations and small arms producers on the other hand. While these numbers were modest 
in comparison with some other UN conferences, they succeeded in making their presence felt.  
The plenary session on 16 July 2001, Monday of the second week of the Conference, was 
probably the most important expression of the NGO role at the Conference. The 42 
presentations given by representatives of both the pro-ban and pro-gun NGOs reflected the 
full range of their expertise, concerns and interests.223 A series of side events was held by 
various NGOs in rooms near the main Conference rooms on themes like “Small Arms Issues 
in Africa” or “The Impact of Small Arms on Children.” Considerable NGO attention and 
support was also given to gun destruction events held by various governments in different 
parts of the world on 9 July, the opening day of the Conference. 
NGOs were also an important source of information on Conference developments, issuing 
daily reports distributed inside the UN and worldwide. A number of countries such as Canada, 
Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom included 
NGO representatives in their delegations.224 
It is difficult to determine with any precision the impact of the NGO presence on the 
Conference outcome. The Programme of Action that emerged from the process represented a 
watering down of previous drafts. In this sense, the firearm community had more impact, 
                                               
220  Report on the participation by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapon War 
(IPPNW) at the 2nd session of PrepCom for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, 8-19 January 2001 <http://www.ippnw.org/SmallArmsPrepComm2.html>. 
221  List of NGOs requesting accreditation in accordance with Draft Rule 64 includes 177 entries 
<http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/smallarms/ngolist.htm>. 
222  United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA). 2001. “A Programme of Action.” DDA 
2001 Update June-July <http://disarmament2.un.org/update/Jun2001/Jun2001.htm>. 
223  The full NGO statements can be seen on the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference website 
<http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/smallarms/ngospeakers.htm>. 
224  See United Nations General Assembly, List of Participants, A/Conf.192/PC/28, 15 January 2001. 
Accessible on the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference website <http://disarmament2.un.org/ 
cab/smallarms/confdoc.htm>. 
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because of its influence on the negotiating position of one state – the United States. It was 
widely credited as inspiring the uncompromising US position that forced the withdrawal of 
key provisions from the Programme of Action.225 
However, the real long-term impact of the IANSA-affiliated NGOs on the Conference process 
is undoubtedly much more substantial. The presence of these NGOs in New York not only 
underlined the importance of this agenda, but also strengthened the positions of those states 
which struggled to hold the line against further erosions of the language contained in previous 
drafts of the Programme of Action. At the same time, the encounters of delegation members 
and NGOs in New York will undoubtedly consolidate relationships that will form a key part 
of post-Conference follow-up. 
It is also important to note that the Conference was the result of many years of activity by 
governments and NGOs. In the run-up to the Small Arms Conference the NGOs developed 
their positions, strengthened their networks, engaged new constituencies, and raised 
substantial funds. Indeed, it seems that the 2001 Conference has strengthened the capacity of 
the small arm control movement to further engage in the post-Conference work. The 
experience of NGO involvement in the UN Conference process can leave no doubt that they 
will continue to be essential actors in the next stages of international action on small arms.226 
Reporting is a key aspect of their role as essential actors. Various proposals called for a 
reporting mechanism on the implementation of the Programme of Action. Until the very last 
moment, the draft text included provision for biennial country reports to the Secretary-
General and another produced by the Secretary-General. As with other specific follow-up 
mandates, this initiative was dropped in the final text. However, IANSA felt that it had a 
mandate by the Programme of Action227 and launched a questionnaire initiative to gather 
information on national small arms activities and initiatives. The information is provided – 
similar to the Landmine Monitor Report by the ICBL – by domestic and local NGOs and 
gathered and compiled by IANSA in partnership with the Biting the Bullet Consortium228. 
The first IANSA Report has been produced for the July 2003 Biennial meeting of States to 
assess the progress made by the states in implementing the Programme of Action. IANSA’s 
                                               
225  Stohl Rachel, 2001, “United Nations Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Conference,” Arms Control Today 31(7) September, 34-5. 
226  See, for example, UNGA 2001, A/CONF.192/15, section I, para. 16; section II, para. 40; section III, para. 
2; section IV, para 2(c). 
227  Specifically by UNGA, 2001, A/CONF.192/15, section IV, para 2. 
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covering letter stated that “NGOs in each country are well-placed to assess the extent of their 
own governments’ implementation of this agreement [i.e. the Programme of Action].”229 By 
compiling and publishing information on the implementation status, IANSA provided an 
important service for the involved actors, both government and NGO community.  
A similar debate took place on the question of small arms brokering. Already before the 
Conference, Fund for Peace – a research institute that focuses on development and security 
issues – has released several studies on this subject and has also elaborated a draft convention 
on brokering.230 Representatives from Fund for Peace presented the draft convention on 
brokering during the Conference as well as on other occasion before. Nevertheless, the 
discussion of how to tackle illicit brokering was much less advanced than it could be based on 
the non-governmental, but expert-based draft. As a result, there was much less confidence that 
the regions and the international community were prepared to start negotiating a legally 
binding brokering instrument. The Conference quickly developed a consensus that states 
needed to regulate the activities of brokers at the national level, especially since very few 
countries actually had already such regulation. The United States suggested that model 
legislation be developed as a precursor to an international instrument – and offered to use its 
own brokering legislation as a guiding example. As a lowest possible consensus on a global 
level, governemnts are committed in the final Programme of Action “[t]o develop common 
understandings of the basic issue and the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering.” 
At least – and due to the insistence and lobby activities of the Fund for Peace and other pro-
regulation NGOs, the UN General Assembly picked up and discussed the Model Convention 
on Arms Brokering after the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference in fall 2001. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
228  The consortium includes NGOs and university institutes such as Saferworld, International Alert and 
Bradford University’s Department of Peace Studies. 
229  Implementation of the UN Programme of Action: Questionnaire for the IANSA Report for the 2003 
Biennial Meeting of States <www.mena-small-arms.org/Roundtable_Meeting_report-
Fen_2003__by_RHSC.pdf>. 
230  Fund for Peace. 2001. Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of 
Unlicensed Arms Brokering, Prepared for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Washington, DC: Fund for Peace. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/ 
publications/reports/model_convention.pdf>; Loretta Bondì, 2001, Expanding the Net: A Model Convention 
on Arms Brokering, A Briefing Paper for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Washington, DC: Fund for Peace. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/ 
publications/reports/expandingnet.pdf> 
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5.6 The future role of NGOs in the implementation of the 
Programme of Action  
The Programme of Action itself provided a mandate for all actors – not only national 
governments, but also NGOs – to contribute to the follow-up of the UN 2001 Small Arms 
Conference. In particular, it engaged “the United Nations and other appropriate international 
and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the 
Programme”. It further called upon “non-governmental organizations and civil society to 
engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national 
efforts to implement the present Programme.”231 These paragraphs were essential to those 
states that wanted an explicit mandate to proceed vigorously with supporting efforts to deal 
with small arms. Equally important for this purpose was the statement that encouraged “all 
initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the 
Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in their implementation of the 
Programme”. In principle, almost everything done to address the small arms problem can now 
be supported by the UN Programme of Action. 
At this stage in the process, at least five conclusions can be drawn:  
· The relatively rapid rise in the issue of small arms and light weapons on the 
international agenda is the result of a complex constellation of factors, of 
which direct NGO pressure is an important element.  
· Perceptions about what constitutes ‘security’ and what is an appropriate 
subject for international oversight, transparency and accountability have had 
to shift from a traditional to a broader concept in order for this issue to rise on 
the international agenda.232 
· Although several small arms control NGOs have been ‘entrepreneurial’ in the 
sense that they have shifted their activities to take advantage of perceived 
                                               
231  In particular UNGA, 2001, A/CONF.192/15, section IV, para 2. 
232  One example of this change is reflected by the UN Security Council Resolution 1209 of 19 November 
1998, the first operative paragraph of which reads: “Expresses its grave concern at the destabilizing effect 
of illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa and at their excessive accumulation and 
circulation, which threaten national, regional and international security and have serious consequences for 
development and for the humanitarian situation in the continent.” The language is that of classic 
"international security" issues, yet the context (and the rest of the resolution) departs significantly from this 
logic. The second example is the final communiqué of the NATO Ministerial meeting (8 December 1998), 
which in noting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council action agenda for the next year, referred positively to 
the inclusion of “arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers and means of encouraging de-mining,” as 
issues under the arms control and non-proliferation agenda. 
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openings in the international agenda to pursue this issue, the taking up of this 
issue by NGOs from the development and human rights communities reflects 
a growing realization that the unchecked proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons has jeopardized the achievement of their core mandate in the field.  
· The momentum that the issue has is the result of the actions by a core group 
of like-minded states as well as NGOs. Most of these states have also realized 
that working with a broad NGO coalition increases their international profile 
and leverage.  
· The links between NGOs, states and intergovernmental organizations, and the 
pathways of influence among them, are far more complex than any simple IR 
model can capture. The problem with such a broad action plan of the pro-
regulation NGOs is that it is difficult to trace how the results have been 
influenced by the efforts of the IANSA coalition itself. 
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6 UN SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE 
 
The Secretary-General warmly welcomes the news today 
that the [UN Small Arms Conference …] was able to 
reach a consensus on many important first steps in 
alleviating this grave threat to international peace and 
security and to human security. He praises these steps as 
essential in building norms and in implementing collective 
measures against this global scourge.233 
─Press Release on behalf of Kofi Annan, 
UN Secretary-General, 
July 21, 2001. 
 
6.1  Preparing for the Conference 
Early in the morning, at about 6.00am on Saturday, 21 July 2001, the United Nations 
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects 
concluded. After several years of preparation and two weeks of difficult negotiations at the 
UN headquarters in New York, the national delegations reached a consensus on a Programme 
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All its Aspects.234 
The Programme spelled out the security, humanitarian, and socio-economic consequences 
associated with the illicit trade and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light 
weapons. It also included a set of norms to guide the actions of states in addressing these 
problems. By agreeing to this Programme, national governments made a commitment to 
                                               
233  United Nations Press Office, 2001, “Secretary-General Congratulates Conference on ‘Important First 
Steps’ to Combat Small-Arms Scourge,” Press Release. SG/SM/7896, DC/2796, 21 July 2001 
<http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2001/sgsm7896.doc.htm> (last checked March 2003). 
234  The full text of the final Programme of Action is included in the Report of the United Nations Conference 
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNGA, A/CONF.192/15) and is 
available on <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/files/aconf192_15.pdf> and attached in the 
Appendix of this dissertation. 
 UN Small Arms Conference 
 92 
implement a series of measures at the national, regional, and global levels. It was also agreed 
to hold a conference every two years to assess the progress made and to review the 
implementation of the Programme more thoroughly at a conference no latter than 2006.  
The Programme of Action provides a mandate for the United Nations, national governments, 
business sector, and NGOs to develop and implement practical measures to the prevent and 
reduce the small arms problem. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan welcomed the news that 
the Conference “was able to reach a consensus on many important first steps in alleviating 
this grave threat to international peace and security […].” He particularly praised these steps 
as “essential in building norms and in implementing collective measures against this global 
scourge.”235 
This chapter analyses the events leading up to the Conference and the two weeks of the 
Conference. It also provides an assessment of the Programme of Action, and looks at how the 
various contentious issues were resolved – or deferred. 
 
6.2  PrepComs and Shortcomings: The road to the Conference 
The initial task of defining the problems associated with small arms and light weapons fell to 
the UN Panel of Governmental Exports on Small Arms (‘1997 Panel’), which was established 
following a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1995.236 The 1997 Panel met from 
June 1996 until August 1997 and issued a report to the UN Secretary-General. This report 
addressed the following points: 
· The types of small arms and light weapons being used in conflicts; 
· The nature and causes of accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, 
including illicit production and trade; 
· The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing 
accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons.237 
As part of its recommendations, the report called for an “international conference on illicit 
arms trade in all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the present report”.238 The 
specific objectives of the conference were only gradually delineated. 
                                               
235  United Nations Press Office, 2001, “Secretary-General Congratulates Conference on ‘Important First 
Steps’ to Combat Small-Arms Scourge,” Press Release. SG/SM/7896, DC/2796, 21 July 2001 
<http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2001/sgsm7896.doc.htm> (last checked March 2003). 
236  General Assembly Resolution 50/70B of 12 December 1995 (UNGA A/RES/50/70) <http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/50/a50r070.htm> (last checked February 2003). 
237  UNGA A/RES/50/70, section B, para. 1. 
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While some countries favored holding such a conference, others were opposing it – for a 
variety of reasons. Supporting countries viewed the conference as a way to raise awareness 
and develop norms of behavior. It was also seen as a starting point to develop specific actions 
to which countries would commit themselves. Additionally, some viewed a conference as the 
only way to broaden the issue of illicit arms beyond a narrow arms control focus. On the other 
hand, skeptics were more cautious, fearing that it was too soon to hold such a conference, 
which could detract energy from the ‘real work’ of dealing with the small arms issue 
particularly on the regional level. Some countries were also concerned about putting the small 
arms issue into the orbit of the UN disarmament system, because they feared that the issue 
would be knocked down by the consensus rule or be hijacked by the pro-gun lobby – this in 
contrast to the success the landmine movement achieved outside the UN system. Finally, 
other countries were opposing such a conference, because they wanted to avoid any global 
discussions on an issue they saw as a matter of national sovereignty. 
Compromising to hold a UN conference 
In the end, a typical UN compromise was reached by appointing a Group of Governmental 
Experts on Small Arms (‘1999 Group’) to assess the implementation of the report of the 1997 
Panel and further develop the concept of the conference.239 Starting in May 1998, the ‘1999 
Group’ was meeting to further develop the recommendations of the ‘1997 Panel.’ The most 
important issue was to prepare an international conference. Many countries had in fact 
indicated their support for a conference on the illicit trade in small arms. As a result, the UN 
General Assembly resolution on small arms of 1998 contained the decision “to convene an 
international conference on the illicit trade in all its aspects.”240 
By late 1998, the move towards a conference had been influenced by the signing of the 
Ottawa Treaty241 in 1997 to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines. The UN secretariat and 
those countries who relied on the United Nations to tackle global problems were very 
                                                                                                                                                   
238  United Nations Panel of Governmental Exports on Small Arms, 1997, Report of the Panel, A/52/298, 27 
August 1997 <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/226/20/PDF/N9722620.pdf> (last checked 
March 2003). 
239  United Nations General Assembly. 1997. Resolution 52/38J, adopted 9 December 1997. A/RES/52/38 of 8 
January 1998. 
240  United Nations General Assembly. 1998. Resolution 53/77E, adopted 4 December 1998. A/RES/53/77 of 
12 January 1999, para 1. 
241  The official name of the Mine Ban Treaty or Ottawa Treaty is ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.’ For the 
development of the Ottawa Treaty see, e.g., Ken Rutherford, 2000, “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: 
Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines,” World Politics 53(1), October, 
74 – 114. 
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concerned that the Ottawa Treaty could set a precedent that would see more and more security 
and disarmament negotiations would take place outside the UN framework. They were thus 
interested in keeping the small arms issue within the United Nations. They were well aware 
that the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and supportive governments felt 
that the UN process had failed and therefore chose to create another negotiation framework to 
hammer out a resolution, i.e. a complete ban of landmines. While only in its formative stages, 
IANSA242, an NGO network of campaigns partially modeled on the ICBL, was beginning to 
push governments for a solution to the small arms problem in all its aspects. 
The results of the 1999 Group 
The ‘1999 Group’ had a dual-purpose mandate: The first task was to assess progress made on 
the 1997 Panel’s recommendations. They were designed “to reduce the excessive and 
destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons in specific regions of 
the world where [these] have already taken place” and “to prevent such accumulations and 
transfers from occurring in the future.”243 The second task of the ‘1999 Group’ was to report 
“on further actions recommended to be taken.” This included developing specific aspects of 
the conference such as venue, agenda, objectives, and other procedural matters.244 
In the process of addressing “further actions to be taken” by the United Nations, international 
and regional organizations, as well as governments,245 the ‘1999 Group’ provided a set of 
recommendations that served as a major source of actions for the planned conference. The 
‘1999 Group’ was quite representative of the United Nations as it included European 
countries, the United States, China, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In 
fact, the debates that took place within the ‘1999 Group’ already forestalled the difficulties 
that would dominate the conference two years later. 
The ‘1999 Group’ made recommendations on issues relating directly to the conference. They 
had an impact both on the conference process itself as well as the outcome. Particularly, the 
Group recommended that the objective of the conference should be to develop and strengthen 
                                               
242  IANSA was officially launched at the Hague Appeal for Peace conference in The Hague, in May 1999. Its 
predecessor, the Preparatory Committee for a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons, began 
as a website campaign and knowledge exchange platform, <http://www.prepcom.org>, in January 1998. 
See in particular chapter 5 on the evolvement of IANSA as well as e.g. Peter Batchelor, 2002, “NGOs and 
the Small Arms Issue,” Disarmament Forum 1, 37-40. 
243  United Nations General Assembly, 1997. Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
A/52/298 of 27 August 1997, para 78. 
244  United Nations General Assembly, 1997, Resolution 52/38J, adopted 9 December 1997. A/RES/52/38 of 8 
January 1998. 
245  UNGA, 1997, A/52/298 of 27 August 1997, section IV. 
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international efforts to prevent, combat, and eventually eradicate the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons. Prior to this, several key countries, especially the United States, had 
played down the need for international initiatives. Other countries were concerned that the 
focus on global efforts would reduce, or at least undermine, regional and sub-regional 
achievements. As a compromise, the Group recommended that the conference should 
strengthen or develop norms and measures at the global, regional, and national levels. 
Regarding the scope of the conference, the ‘1999 Group’ addressed the fine line between 
illicit and licit in a comprehensive manner, noting that: 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is closely linked to the 
excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of such arms. 
The scope of the Conference should therefore not be limited to 
criminal breaches of existing arms legislation and export/import 
controls but consideration should be given to all relevant factors 
leading to the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms 
and light weapons in the context of the illicit arms trade.246 
Like its predecessor, the ‘1999 Group’ did not, however, attempt to establish a formal agenda 
for the conference. It also deferred the decisions on dates and venue to the preparatory 
meetings. This was a major shortcoming at this stage.  
By late 1999, it was clear that there would be a UN conference on small arms. The 
contentious work of shaping a formal decision began with the drafting of the UN General 
Assembly resolution 54/54V,247 despite the misgivings some countries had about the 
initiative. Prior agreement on key assumptions and principles were codified in this resolution 
which was adopted in December 1999. Countries had little difficulties agreeing on most of the 
preambular paragraphs. The resolution defined the small arms problem as urgent and in need 
for a comprehensive approach to its resolution. It further recognized the importance of civil 
society as well as the humanitarian and socio-economic consequences stemming from the 
ready availability of small arms. It established a connection between terrorism, organized 
crime, and drug trafficking. In the resolution, the UN members decided to convene a 
conference in June/July 2001 and to hold three preparatory committee meetings (PrepComs). 
At that stage, only the date for the first meeting (28 February to 3 March 2000) was agreed. 
                                               
246  United Nations General Assembly, 1997, A/52/298 of 27 August 1997, para 132. 
247  United Nations General Assembly, 1999, Resolution 54/54V, adopted 15 December, A/RES/54/54 of 10 
January 2000. 
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Details on the venue and dates of the Conference as well as the other two PrepComs were left 
to the first PrepCom to decide. Also other important issues such as objectives and agenda of 
the Conference as well as a draft document that would later become the Programme of Action 
where deferred. 
The progress and results of the PrepComs 
The actual work of the Conference began with the first meeting of the PrepCom at the UN 
Headquarters in New York, from 28 February to 3 March 2000. This meeting got bogged 
down in procedural issues – such as NGO participation. There was little substantive 
discussion. Despite this disappointment for more progressive countries, the proposed 
Programme of Action began to take shape as governments laid out their basic positions. 
There was a fair amount of agreement on a range of measures more strictly related to the 
illicit trade in small arms. These included the need for effective border controls, better 
enforcement of existing UN arms embargoes, improvements in marking and tracing of small 
arms, the need for safe and secure storage of stockpiles, the destruction of surplus weapons, 
but also the right of sovereign states to produce, acquire, use, and export small arms and light 
weapons. Predictably, there was no agreement on the more contentious subjects where 
national interests were an issue of discussion such as making a link between responsible 
weapons transfers and human rights as well as humanitarian law. 
Given the preliminary and inconclusive results from the first meeting, the chairman of the 
PrepComs, Ambassador Carlos dos Santos, Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the 
United Nations, conducted two informal consultations prior to the second PrepCom session. 
These consultative meetings were held in New York from 17 to 19 July and on 6 October 
2000. At the second consultative meeting, Ambassador dos Santos issued an informal 
proposal entitled Draft Structure and Elements for a Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. 
In general, the negotiating parties agreed that this document should serve as the basis for the 
first draft of a Programme of Action. The draft would be debated at the second PrepCom. 
Based on informal responses to this Draft Structure, the chairman of the PrepCom revised it 
until early November 2000 and gave it to a group of external and internal advisors248 with the 
task of drawing up the draft Programme of Action. 
                                               
248  This ad hoc advisory group included experts from the United Nations, national governments as well as 
academia and think tanks. Edward Laurance of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) also 
belonged to this expert group and was a key contributor to the drafting of the Programme of Action. 
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The second PrepCom meeting was held at UN Headquarters in New York from 8 to 19 
January 2001. At this meeting, procedural issues were less evident, and proved far less 
controversial than during the first PrepCom. The participating countries mainly focused on 
actually starting the negotiations on a consensus text of the Programme of Action. The first 
draft of the Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/PC/L.4) was issued a month before the 
second PrepCom. This 18-page document attempted to integrate various proposals for a 
preambular section, measures at the national, regional, and global levels, and for an 
implementation and follow-up process. The central part of the draft formulated measures on 
the following issues: 
· illicit manufacturing, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfers; 
· measures to prevent diversion from legal manufacture, acquisition, and 
transfer;  
· transparency, confidence building, and exchange of information 
· stockpile management and safe storage; 
· collection and destruction of illicit and surplus small arms; 
· civilian possession; and 
· post-conflict situations.249 
The fact that the first draft was issued only a month prior to the second PrepCom meant that 
most delegations had very little time to study and consult it before the start of the session. 
Some delegations, including the United States, voiced strong objections to many of the 
elements it contained.250 
While the first draft incorporated a wide range of views gathered from many sources over a 
two-year period, the second draft (A/CONF.192/PC/L.4/Rev.1) was much more concise and 
clearly reflected the discussion of the January meeting.251 In effect, it removed much of the 
language from the first draft that was considered too controversial for the achievement of a 
                                               
249  United Nations General Assembly, 2000, Working Paper by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, 
A/CONF.192/PC/L.4. 
250  Many delegations also criticized its structure, arguing that, while it was extremely comprehensive, it was 
also repetitive and unduly complicated. Interviews with representatives from various countries present 
during the UN 2001 Small Arms Conference, New York, 17 July 2001. The interviewees asked not to be 
identified because of the sensitivity of the issue. 
251  United Nations General Assembly, 2001, Draft Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Working Paper by the Chairman of the 
Preparatory Committee, A/CONF.192/PC/L.4/Rev.1, 12 February 2001. This draft version was issued on 
12 February 2001, more than a month before the third PrepCom. 
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consensus. It also narrowed the Programme of Action to focus only on those critical issues 
that had been identified during the debates at the second PrepCom. Most countries were much 
more positive about the second draft, and many delegations stated that it provided a good 
basis for negotiating the final conference document.252 By the end of the third session there 
was a fair amount of agreement on large sections of the second draft.253 
 
6.3  Negotiating a consensus at the Conference 
At the end of the third and final PrepCom session in March 2001 it was agreed that the 
PrepCom chairman, Ambassador Carlos dos Santos, would produce an informal paper 
containing his assessment of the discussions during the third PrepCom.254 Largely as a result 
of pressure from the non-aligned movement states, it was also agreed that the chairman would 
not produce a rolling text of the second draft of the Programme of Action and that L.4/Rev.1 
would provide the basis for negotiations at the UN Small Arms Conference in July 2001. As a 
consequence, delegations arrived at the Conference in New York on 9 July with only 
L.4/Rev.1 plus a compilation of views – which were often contradictory and confusing – from 
the discussions at the second and third sessions of the PrepCom. 
At the third PrepCom it was also agreed that the first week of the July Conference would be 
devoted to statements at the ministerial level. This is a standard practice for major 
international conferences and usually gives added weight to the proceedings. Additionally, 
this is also an indicator of the importance the conference has in the view of the states. 
However, arguably reflecting a lack of commitment to the issue on the part of many countries, 
the ministerial level attendance at the Conference was rather poor. During the first week, the 
Conference heard statements from 143 speakers, including one vice-president, two deputy 
prime ministers, 38 foreign and other ministers, and 23 deputy ministers. Of those speakers, 
131 represented their countries, four spoke for regional organizations, and 8 spoke for UN 
agencies and other international organizations.255 
                                               
252  Interviews with representatives from various countries present during the third PrepCom, New York, 19 
March - 30 March 2001. 
253  About 60% of the text covering 86 paragraphs has been agreed upon. This seemed to be a good progress, 
but as it turned out also already agreed paragraphs opened up for negotiations again during the July 
Conference. 
254  On 4 June 2001 Ambassador dos Santos issued his informal paper outlining his assessment of the 
discussions at the third PrepCom. It also summarized the problems that remained unresolved. 
255  Peter Batchelor, 2001, “The 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms: A First Step?” Disarmament Diplomacy, 
No. 60, September 2001. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd60/60op1.htm>. (Last checked March 2003). 
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Despite the presence of few ministerial-level officials at the Conference, the ministerial 
session turned out to be much more than a pro-forma event. On the first day, the US 
representative, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John 
Bolton, gave a harsh speech, which literally woke up the Conference.256 He called the draft 
Programme of Action defective and identified several aspects, which the United States could 
not, and would not, support.257 Most of the other ministerial-level statements were not nearly 
as critical or provocative as the one by the United States. Generally, they tended to highlight 
specific dimensions of the illicit trade in small arms related to their own country and region, 
while at the same time reaffirming their commitment to ensuring the success of the 
Conference.258 After the opening statements by the high-level representatives, actual 
negotiations on the final Programme of Action also began in the first week of the Conference. 
The chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, also used the first 
week to give states a final opportunity to comment on the draft Programme of Action 
(L.4/Rev.1). As it was clear that he would be required to write a new draft prior to the final 
phase of negotiations, he felt that he needed to hear the views directly from the countries. He 
also appointed various vice-presidents of the Conference to conduct consultations on 
problematic paragraphs in the hope of developing a more acceptable text for his final draft.  
At the beginning of the second Conference week, on Monday 16 July, Ambassador Reyes 
distributed a revised version of the draft Programme of Action.259 Since very little new text 
had been suggested since the end of the third PrepCom, this draft mainly reflected the review 
by the countries’ delegates conducted in the first week of the Conference. The draft contained 
some new paragraphs that had been agreed during the third PrepCom. But it left much of the 
language on the contentious issues the same as in the previous draft (i.e. L.4/Rev.1). Some 
countries, especially from the Arab League, however, were still uncomfortable with the 
language on humanitarian concerns and transparency included in the new draft.  
                                               
256  John Bolton’s speech is included in the Appendix and can also be downloaded on 
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements/use.html> (Last checked March 2003). 
257  For a more in-depth analysis of the US small arms policy and Bolton’s speech see Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation. 
258  Most of the speeches held during the July Conference by the representatives are available on the UN 
website <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements.htm>. (Last checked March 2003).  
259  United Nations General Assembly, 2001, Draft Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Working Paper by the President of the 
Conference, A/CONF.192/L.5, 16 July 2001. 
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At this point, Ambassador Reyes began a series of informal consultations on key controversial 
issues, such as the use of the following key-words ‘excessive and destabilizing 
accumulations,’ ‘civilian ownership,’ ‘supplying non-state actors,’ ‘transparency,’ ‘self-
determination,’ ‘export controls,’ and ‘follow-up process.’ Based on his assessment of the 
debate, Ambassador Reyes invited the representatives of selected countries to meet with him 
separately on each issue. By Thursday 19 July, there were still a number of paragraphs where 
no agreement could be found. 
On Friday 20 July, officially the last scheduled day for negotiations, the President of the 
Conference introduced a package of proposals in the form of six informal conference papers 
(CRP1-CRP6). They included new language on all the pending issues. One by one, as the end 
of the Conference approached, agreement was reached on all issues except ‘supplying non-
state actors’ and ‘national regulation of civilian ownership.’ The United States insisted that 
these two issues have to be dropped if the other negotiating countries wanted to have the 
United States join a consensus on the Programme of Action. 
Just before midnight, the negotiation clock was stopped to technically continue the bargaining 
on 20 July. And the negotiations dragged on the whole night until the early morning hours on 
Saturday 21 July. The discussions went back and forth and the negotiations in the plenary 
were stopped several times. At some points during the nocturnal negotiations, Ambassador 
Reyes saw no way to continue them because the discussions were too contentious and without 
prospect for an agreement. He asked the delegations to meet – mostly on a regional level – in 
order to continue the bartering in an informal setting. 
During these breaks coalitions broke up and were rebuilt, issues were linked and de-linked 
again, side-payments were offered and threats voiced. The African bloc, in a display of unity 
typical of its overall behavior during the Conference, insisted that the two paragraphs on 
‘supplying non-state actors’ and ‘national regulation of civilian ownership’ remain in the 
Programme. The European governments strongly supported them to stand firm against the 
request by the United States to drop these items. This stalemate held until around 6.00am on 
Saturday 21 July. But given the late – or rather early – hour, most delegations had conceded 
that these two paragraphs would have to be removed, if the parties interested in an agreement 
– however weak – really wanted to safe a minimal Programme from collapsing. 
The European countries realized that they could only safe the rest of the Programme if they 
give in and advised – or even pushed – the African delegates to do the same. This U-turn 
included both a compromise and a package deal: Make concessions to safe the whole 
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arrangement. Finally, the African states agreed to drop the two paragraphs, and the US 
delegation agreed to allow a follow-up conference (not capitalized!) to be held no lather than 
2006. This was also one of the original US red flags, but probably one that was erected 
strategically to trade in at the end. But the United States was not willing that additional 
resources would be allocated for the follow-up process. Furthermore, there should be no 
additional bureaucracy or infrastructure. The participants also agreed that the date and venue 
would be decided at the 58th session of the General Assembly in fall 2003. This was a classic 
compromise, setting a date and a mechanism for a review process and establishing a 
monitoring mechanism (biennial meetings), while giving the United States and other skeptics 
time to resist a review conference. It also tries to keep the process within the United Nations, 
giving those who might be unhappy with the rate of progress reason not to take the issue 
outside the UN framework. 
Being quite disappointed about the compromise at the very last stage of the negotiations, 
Ambassador Reyes made a very strong final statement describing what had happened behind 
closed doors. He did so during the adoption of the final Programme later on Saturday and 
noted: 
While congratulating all participants for their diligence in reaching a new 
consensus, I must, as President, also express my disappointment over the 
Conference’s inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State [i.e. the 
United States], on language recognizing the need to establish and maintain 
controls over private ownership of these deadly weapons and the need for 
preventing sales of such arms to non-state groups. 
The states of the region most afflicted by this global crisis, Africa, had 
agreed only with the greatest reluctance to the deletion of proposed 
language addressing these vital issues. [...] They did so strictly in the 
interests of reaching a compromise that would permit the world community 
as a whole to proceed together with some first steps at the global level to 
alleviate this common threat.260 
                                               
260  Camilo Reyes, 2001, Statement by the President of the Conference after the Adoption of the Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its 
Aspects, New York, 21 July 2001, Reproduced in UN document A/CONF.192/15 (Annex). 
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements/president.html> 
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In the afternoon of Saturday 21 July, the Conference adopted the orally amended draft 
Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/L.5/Rev.1) and its report to the General Assembly by 
consensus.261 
 
6.4  Assessing the UN Small Arms Conference 
As we have seen in this chapter, the efforts to achieve consensus on the draft Programme of 
Action was in the end reduced to negotiations around two issues: civilian possession and 
transfers to non-state actors. In both cases the US delegation wanted these issues be dropped 
from the final document, while many other delegations strongly supported their inclusion. 
While it appeared that the United States was isolated on the two issues, many delegations262 
were in fact content to hide behind the US stance and to remain silent during the negotiations. 
Contrary to some other countries with a large small arms production and exporting industry, 
the EU and its member states were much more aggressive in trying to achieve a more far-
reaching Programme of Action. With regard to the role of the European Union and its 
collaboration with NGOs two points are worth mentioning: First, the European Union pursued 
a strong position at the UN Conference and advocated specific references to the need to 
develop and respect export criteria, to negotiate legally-binding instruments on arms 
brokering and on illicit weapons tracing, to encourage greater transparency in the export and 
import of small arms, and to work together with NGOs. This acknowledgement to collaborate 
with NGOs was also implemented by the financial and political support of various SALW 
initiatives and projects conducted by NGOs and the inclusion of NGO experts in some of the 
national delegation during the PrepComs and the Conference. The EU had to abandon its 
strong position in the conference end game, but its long insistence, nevertheless, reflected a 
definition of state interests that was quite different than that of the United States. 
Second, individual EU states have pursued even more active policies to stem small arms 
proliferation. France has made noteworthy progress in promoting greater transparency 
concerning arms exports, especially by supporting the marking and tracing initiative together 
with Switzerland.263 Netherlands was a key promoter of destruction of surplus weapons and 
                                               
261  United Nations General Assembly, 2001, Draft Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/L.6, 19 July 2001. 
262  Among other small arms producers, China and Russia were also – at least silently – against restrictions on 
civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors. Interviews with national representatives during the UN 
2001 Small Arms Conference, New York, 20 July 2001. The interviewees asked not to be identified 
because they were not authorized to speak on the record. 
263  See Chapter 8 for more details on the French-Swiss initiative on small arms marking and tracing. 
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assistance to exporting and affected states in East-Central Europe. Finally, the EU has 
initiated technical and financial assistance projects (such as in Albania or Cambodia) for 
weapons collection and destruction. In all of these cases, it can be demonstrated that state 
interests have changed. In the absence of the multilateral process, pressure and lobbying from 
NGOs as well as the attention it drew to the topic of small arms and light weapons, it is 
unlikely that these initiatives would have been pursued. Further, insofar as some EU states 
(notably United Kingdom and France) would be assumed by structural realists to have similar 
geopolitical interests as the United States, these differences in how state interests are defined 
challenge the structural realist accounts of interest formation that exclude domestic processes 
and the possible influence of NGOs or multilateral processes on them. 
After nearly seven months of negotiations, culminating in the final two weeks in New York, 
the Conference was able to agree by consensus on a Programme of Action. This achievement 
by itself, given the state of the multilateral climate on small arms issues even a few years ago, 
means that the Conference can be considered a – qualified – success. 
The Conference itself was important for at least three reasons. First, it generated an 
international debate on the small arms issue and forced states to go on record with their views 
on the causes and consequences of the problem, as well as on the action they supported.264 
Those governments and NGOs preparing to take the issue forward now have a much better 
idea of which countries might be part of any coalition of ‘like-minded states’ that could 
provide leadership. Second, the Conference generated two weeks of high-level international 
media attention and as such raised awareness of the various dimensions of the small arms 
issue. Third, the Conference helped to build partnerships amongst civil society groups, and 
between NGOs and government delegations. These partnerships will be crucial for future 
efforts to address the different dimensions of the small arms issue. 
The Programme of Action itself can be regarded as a positive outcome in so far as it defines 
norms and principles that will guide the work of the international community on the small 
arms issue. In particular, the Programme confirms that the problems caused by the 
proliferation and misuse of small arms are multi-faceted. They go much beyond arms control 
and disarmament issues. They include conflict prevention, development, crime control, public 
health as well as humanitarian dimensions. The Programme also establishes the general 
principle that durable solutions to armed conflicts must focus on the tools of violence as well 
                                               
264  See the Small Arms Survey’s UN Conference database for details of country statements and positions: 
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>.  
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as root causes. Furthermore, it assigns primary responsibility for solving the problems of 
small arms to governments. They have committed themselves to wide-range improvements in 
the way they manage the production, acquisition, export, re-export, transfer, storage, 
collection, and destruction of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, the Programme 
highlights the importance of both regional and global measures. Finally, despite major efforts 
by some countries to restrict the scope of the Programme of Action just to illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons, the document does not only include progress reports, biennial 
meetings and a review conference no later than 2006, but also a mandate for the mobilization 
of resources and expertise by countries to promote the implementation of the Programme. 
Most importantly, cooperation with civil society and international organizations was also 
specifically mentioned. 
However, two important concepts have been tremendously watered down during the 
negotiation process: the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of SALW and national 
transparency. 
Since the small arms issue has emerged on the UN agenda in 1995, the excessive and 
destabilizing accumulation of these weapons had been identified as one of its major 
manifestations. This implied that the negative consequences of small arms go beyond their 
‘illicit trade’. The phrase had therefore become a code for addressing the legal production, 
acquisition, and transfer of these weapons. In that sense, it was an invitation for controversy. 
Already during the third PrepCom, the Arab group in particular began to call for the 
elimination of all references to ‘excessive and destabilizing accumulation’ and tried to 
substitute the much narrower term ‘illicit trade’. In one of the more innovative solutions to 
stalemate at the Conference, the phrase remained in the Preamble, but was removed from the 
Measures section of the Programme. The removal of the term from the Measures section 
meant that no (direct) reference was made to restraint in the legal acquisition or export of 
these weapons – a disappointment to the EU and others who felt that some sort of restraint 
provision was crucial to an effective solution. 
Like the term ‘excessive and destabilizing accumulation’, the concept of transparency was 
critical to those states who wanted a strong and effective Programme of Action. In their view, 
legal production and transfer had to become transparent if the illicit trade was to be tackled. 
The EU and Canada pushed from the beginning to list government transparency as a basic 
principle of the Programme of Action. While such a principle was in the first draft, Arab 
League states, China and others, objected strenuously to it during the second PrepCom. The 
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President’s draft of 16 July did not mention transparency as a norm or principle in the 
Preamble. However, it committed states – as a national measure – to provide relevant 
information on illicit trade. Yet, it did not extend this information to cover all small arms 
exports and imports as the EU has suggested. At the regional level, the final Programme 
included “measures to enhance transparency.” There were no transparency measures 
envisioned at the global level. 
While the Conference and its Programme of Action can be deemed successful from certain 
perspectives, a number of factors temper this positive assessment. The most prominent is the 
fact that the Programme is legally non-binding. This leaves wide margins for countries to 
exercise discretion or interpretation through frequent use of such clauses as ‘where 
applicable,’ ‘as appropriate,’ ‘where needed’ or ‘on a voluntary basis.’ More importantly, 
several crucial issues identified by certain countries and NGOs prior and during the 
Conference have not been – or only very vaguely – included in the final Programme of 
Action: 
· Increase transparency in the legal production, stockpiling, and trade in small 
arms; 
· Agree upon specific criteria governing arms exports;  
· Regulate the civilian possession of (military-style) weapons; 
· Control transfers to non-state actors; 
· Negotiate an international instrument on marking and tracing; and 
· Negotiate an international legally binding instrument on arms brokering. 
Many governments and NGOs were even more disappointed that critical elements needed for 
the solution of the small arms problems were not included in the Programme. Sally Joss, 
IANSA Co-ordinator, stated in the closing press conference on 21 July 2001: 
When this whole process began we were aiming for a clear international 
plan of action. Instead this has been eroded to the lowest common 
denominator, and the framework that remains falls short of what is so 
urgently needed.265 
While welcoming the consensus Programme, IANSA expressed disappointment that certain 
key elements – including commitments to negotiate international legal instruments on 
                                               
265  IANSA, 2001, “Opportunity Squandered to Introduce Tougher Arms Controls.” Press Release, 21 July 
2001 < http://www.basicint.org/WT/smallarms/UN2001/pr-opportunity.htm> (last checked February 2006). 
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marking and tracing, as well as brokering, linking export criteria to human rights violations 
and humanitarian law or promises of greater transparency – had been left out of the 
Programme. Human Rights Watch labeled the outcome a ‘Programme of Inaction’.266 
The issue areas that are left many disappointed were those that had been identified as 
contentious form the beginning of the process in 1995. As the production, import, and export 
of these weapons are legal activities critical to their national defense, many governments 
resisted any attempt by the Conference to limit their sovereign rights in this area. Others 
insisted that a comprehensive response also required consideration of legal activities since 
legal arms were the source of most illicit activities. 
While the Programme of Action is not legally binding, it does contain a concrete set of 
measures at nation, regional, and global levels. It was agreed by consensus by all participating 
countries.267 As a result, it represents the first global framework to guide the work of national 
governments, regional and international organizations as well as civil society in combating 
the illicit trade in small arms. It has served to raise the level of commitment of governments to 
address the illicit trade in small arms. It also provides the justification for all actors, including 
NGOs, to monitor, report on, encourage, and apply political pressure to those countries that 
are not meeting their commitments. 
The holding of such a high-level, large-scale Conference may also pave the way for more 
innovative and effective approaches to international disarmament issues in the future. The 
Programme of Action could provide the basis for at least three ways forward: 
First, the process could remain under the auspices of the UN First Committee, and thus be 
dominated by an arms control and disarmament perspective. Given the well demonstrated 
need to broaden the scope and agenda beyond arms control perspectives this would represent 
a minimalist approach. 
Second, continued disappointment with omissions in or the implementation of the Programme 
of Action by countries may produce a version of the Ottawa Process outside UN auspices. 
This approach would focus more on the humanitarian and economic costs associated with the 
                                               
266  Human Rights Watch, 2001, “UN: ‘Program of Inaction’ of Small Arms,” Human Rights News New York, 
19 July 2001 <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/smallarms0719.htm> (last checked February 2006). 
267  As we have seen in this chapter this has positive and negative consequences: On the one hand, basically 
every country agreed to and felt committed by the Programme of Action. On the other hand, to reach this 
consensus a rather weak lowest common denominator has resulted. This agreement has been watered down 
by countries, particularly the United States, who have threatened to walk away from the negotiations if their 
concerns were not fully taken into account. 
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use of small arms. Main actors would be a core group of like-minded middle-powers in 
cooperation with concerned NGOs. 
Third, the United Nations could change the way it tackles the problem by recognizing that the 
small arms issue is multi-dimensional. Following this approach, the United Nations would 
create a mechanism that allows the consideration of the economic, social, and humanitarian 
effects of the accumulation, proliferation, and misuse of small arms. This would also include 
the effective participation of a wide range of stakeholders – both governmental and non-
governmental. 
At least until the scheduled review conference in 2006 it seems that the more minimalist 
approach will prevail. However, it will certainly depend on the outcome of this conference 
whether a coalition of middle-powers and NGOs will break new ground and start an 
alternative negotiation process with like-minded states and other stakeholders. This possible 
alternative creates incentives for the United Nations itself to keep the current process on track, 
to deliver specific results at least until the review conference and even to enlarge the 
participation possibilities by NGOs and to broaden the agenda. Yet, exactly by broadening the 
agenda, further progress might be even more difficult to reach as IANSA’s internal 
coordination and prioritization problems have shown. 
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7 CASE STUDY I: UNITED STATES 
 
The United States believes that the responsible use of 
firearms is a legitimate aspect of national life. Like many 
countries, the United States has a cultural tradition of 
hunting and sport shooting. We, therefore, do not begin 
with the presumption that all small arms and light 
weapons are the same or that they are all problematic. It 
is the illicit trade in military small arms and light weapons 
that we are gathered here to address and that should 
properly concern us.268 
─John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security Affairs, 
Statement at Ministerial Session of the 
UN Small Arms Conference, July 9, 2001. 
 
7.1  Domestic setting: a nation of hunters and soldiers? 
The United States is the most prominent civilian market. In 1999 alone, Civilians purchased 
more than 95% of the four million firearms manufactured in the country. Combined with 
imports – mostly from Brazil and China – of about one million, this means that the US 
civilian firearm stockpile grew by roughly five million in 1999. Production for civilian 
purchase in other countries added another two million. Thus, new production increased the 
global civilian stockpile by almost seven million in 1999, a level that appears to have been 
sustained since then.269  
                                               
268  Statement by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, 
Ministerial Session of the UN Small Arms Conference, July 9, 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/ 
smallarms/statements/usE.html> (last checked December 2004). 
269  Small Arms Survey (ed.), 2002, Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost, Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 79. 
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The United States does not only constitute by far the largest civilian weapons market in the 
world, it is also a massive military market. Its armed forces are the world’s best financed with 
a budget of US$ 328 billion for fiscal year 2002.270 This is equal to the total defense spending 
of the next nine largest military powers together.271 With a total of more than 2.5 million men 
and women in uniform – active duty and reserve – it also has the fourth largest armed forces 
in terms of personnel.272 US military procurement considerably influences global patterns, 
especially by setting strategic and tactical precedents that influence military and political 
decisions elsewhere. The significant decline in US military small arms inventories since the 
end of the Cold War has had broad implications in this respect. 
During the Cold War, the US military maintained large reserves of small arms for its armed 
forces as well as for its allies. Assuming that it might have to fight two major wars 
simultaneously – in Europe and East Asia – as well as be called upon to support allies in the 
Middle East and possibly elsewhere too, the US military establishment had a policy of 
procuring additional weaponry when feasible and preserving older equipment when possible. 
This stockpile, or floating reserve, was a key element of a national doctrine that stressed the 
ability to mobilize to fight lengthy conflicts. 
In the past, the Pentagon deliberately kept enough equipment to maintain a small arms 
inventory equivalent to roughly 2.3 small arms for each personnel in uniform. This was the 
practice from World War II to the 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War, however, long-term 
mobilization, involving the training of hundreds of thousands of additional troops, was no 
longer relevant. Long-term requirement for a large floating reserve of small arms disappeared 
with the doctrinal change in the mid-90s. 
With the end of the Cold War, the US military doctrine changed to emphasize rapid responses 
to smaller contingencies. There were the interventions in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 that established the precedents for future war 
fighting.273 Instead of lengthy warning following protracted mobilization as in the major wars 
                                               
270  See Jason Sherman and Amy Svitak., 2001, “DoD supports proposed US$ 32.3 billion boost,” Defense 
News 5 November 2001, 6. 
271  This trend has in the meantime even accelerated. Among other things due to the military engagements in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the US defense budget in 2005 equals those of all the other countries together. For 
figures from fiscal year 2002 see SIPRI Research Project, 2002, The fifteen major spenders in 2001, 1998-
2001. <http://projects.sipri.se/ milex/mex_major_spenders.html>. (Last checked March 2003). 
272  Only China, Russia, and Vietnam have a larger army by manpower. 
273  There is a difference between the relative short intervention period due to the technical superiority of the 
US military and its allies and the sometimes protracted stabilization and reconstruction period. 
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of the twentieth century, today’s wars are fought by ‘come-as-you-are’ forces, i.e. forces that 
are flexible enough to accommodate to quickly changing environment.  
Table 7.1: Small arms inventory of the US Army, April 2001 
 
Type Deployed Non-deployed Total 
Machine guns    
M2 flexible 19,999 3,785 23,784 
M2 fixed 3,107 634 3,741 
M60 21,552 2,560 24,112 
M85 66 249 315 
M249 68,640 1,737 70,377 
M240 9,746 2,450 12,196 
M240B 5,358 806 6,164 
M240C 4,359 1,059 5,418 
Grenade launchers    
M79 350 283 633 
M203/M203A1 57,829 782 58,611 
MK19 20,369 1,567 21,936 
Current rifles & carbines    
M16A1 144,275 74,418 218,693 
M16A2 640,520 1,443 641,963 
M16A4 4,787 11,290 16,077 
M4 carbine 77,671 787 78,458 
M4A1 16,494 3 16,497 
M231 6,745 9,636 16,318 
Obsolescent rifles & 
carbines 
   
M1 458 3,716 4,174 
M14 12,597 104,657 117,254 
.22 cal. Rifle 5,862 8,012 13,874 
.30 cal. Rifle 77 952 1,029 
Sniper rifles    
M21 447 0 447 
M24 2,153 110 2,263 
Pistols    
M9 158,711 21,621 180,332 
M11 2,789 38 2,827 
.22 cal. Pistol 1,830 14,196 16,026 
.38 cal. Pistol 541 69 610 
45 cal. 4,591 28,179 32,770 
Other categories    
Shotguns 5,581 1,610 7,191 
M3 sub-machine gun 135 12,502 12’637 
Pyrotechnic pistol 501 481 982 
Total 1,298,140 309,632 1,607,772 
 
Source: SAS 2002: 84. 
The implications of this strategic transformation for small arms inventories are clearest in the 
US Army. With a total of over 1.6 million firearms of all types as of April 2001, it has the 
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largest small arms arsenals of the US armed services. These range from virtual-museum 
artefacts like .45 caliber pistols to state-of-the-art Objective Individual Combat Weapons. 
The US stockpile is enough to equip a combined active and reserve force of 1.2 million 
personnel. It gives the US Army the equivalent of only 1.3 firearms per soldier. This is just 
enough to fully equip its combat forces with a small central reserve to cover breakage and 
other losses. Most of the reserve holdings listed in Table 7.1 consists, on the one hand, of 
newly arrived equipment that has not been passed on to its designated units – such as M9 
pistols and M16A4 rifles. On the other hand, it includes obsolescent equipment the US Army 
has not disposed of yet – such as M14 and M16A1 rifles or .45 caliber pistols.  
The low ratio of troops to small arms is the result of strategic choice. Since the new military 
doctrine does not integrate plans to fighting extended wars, the chance of soldiers of losing 
weapons in combat is lower. Most of the small arms reserve is more important today to 
replace weapons being overhauled rather than weapons that might be lost in the battle. The 
evolution of force structure is also an important consideration shaping the small arms arsenal. 
With an ever-greater proportion of personnel allocated behind the lines to logistic and support 
duties, fewer troops need firearms. Although the number is not readily calculated, a 
surprisingly large proportion of US soldiers never carries a gun after basic training (SAS 
2002: 85). For the other services, the tooth-to-tail ratios – the number of combatants per 
support personnel – are even lower and the proportion carrying firearms is still lower (see 
7.2). 
Table 7.2: Total US military firearms, by service, 2001 
Air Force 260,000 * 
Army 1,608,000  
Coast Guard 20,268  
Navy (including Marines) 800,000 * 
Total 2,688,000  
Total firearms per uniformed member 1.05  
 
* Estimated 
Source: SAS 2002: 85. 
With these changes, the US Army dramatically reduced its small arms inventories in the 
1990s. Initially, it ‘demilitarized’ large quantities of small arms through contracts for physical 
destruction. Among the largest were contracts that led to the destruction of 479,367 M14 
rifles in 1993-94 and roughly 350,000 M16A1 rifles in 1996. 
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These destruction events prompted the National Rifle Association (NRA) to lobby members 
of the Congress. The Congressional gun advocates reacted to this intervention and requested 
that excess weapons are made available to the public. However, since the sale of new 
automatic rifles to the US public is prohibited under a presidential order form 1994, they 
could not be sold on the US civilian market. Instead, the Congress passed legislation 
amending the annual Defense Authorization Act in 1996 to prohibit the Army from 
destroying further ‘collectable’ weapons. The amendment has been passed every year since 
then, but gun lobbyists still wait until these firearms will be made available for public sale 
(SAS 2002: 85). 
With destruction increasingly controversial, the US Army changed course. In 1995, it began 
to transfer many of its surplus small arms to foreign governments. Between 1995 and early 
1998, the export of 321,905 discharged Army firearms was arranged through aid packages to 
foreign militaries under the Excess Defense Articles programs. The leading recipients were 
the three Baltic States and Israel, all of which received the equipment free of charge. The 
Philippines and Taiwan had to pay varying amounts for the weapons.274 Most of this 
equipment has been exported by the end of 1999. This approach had the advantage of 
strengthening vulnerable friends and allies while getting the guns out of the Army’s own 
inventories and making someone else responsible for them. The integrity of the weapons 
should not be a problem since foreign governments are not allowed to re-transfer US-supplied 
defense equipment without permission from the United States.275 
Table 7.3 US Army small arms acquisitions in fiscal year 2000 
 
M2 heavy machines guns 952 
M4 carbines 9,428 
M11 pistols 311 
M16A4 rifles 14,895 
MK19 grenade launchers 1,517 
M240B medium machine guns 4,623 
M249 light machine guns 5,498 
Total 37,224 
 
Source: SAS 2002: 86. 
Today, the US Army has its firearms inventory very close to what it believes is ideal. It still 
buys additional small arms for modernization, but the total inventory is changing more 
slowly. In the fiscal year 2000, it acquired a total of 37,224 small arms (see Table 7.3), equal 
                                               
274  Lora Lumpe, 1999, “The Legal Side of Dirty Business,” Washington Post 24 January 1999. 
275  On the US re-export policy of SALW during the Conference see also Chapter 7.5 of this dissertation. 
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to some two percent of its holdings. It still sells some weapons to the general public. M1 
semi-automatic rifles of World War II vintage are released for sale to the public through the 
Civilian Marksmanship Program, a program very popular with collectors.  
 
7.2 US arms industry: still a growing business? 
The United States, together with China and Russia, is one of the world’s major producers of 
small arms. During the period from 1993 to 2000, the United States was ranked as the world’s 
major supplier of conventional arms to developing countries with sales of US$ 61.5 billion, an 
average of US$ 7.6 billion a year (Grimmett, 2001). Without exception, there is more official 
and unofficial information about the production of small arms in the United States than for 
any other country. Over 300 companies, all privately-owned, serve both the commercial, i.e. 
civilian, and military small arms markets. In the same year, there were 113 ammunition 
companies in the United States, of which only 19 had more than 20 employees.276 Three states 
alone – Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York – were the largest domestic producers (by 
output) of small arms. They produced 77% of the total volume of domestic small arms 
production between 1975 and 1997.277  
The small arms manufacturing industry is not a particularly significant sector of the US 
economy – but its political leverage is huge. Total employment amounted to 16,770 people in 
1997, comprising 9,907 in small arms production, and 6,863 in ammunition production. The 
total value of production was US$ 2.059 billion – US$ 1.2 billion for small arms and US$ 859 
million for ammunition, respectively.278 Thus, the small arms business is worth about US$ 2 
billion to the US economy in 1997, when the GDP was US$ 7.7 trillion.279 Figures provided 
by the ‘gun-lobby’ are obviously higher to underline the significance of this industry to the 
whole US economy. According to a recent study, the domestic small arms industry in the 
United States is “like a pyramid in terms of companies, and an upside-down pyramid in terms 
                                               
276  US Census Bureau. 1997. Small Arms Manufacturing: Economic Census 1997. Washington, DC: 
Department of Commerce; US Census Bureau. 1997. Small Arms Ammunition Manufacturing: Economic 
Census 1997. Washington, DC: Department of Commerce. 
277  Violence Policy Center. 2000. Firearms Production in America, 1975-1997. Washington, DC: Violence 
Policy Center. <http://www.vpc.org>. (Last checked March 2003). 
278  US Census Bureau. 1997. Small Arms Manufacturing: Economic Census 1997. Washington, DC: 
Department of Commerce; US Census Bureau. 1997. Small Arms Ammunition Manufacturing: Economic 
Census 1997. Washington, DC: Department of Commerce. 
279  This figure does not include light weapons production, most of which is for military use. It does also 
exclude the economic value of associated business such as sport shooting and hunting equipment. By 
comparison, the tobacco industry in 1997 contributed US$ 28.3 billion to the US GDP, while the alcohol 
industry contributed US$ 27.7 billion (US BATF. 2000. Commerce in Firearms in the United States. 
Washington, DC: Department of Treasury). 
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of volume. … A few giant companies make most of the guns … [and an] assortment of many 
other small manufacturers make the rest, some as few as one gun a year.”280 
Despite the small increase in 1999, total domestic production of firearms is still way down 
from the peak in 1993-4, when total production was over five million units a year. More 
recent unofficial information suggests that the firearm industry, particularly the handgun 
business, may be a “dying industry.”281 Production levels are at a 30-year low. Imports of 
handguns into the United States are also lower than in recent years. The industry’s decline is 
variously attributed to market saturation, stiffer rules for buyers (Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993), a massive decline in the number of licensed gun dealers (104,000 in 
2002, down from 284,000 in 1992), lower levels of crime, and declining public acceptance of 
owning handguns (Associated Press, 16 April 2001). The number of handguns produced for 
the US military has also declined dramatically in recent years. Purchases between 1993 and 
2000 were 80% lower than in the previous eight-year period. The drop in purchases by the US 
military is attributed to “smaller armed forces and greatly diminished threat in the post-Cold 
War era.”282 
Table 7.4: Top US small arms companies, selected financial indicators, 1998-2000 
 
Company Total sales* 
1998 (US$ m) 
Total sales* 
2000 (US$ m) 
Employment
** 2000 
Sturm, Ruger & Co 211.6 202.7 1’778 
Smith & Wesson 140 133 670 
OF Mossberg 20 75 585 
Colt’s Manufacturing 70 72 600 
Saco Defense 65 31 240 
Marlin Firearms   50 52.4 440 
FN Manufacturing (est.) 47 (est.) 45.9 390 
Crossman Corp 45 29 310 
Savage Arms 26 25 200 
Beretta USA n/a 30 200 
Remington Arms n/a n/a 2’200 
Total 674.6 696 7’613 
 
Notes:  * Includes sales of small arms and other products. 
**  Includes employment of those directly involved in small arms production 
n/a not available 
 
Sources: Ezell (2001); Gale Research Inc (2001); Reed (2001); Standard & Poor’s 
Cooperation (2001); SAS 2002: 28. 
                                               
280  Tom Diaz. 1999. Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in America. New York: The New Press, 23. 
281  Cameron Hopkins, 2001, quoted in Virginian Pilot, 14 August 2001. 
282  Greg Fetter, 2001, quoted in Associated Press, 16 April 2001. 
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Against this background of a declining US handgun market, Smith & Wesson, one of the 
most famous small arms producers for nearly 150 years, was sold for US$ 15 million to Saf-
T-Hammer. Saf-T-Hammer itself has been bought by the British company Tomkins for US$ 
112 million in 1987 (Los Angeles Times, 15 May 2001). Total production at Smith & Wesson 
in 1999 was 334,491, down from 680,717 in 1995. The company, together with other 
manufacturers, has since 1998 been faced with lawsuits from a range of cities and government 
bodies concerning negligence. The lawsuits sought reimbursement from gun makers for the 
high costs of policing violence and treating gunshot victims. Rather than fighting in court, 
Smith & Wesson negotiated a government settlement, agreeing to include locks on all its guns 
and to introduce a range of other safety features and changes for selling out (Associated Press, 
16 April 2001). As a result of this decision, the company’s sales have suffered in recent years 
because of boycotts from dealers and customers (Ezell 2001). 
Table 7.5 Top US producers of firearms, ranked by weapons type* 
Type Company Production 
1998 
Production 
1999 
Change 
in % 
Exports / total 
production (%) 1999 
Pistols Sturm, Ruger & 
Co 
161,058 213,876 32.8 3,519 (1.6%) 
Revolvers Smith & Wesson 139,583 152,724 9.4 37,857 (24.7%) 
Rifles Sturm, Ruger & 
Co 
332,538 426,226 28.2 453 (0.1%) 
Shotguns Remington Arms 
Co 
336,527 364,354 8.3 11,121 (3%) 
Total **  3,725,191 4,085,514 9.7 245,528 (6%) 
 
Notes:  * Ranked according to 1999 production 
** Total production of all types of firearms, by all US producers 
 
Sources: United States, BATF (1998; 1999); SAS (2002: 28). 
Sales by individual companies have mostly either remained unchanged or declined over the 
last few years. Production and total sales by the top companies declined between 1997 and 
2000. Only one major US company – O.S. Mossberg, which manufactures mainly shotguns 
and rifles for both civilian and law-enforcement markets – has significantly increased its 
sales, from US$ 20 million in 1998 to US$ 75 million in 2000. This was largely a result of 
good business planning and increasing demand for long guns, particularly shotguns.283 
In terms of value of sales, employment, and total production, Sturm, Ruger & Co. is the most 
important firearm producer in the United States. It dominates domestic production of pistols 
and rifles for the commercial market. Sturm, Ruger & Co. is the only US-based producer that 
offers products in all four categories of pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns. Rifles account 
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for nearly 40% of the company’s total sales. It is also an important supplier of military-style 
small arms.  
The most important US producers of military-style small arms, however, are Colt’s 
Manufacturing (M4 carbine, M16 rifle), FN Manufacturing, a subsidiary of FN Herstal of 
Belgium (M16 rifle, M249 squad automatic weapons, and M240B medium machine gun), 
Saco Defense, as subsidiary of General Dynamics (M2HB machine gun, MK19-3 grenade 
machine gun), and Beretta USA, a subsidiary of Beretta Italy. Both FN Manufacturing and 
Saco Defense are completely dependent on government sales. Because of its civilian business, 
Colt’s Manufacturing is less dependent on a single market segment (Ezell 2001). 
Two companies – Alliant Techsystems and Primex Technologies – dominate the production 
of military caliber ammunition for the US military. Alliant Techsystems had total sales of 
over US$ 1 billion in 2000, and employed 6,500 people. Its conventional munitions group, 
which manufactures ammunition from small arms to tank ammunition, had sales of US$ 421 
million in 2000. This account for nearly 40% of the company’s total sales. All the company’s 
small arms ammunition is manufactured at the Alliant Lake City Small Calibre Ammunition 
Company.284 In 2000, Alliant was awarded a ten-year contract, worth US$ 100 million 
annually, to supply small arms ammunition for the US army (International Forecast, 2002). 
Primex Technologies, which was acquired by General Dynamics in early 2001, had total sales 
of US$ 530 million in 2000, and employed 2,850 people.285 
 
7.3 The US small arms policy before the Conference 
The US stance on small arms issues is in large parts based on the Conventional Arms Transfer 
Policy from February 1995. Even though issued by President Clinton, the policy paper has not 
been revised President Bush’s first years and was applicable during the UN 2001 Small Arms 
Conference. According to that policy, the United States is undertaking and supporting a wide 
range of national, international, and regional efforts to address many aspects of small arms 
proliferation and control.286  
                                                                                                                                                   
283  Virginia Ezell, 2001, Small Arms Producers in the USA, Background Paper, Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 
284  The company was ranked by SIPRI as the world’s 39th largest defense company in the OECD and 
developing countries in 1999 (SIPRI 2001: 309). 
285  Less than ten percent of the total sales of Primex are small arms. The company was ranked by SIPRI as the 
world’s 69th largest defense company in the OECD and developing countries in 1999 (SIPRI 2001: 309). 
286  See fact sheet by the State Department. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998, Small Arms Issues: 
US Policy and Views, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: State Department, 11 August 1998. 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/conwpn/small.html>. (Last checked March 2003). 
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US arms transfer policy is designed to support transfers that meet legitimate defense 
requirements. It also supports US national security and foreign policy interests. On the other 
hand, the policy is designed to restrain arms transfers that may be destabilizing or threatening 
regional peace and security. Among the goals of the US policy are to promote regional 
stability, peaceful resolution of conflict, arms control, human rights, and democratization. 
Major elements of the policy include promotion of national and multilateral responsibility, 
restraint, and transparency in the transfer of arms.287 
Where such action is necessitated by overriding national interests, the United States applies 
unilateral restraint. In a positive interpretation this restraint can be read as more restriction for 
the sake of stability or in a negative interpretation this would mean that the United States 
exports weapons – also to non-state actors – when it deems necessary to pursue its national 
interests. On the other hand, the United States actively assists other countries in developing 
effective export control mechanisms to support responsible export policies, as has been the 
case in several Latin American and African countries.  
Decisions on arms transfers are made on a case-by-case basis. They are guided by the 
foregoing goals and a set of comprehensive criteria. These criteria include consistency with 
international agreements and arms control initiatives – as well as with US regional stability 
interests. Other policy criteria include weighing the risk of adverse economic, political, or 
social impact within the recipient nation, as well as the human rights, terrorism, and 
proliferation records of the country in question. However, the US record seems rather 
doubtful considering the massive arms exports both to countries which have rather weak 
human rights records (Arab allies, Central Asia) and deliveries to non-state actors that turned 
their weapons towards their own provider (Afghan Mujahedeen, al Queda).  
One recent and significant change in US law and regulations governing arms exports is the 
introduction of a law on arms brokering.288 It requires brokers to register with the Department 
of State if they want to sell abroad any defense articles or defense services subject to export 
controls. Any US citizens, wherever located, as well as any foreigners located in the United 
States fall under this law when they engage in the business of brokering activities. Specified 
brokering activities now require prior written approval of the Department of State. Other 
                                               
287  See on transparency later in this chapter. 
288  Loretta Bondì and Elise Keppler, 2001, Casting the Net? Implications of the US Law on Arms Brokering, 
Washington, DC: Fund for Peace. 
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brokers require prior notification with the authorities. So far, there has not been a real test in a 
court that has set a precedent.289  
To further the objectives of controlling the illicit small arms trade, the US Secretaries of State, 
Commerce and Treasury have been directed to implement the Model Regulations. In the final 
month of the Clinton presidency, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have 
been amended in order to carry out this directive. In addition to amending the ITAR, the US 
Office of Defense Trade Controls has modified its firearms licensing practices. Since June 
1998, all requests for approval for authorization to export firearms and/or ammunition to an 
OAS member country must have an import authorization that includes a series of 
information.290 Requests that do not include an authorization with this information will 
immediately be returned without action.  
The United States claims to strictly enforce its export control laws. For instance, Operation 
Exodus, a Customs Service program in existence since 1981, has made almost 14,000 seizures 
totaling more than $1 billion in illicit exports. In 1996, Operation Overrun, a task force of 
Customs inspectors aimed at seizing illegal shipments of military surplus and scrap material, 
seized more than $10 million in illicitly arranged exports.  
On a global level, President Clinton acknowledged in his keynote address to the 50th United 
Nations General Assembly session in October 1995 the need to focus more on the problem of 
small arms and on related problems of drug trafficking, smuggling, and increase in terrorism. 
The US approach to small arms proliferation has been to address in a balanced way, both 
demand-side issues, or underlying causes, and supply-side issues, such as illicit trafficking. In 
an effort to stem illicit flows as well as better regulate legal flows, the United States uses the 
full range of its policy tools. US demand-side efforts include initiatives by the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to promote the establishment of democratic institutions 
and practices, continued emphasis on respect for human rights, adoption of an integrated 
response to complex transnational crises, implementation of a number of practical post-
conflict disarmament and development measures, and support for establishing and enhancing 
regulatory and law enforcement capacities in threatened and war-torn societies.  
                                               
289  Kathi Austin, 2001, Arms Trafficking: Closing the Net: A Test Case for Prosecution under the US Law on 
Arms Brokering, Washington, DC: Fund for Peace. 
290  Requested information includes a number unique to the country of issuance; name of issuing country; date 
of issuance; identification of authorizing party; identification of importer, quantity, value, type, 
manufacturer, model and country of manufacture; and expiration date. 
 Case Study I: United States 
 120 
On the supply side, the United States seeks to globalize ‘best practices,’ including 
encouraging global adoption of model regulations on commercial arms transfers. However, 
the United States is not in favor of legally binding international instruments. But it supports 
imposition of controls on arms brokering and re-export transactions. It also provides 
assistance for stockpile security and weapons destruction. Finally, it promotes the early 
conclusion of an international agreement to restrict the proliferation of man-portable air 
defense systems – especially to non-state actors. As a supplier nation, the United States has an 
important responsibility to live up to its own standards of transparency and export controls as 
well as regulation of brokering activities.  
At the special September 1999 UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Africa, the 
United States initiated a number of concrete measures, including:  
· meetings of governments as well as international and non-governmental 
organizations to exchange information on regional arms transfers;  
· commitments to full and timely disclosure of all arms shipments being 
transferred into zones of conflict in Africa;  
· international support for voluntary moratoria on arms sales (such as the 
ECOWAS moratorium);  
· increased aid for capacity-building in Africa to monitor and interdict arms 
flows and strengthen sanctions enforcement;  
· adoption of national legislation to criminalize violations of mandatory arms 
embargoes and other sanctions regimes; and  
· support for effective implementation of the Firearms Protocol and a 
multilateral agreement restricting the export of man-portable defense 
systems.  
These initiatives complemented a number of existing US initiatives directed at ending 
violence in Africa. For instance, in 1994, the US government enacted the African Conflict 
Resolution Act, which requires US agencies to report to Congress annually on their efforts to 
improve conflict resolution capabilities in Africa. At the March 1999 US-Africa Ministerial 
called ‘Partnership for the 21st Century,’ the United States reaffirmed support for the Africa 
Crisis Response initiative. Since 1993, the United States has contributed US$ 8 million to 
support this initiative. The United States also continues its efforts to extend political, 
technical, and material support to the efforts of Mali and its neighbors to implement the 
moratorium on the import, export, and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa 
(ECOWAS moratorium). 
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The United States also participated in a wide range of international meetings, conferences and 
workshops. It was also part of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, whose 
1997 and 1999 reports made a number of recommendations – also related to the scheduled 
UN conference on small arms. Even though the United States has endorsed them, it also 
helped to water down their content to some extent. 
The United States participates in the Wassenaar Arrangement291, the Group of Six on Arms, 
the G-8 Lyon Group Firearms Subgroup, and the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) Forum. In the SADC Forum, the United States has issued a Joint US-SADC 
Declaration on small arms and light weapons and established a Joint Working Group to deal 
with small arms and light weapons issues.  
Towards transparency: National export reporting 
Countering the conventional wisdom that transparency is bad for business – and proving that 
transparency does not necessarily equate with restraint – the United States has issued a highly 
detailed and disaggregated annual report since 1997. The phonebook-thick document includes 
a breakdown of weapons each country imported from the United States through the 
government-negotiated Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, as well as a highly specific 
listing of the quantity and dollar value of weapons that the State Department Directorate of 
Defense Trade Controls292 authorized manufacturers to export directly. 
The report is known as the ‘Section 655’ report for the portion of the Foreign Assistance Act 
which requires that both the State and Defense Departments prepare it. The State Department 
section reports export licenses granted through commercial sales, with a breakdown by 
country of weapon type, quantity, and value. The Department of Defense section lists actual 
exports of arms transfers negotiated by the Department of Defense, again broken down by 
country, weapon type, quantity, and value. This section also includes similarly specific data 
on transfers of surplus weapons donated through the Excess Defense Article Program.293 
                                               
291  For more information on the Wassenaar Arrangement see <http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/ 
index.html> (Last checked June 2003). 
292  Information on the State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls can be found on the web 
<http://pmdtc.org/>. (Last checked March 2003). 
293  Additional reports such as Report Pursuant to Sec. 40A and Sec. 38 of The Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) (also known as End-Use report): http://pmdtc.org/docs/End_Use_FY2001.pdf; Notifications to the 
107th Congress; Pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (Sections 36(c) and (d)) (Congressional 
Notification list) (http://pmdtc.org/CONGNOTIFY.HTM) (Last check March 2003). 
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The report covering US fiscal year 2001 (1 October 2000 – 30 September 2001) was released 
in fall 2002. Previously, these reports were very difficult to obtain. However, due to a 
decision by the US Congress in 1999, these reports are now available on the Internet.294 
The reports are broken down in four discrete categories: 
· a country-by-country listing indicating the quantity and value of licenses 
granted by the State Department through its direct commercial sales 
program, sorted according to specific weapon types and models; 
· a country-by-country listing indicating the quantity and value of weapons 
deliveries negotiated by the Defense Department, sorted according to 
specific weapon types and models; 
· a country-by-country listing indicating the quantity and original value of 
surplus weapons that the US military is giving away through the Excess 
Defense Articles program; and 
· a listing of weapons imported into the United States in the preceding year. 
Prior to the publication of the ‘Section 655’ report, it was only possible to obtain aggregate 
dollar totals for arms sales or donations to foreign countries. Identifying specific weapons 
systems that had been shipped or cleared for export was time consuming at best, and usually 
not possible. For the first time, the report for 1999 lists out in detail some US$ 470 million of 
small arms and ammunition that the State Department authorized manufacturers to export to 
foreign countries.  
The total amount of weapons and military articles licensed for export by the State Department 
in 1999 (2001) was US$ 18.5 billion (17 billion), and the total licenses for manufacturing and 
technical assistance agreements was US$ 28.4 billion (35 billion). This amount comes on top 
of the US$ 11.9 billion (13.3 billion) in weapons deliveries that the Pentagon made through 
its Foreign Military Sales program.295 
The State Department only reports on licenses for exports, rather than contracts or weapons 
deliveries (unlike the Pentagon, which reports actual deliveries). These licenses are good for 
four years, meaning that the exact weapons systems or defense services listed in the report are 
not necessarily exported or provided in the respective year. 
                                               
294  More information on US arms control export policy and regulations, including embargoed destinations, a 
listing of US exporters who have been debarred due to export law violations and registration form to 
license as an exporter can be obtained at <http://www.pmdtc.org/reference.htm> (Last check March 2003). 
295  Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of 30 
September 2001, published by the Deputy for Financial Management Comptroller 
<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/Comptroller/2001_FACTS/default.htm> (Last checked March 2003).  
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Licenses allow companies to proceed with a sale, but many deals fall through or are executed 
for a lower amount. There is also an element of double counting between the defense articles 
and the manufacturing licensing agreements, as many licensing agreements include spare 
parts or other articles for which the exporting company needs to seek an additional, 
sometimes overlapping license. The actual amount of arms and services is estimated by the 
State Department to be half of what is licensed in a given year. However, it is not possible to 
know the exact quantity.296 
A law passed by the Congress in 2000 requires that the future iterations of the ‘Section 655’ 
report also includes information on the actual deliveries of articles and services approved 
under the State Department’s direct sales program. However, this law has not been fully 
implemented in the last report issued for FY 2001. 
The State Department report also shows a high rate of licenses for the export of small arms 
and light weapons, despite the Department’s commitment297 to reducing illicit trafficking of 
this type of weapons. For example, small arms, ammunition, and related material were 
licensed for export to all but two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Cuba and 
Suriname), a region where high crime rates, drug trafficking, and political instability would 
seem to call for particular restraint. How can it be explained that the United States has on the 
one hand well-established legal and transparency mechanisms, but on the other hand is 
reluctant to engage in international agreements? 
 
7.4 Red flags and No-goes: the US position during the Conference 
The United States was a major player throughout the Conference process. At the Conference 
itself, however, its primary role was quite obstructionist. This was clearly demonstrated 
during the opening day of the Conference on 9 July. On the first day, the head of the US 
delegation, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John 
Bolton, gave a fervent speech.298 After a few words praising the goals of the Conference, 
Bolton made it clear that the United States would not support a Programme of Action which 
he characterized as defective. 
                                               
296  Maria Haug, et al., 2002, Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency, 
Occasional Paper No. 4, Small Arms Survey, 84 
297  See on US small arms policy Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2001, Background Paper: Can Small 
Arms and Light Weapons Be Controlled? Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: State Department, 2 June 2001. 
<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/3768.htm> (Last checked March 2003). 
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Specifically he stated that the United States would not support: 
· prohibitions of civilian small arms possession; 
· limits on trade in small arms and light weapons solely to governments;  
· constraints on legal trade and legal manufacturing of small arms and light 
weapons; 
· promotion of international advocacy activity by international or non-
governmental organizations; and 
· a mandatory review conference. 
The media covering the event used various phrases to describe this ‘red-flag’ speech – tough, 
mean, hard, a warning, prepared to do battle, etc. The speech also made news for reasons 
other than its tone. The extensive citation of the Second Amendment of the US Constitution 
reflected the NRA’s influence on the American position. 
The paragraph in L.4/Rev.1 referring to advocacy was so uncontroversial that it had not 
drawn one intervention during the third PrepCom. Delegations were truly puzzled by the 
reference by Bolton to this item and assumed that the United States had included it to increase 
the unpleasantness of its attack on the draft text. Veteran disarmament diplomats at the 
Conference had a more sober assessment. Their goal was to reach a consensus on a 
Programme of Action, even if imperfect, for the cost of failure was unacceptable. In their 
view, two of the points made by Bolton on supplying non-state actors and civilian possession 
were well known. 
Given that the various drafts of the Programme had kept these paragraphs despite strenuous 
US objections the brusqueness of the attack was not surprising to them. The speech merely 
emphasized that the United States was indeed serious – something had to be negotiated on 
these two points. The paragraph on advocacy was not that important. The point on 
constraining legal trade and manufacturing was somewhat exaggerated, and in any case many 
other states shared that view. Finally, many felt that the threat not to support a Review 
Conference was a bargaining chip that the United States would give up in exchange for the 
deletion of the two sensitive paragraphs on supplying non-state actors and civilian possession.  
In more details, Bolton’s speech outlined the US position in the following way: The United 
States defined small arms and light weapons as strictly military arms that contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                   
298  The speech is attached in the Appendix and can also be downloaded on <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/ 
smallarms/statements/usE.html>. 
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violence around the world. They are separate from firearms, and the responsible use of 
firearms is a legitimate aspect of life. Thus, it should not be assumed that all small arms are 
the same. Bolton described the strict controls that govern civilian ownership in the United 
States, stating that weapons cannot be transferred outside the United States without legitimate 
procedures. He also described US laws on brokering as comprehensive. 
He noted several parts of the Programme of Action that the United States will not support and 
that the Programme of Actions goes beyond the scope of the Conference. These aspects 
should be addressed through national legislation or voluntarily on a regional level. The United 
States will not support measures that would constrain legal transfers. The United States will 
not support mandatory processes and will not commit to any legally binding instruments. 
Bolton requested that reference to restrictions on the civilian possession of arms be eliminated 
from the Programme of Action, and that other provisions that purport to require national 
regulation of the lawful possession of firearms be modified to confine their reach to illicit 
international activities.  
In the first actual closed negotiation session, in the afternoon of 11 July, the meeting has been 
described as very busy, with all delegations attending. This was not the case in the morning 
ministerial meetings that were almost empty, while the delegations still presented the view of 
their governments.299 Contrary to general expectation, the US statement by Bolton of the first 
day of the Conference has not prompted a general shift amongst fence-sitters towards the US 
position. If anything, the opposite has occurred, with some member states digging in to 
strengthen the draft Programme (L4.Rev1). At this stage, the majority of the suggestions for 
the Programme have been strengthening rather than weakening.300 This is rather surprising 
given the US drum-beat at the beginning of the Conference. The delegates of the other 
countries seemed to test the US position and were looking for room of maneuver.  
In the afternoon negotiation session, one of the key paragraphs for the United States 
concerning the transfer of small arms to governments has been discussed. While Indonesia, 
Brazil, South Africa, Egypt and Lesotho have seen this paragraph as important to keep, the 
United States only received support from Pakistan for deletion. The other ‘usual suspects’ 
(China, Russia, etc.) could easily hide behind the firm US position. Another hotly debated 
issue was the proposed prohibition of civilian ownership of military-style small arms. The 
                                               
299  Interview with representative of Swiss delegation, New York, 12 July 2001. 
300  See daily updates for summary of the debate. <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001UN/events/jul11.htm>. 
(Last checked March 2003). 
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United States built up strong opposition to it, but even some allied countries in the Middle 
East (especially Egypt as a regional leader) and also South Africa supported a ban. 
On both issues a decision was not within reach and the agenda moved on to the next issues, 
which were less disputed. But nevertheless, international programs for specialist training has 
been opposed by the United States, again, as it stated that the United Nations could end up 
developing an entire bureaucracy on training. Instead, it proposed training programs based on 
national-level donor assistance. Indeed, the United States was opposing any enhanced role for 
the United Nations and did not want to commit itself to new financial contributions or 
internationally binding instruments. 
On the fifth conference day, on 13 July, the first reading of the draft Programme (L4.Rev1) 
had been completed, and the second version of L5 has been announced to be available for 
discussion on Monday. Most of the comments made by the government delegates about the 
course of the negotiations were quite positive. Even the United States was not as negative or 
confrontational as in previous days. Though, it will not support what it called “an over-
bureaucratised formal process.” The United States accepted follow-up meetings to the UN 
Small Arms Conference on an “as needed basis.” It also expressed its willingness for 
discussion to find acceptable solutions to outstanding issues for the follow-up process.301 
Over lunch of the same day, the US delegation held a semi-closed session specifically 
reserved for US-based NGOs. Almost the entire delegation was present, and a large amount of 
NGOs also attended – both from the gun lobby and the small arms control interest groups.302 
As the United States wanted the scope of the Conference as narrow as possible, definitions, 
particularly of the term “in all its aspects,” formed a major part of the discussion. While they 
recognized the human costs associated with small arms, they did not see this as the focus of 
the Conference. A clear reference to the domestic gun lobby was also made regarding the 
definition of SALW. In the US government opinion it was only about military weapons and 
not pistols or hunting rifles. 
During this session, the US delegates also stated that the United States does not see global 
action as the way forward, saying that it is rather up to individual states to take action. This 
view was, however, at odds with other things that were said during the meeting – for instance 
that the United States expressed support for brokering restrictions. Furthermore, the United 
                                               
301  See daily update for comments of the delegates. <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001UN/events/ 
jul13.htm>. (Last checked March 2003). 
302  Interviews with US NGO representatives who attended the meeting (New York, 13 July 2001) 
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States did not think there was a place for the United Nations in the follow-up to the 
Conference, arguing that governments are not accountable to the United Nations or the 
international community, rather they are accountable to their own country and laws. A clearer 
reference to the NRA was hardly given than in that occasion. Finally, the United States 
recognized that other states are free to provide resources to implement the Programme, but 
that the UN Conference was not the place to create such a pool of resources.303 
When the new draft Programme (L5) was distributed on the next negotiation day, on 16 July, 
the overall mood was not very positive.304 Progress through L5 has been slow during the 
afternoon session, though President Reyes had called for an evening session. Several 
delegations, in particular the United States, have expressed their disappointment with the 
changes in L5, which they felt did not reflect improvements on problematic paragraphs in 
L4.Rev1. There was even a clear split between states from the Non-Aligned Movement and 
the EU, a coalition of states that normally walks together in these matters. 
It was less astonishing, however, that the United States was increasingly isolated, rejecting 
key text suggestions and not suggesting alternative language in exchange. It even rejected 
proposals to clarify definitions as suggested by India when it wanted to insert a footnote to 
refer to ammunition and explosives as part of SALW. On the basis that there was no 
scientifically proven link, the United States also opposed a new paragraph that made a 
connection between poverty and illicit small arms trade. Egypt, on the other side, even wanted 
to go further and to add other root causes for poverty. Also many of other African states 
supported this Egyptian sponsored paragraph – but without prospect of success. 
There was even a paragraph on terrorism and organized crime which was opposed by the 
United States. It opposed the paragraph mainly for two phrases “uncontrolled spread of 
SALW” and “controlling or reducing the supply and demand of such weapons.” It described 
them as “provocative and inflammatory.” This point is interesting to note, because it would 
have been interesting to see how the United States reacted to this paragraph after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. In any case, Norway, Canada and Namibia strongly supported this paragraph 
and other countries wanted to revert to the less controversial language in L4.Rev1.305 
                                               
303  Information from daily update. <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001UN/events/jul13.htm>. (Last checked 
March 2003). 
304  Interview with a representative of Swiss delegation, New York, 17 July 2001. 
305  See daily update for more information <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001UN/events/jul16.htm>. (Last 
checked March 2003). 
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At the end of the seventh negotiation day, on 17 July, Reyes warned that nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed. A clear statement that it was dangerous to assume that already 
approved paragraphs had actually been finished with. There will be additional final trading, 
which could open up debates about already agreed upon paragraphs. But especially 
paragraphs not yet approved caused a lot of diplomatic headache and were responsible for yet 
another evening session. The primary focus of the evening session lay on the negotiation of 
the Preamble. 
It was almost the only time the United States did not only disapprove with paragraphs, but 
also made suggestions. However, the US proposals were not very well received. It suggested 
that Clauses 10 and 11 from the Inter-American Convention of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) be inserted in the Preamble of L5. Clause 10 of the OAS Convention 
recognized that states have developed different cultural and historical purposes for firearms. 
Control measures on the illicit trade in SALW must recognize these different views and 
lawful activities. Clause 11 of the OAS Convention recognized that states have their own 
domestic laws to control firearms and ammunition. This was another reference to its own 
domestic lobby, indicating that it could not accept anything on the negotiation table that was 
unacceptable domestically.306 
Another reference to the domestic constituency was made with paragraph 15 in L5. The 
United States thought that it was even worse than the Paragraph in L4.Rev1. This paragraph 
would make it difficult for private citizens to import and export hunting rifles, or to support 
rebel movements against genocidal regimes. Consequently, the United States wanted it 
deleted. Both paragraphs were clear signs of the strength of the domestic negotiation level 
which was strategically used in the negotiations by the US delegation not to give in.307 It was 
clear for a majority of the national delegations that the United States would not compromise 
about the key concerns it has waved in the beginning of the Conference as red flags. 
Particularly, the issues of civilian possession and transfer to non-state actors were non-
negotiable. 
The agenda of any review process was equally important to the conference follow-up. This 
involved a repetition of the debate over determining the agenda for the conference itself. 
Canada and the EU wanted the follow-up to include not just monitoring implementation of the 
                                               
306  See daily update for more information <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001UN/events/jul17.htm>. (Last 
checked March 2003). 
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Programme, but also consideration of new measures. Until the very end of the negotiations, 
the draft of the Conference President included the mandate to “examine ways to strengthen 
and develop measures contained” in the Programme. This inclusion was resisted by the 
United States and dropped from the final text. The final version has not clarified the question 
whether the work of the biennial meetings will deal exclusively with the Programme of 
Action as written or whether it can also discuss and develop action on new issues. In the 
following paragraphs, this stalling will be further illustrated by analyzing the US position on 
re-export, civilian possession and transfers to non-state entities. 
Many countries, such as the EU and Canada, felt that also legal exports could have negative 
consequences, if the Programme did not establish export and re-export controls. If there were 
no established standards for export and re-export controls, this would create loopholes large 
enough to render ineffective much of the rest of the Programme. The key for these countries 
was establishing provisions that would commit governments to consider the implications of 
their exports in advance. Throughout the deliberations, countries such as China, Russia, and 
some NAM states resisted any measures that would restrict their ability to export or re-export 
small arms. This was consistent with long-standing differences between arms suppliers like 
the EU and the United States on the one hand and recipient countries on the other. The latter 
have historically resisted any restrictions on their ability to acquire – and re-transfer – military 
equipment. 
However, the President’s draft of 16 July (L.5) attempted to reach a compromise by including 
language committing governments to assess export applications “according to strict norms 
and procedures […] consistent with States’ existing responsibilities under international law.” 
This reference to international law was seen as too weak by the EU. In a further proposal, the 
President added “relevant” before “international law”. Finally, a consensus could be reached, 
when the phrase “taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into 
the illegal trade” was added, and the word “norms” replaced with “national regulations.”308 
A similar debate revolved around states’ ability to re-export weapons imported from another 
state. In this case, both sides of the arguing parties got what they wanted. States undertook to 
make every effort to “notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral 
                                                                                                                                                   
307  Robert D. Putnam, 1988, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 43(3), Summer, 427-460. 
308  See section II, paragraph 11 of the Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNGA, A/CONF.192/15). <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/ 
smallarms/files/aconf192_15.pdf>. (Last checked March 2003). 
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agreements before the retransfer of those weapons, […] without prejudice to the right of 
States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have previously imported.” It was 
quite uncommon that an explicit reference to the “right of States to re-export” weapons has 
been included. This was another clear indication of the strong influence exerted both by the 
small arms industry and the gun lobby. 
A majority of national delegations saw the possession of small arms by civilians as potential 
problem.309 They believed that the Conference should also deal with this issue. No delegation, 
however, was prepared to have common rules for civilian possession applied to the national 
level. That this is why the earlier language in L.4/Rev.1 was general, asking states to 
“seriously consider the prohibition of unrestricted trade and private ownership of small arms 
and light weapons specifically designed for military purposes.” Citing its own constitution 
and especially the second amendment,310 the United States opposed this provision. This 
opposition was not surprising given the opening statement by Under-Secretary of State Bolton 
as well as the strong influence of the NRA and the presence felt by its representative. On the 
other hand, South Africa, a country heavily affected by private gun ownership and related 
crimes stated that keeping this paragraph in the document was a ‘red line’ issue for it, too. 
Norway gave also an extensive defense of the paragraph. It argued that civilian possession 
was directly linked to many of the negative consequences outlined in the Preamble. 
In the clearest case of the NRA’s influence on the US position, the latter rejected any mention 
of the term “civilian possession” in the text, no matter how general, weak or lacking in 
commitment. Several delegations suggested compromise language stressing the prohibition of 
fully automatic weapons. Others reminded the United States that the language of the civilian 
possession paragraph came from the Report of the 1999 Group, to which the United States 
and the whole General Assembly had agreed.311 Several options were presented from the floor 
in this vein, each of which was dismissed by the United States. 
Reflecting suggestions from the floor and the US pressure, the relevant paragraph of the 
national measure section of the Programme of Action was changed to “establish or maintain, 
subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, regulations on the 
                                               
309  Especially, representatives from Brazil voiced very strong concerns being heavily affected by wide spread 
gang violence. 
310  Second Amendment as included in the Bill of Rights: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 
<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment02/> (last checked March 2003). 
311  UNGA, 1999, A/54/58, para 120. 
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ownership of small arms and light weapons and to apply those regulations in a manner 
consistent with the Programme of Action.” 
Again, the United States dismissed also this compromise language, as did other delegations 
that insisted that this issue was important enough to be retained as an operational measure. 
The US delegation tried to put forward language on this issue, but it was unacceptable to the 
rest of the Conference delegations. In the very last negotiation night, the negotiating parties 
decided to drop this paragraph altogether. 
Early on in the Conference, the United States flagged as one of its ‘red line’ issues the 
paragraph in the draft Programme establishing that “[e]xporting countries will supply small 
arms only to Governments, either directly or through entities authorized to procure arms on 
behalf of Governments.” The United States objected that this would constrain legal 
commercial sales to collectors and hunters, and would tie government hands more broadly in 
the future. This is another typical case where the domestic influence and lobbying can clearly 
be seen. The speech by the US Under-Secretary of State John Bolton at the ministerial 
opening day to the Conference made this abundantly clear when he stated that “this proposal 
would preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal 
government.”312 Yet many other delegations, especially from Africa, took the floor in support 
of the paragraph, suggesting some slight modifications that did not alter its meaning. 
The President’s compromise package contained a new text on this issue, taking it out of the 
measure section and making it part of the Preamble: “Believing also that Governments bear 
the responsibility to supply small arms and light weapons only to Governments, or to entities 
duly authorized by governments.” However, it remains open to interpretation whether 
“entities duly authorized by governments” means entities authorized by both the exporting 
and importing countries, or only one of those. As in the case of civilian possession of small 
arms, the United States rejected the proposed text by the President. This rejection rebuffed the 
African bloc which had decided to stand firm against the United States on this issue until the 
very end when they realized that a Programme of Action could only be concluded by deleting 
the issues opposed by the US delegation. It is interesting to note that at no time in the debate 
did any other state side with the United States on this question, even though many countries 
regularly export arms to non-state actors. Since they knew that the United States would not 
                                               
312  Statement by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, 
Ministerial Session of the UN Small Arms Conference, July 9, 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/ 
smallarms/statements/usE.html> (last checked December 2004). 
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back down, these states – particularly China – could afford to hide behind the US position – 
letting the United States appear as the sole obstacle to agreement on this issue. This behavior 
once more raises the question why the United States was so uncompromising. 
 
7.5 The NRA as a key actor 
The National Rifle Association of America (NRA) plays an important part in answering this 
question. The Second Amendment of the US Constitution builds the core of their argument: 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”313 From this amendment, the NRA 
derives the unalienable “right to bear arms.” According to the interpretation by the NRA, the 
Second Amendment speaks to far more than the right to keep firearms. It constitutes a 
fundamental US freedom worthy of defense such as freedom of speech.314 The NRA 
president, Academy winning actor Charlton Heston, stated in a speech at the Harvard Law 
School on 16 February 1999: “The Second Amendment is the backbone, the keel, the 
keystone and compass without which freedom is invariably lost. Aristotle knew it, anyone 
who considers it can comprehend it, and no judge can deny it simply by saying it isn’t so.”315  
However, the interpretation of the Second Amendment has always been a hotly debated 
subject in the US public – and in court. There are many court decisions on this subject, but all 
provide basis for new debates. The opponents to the NRA, mostly the gun control community, 
blame the gun lobbyists to skip the first part of the Amendment and to disconnect it from the 
historical background when the United States still had a militia army to defend itself.316 
Since the United States no longer maintains a militia army, the Second Amendment seems 
obsolete. But the gun lobbyists focus even more on the second part that can be interpreted as 
to warrant the right for all citizens to bear arms. Some right-wing militant circles even 
reintroduced the tradition of historic militias – some with a heavier emphasis on the fancy 
dresses, others with clear political and even criminal intentions. Members of these militias 
have been involved in a couple of assassinations that have generated nation-wide attention. 
                                               
313  See Second Amendment to the US Constitution: Bearing Arms <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/ 
constitution/amendment02/> (last checked March 2003). 
314  NRA. 2001. Fact Sheet: NRA and the Second Amendment <http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/ 
Read.aspx?ID=108> (posted 6 November 2001, last checked March 2006). 
315  Charlton Heston, 1999, Winning the Cultural War, Speech at the Harvard Law School, 16 February 1999 
<http://www.nrahq.org/transcripts/harvard.asp> (last checked March 2003). 
316  Jack Anderson, 1996, Inside the NRA: Armed and Dangerous, Beverly Hills: Dove Books, 51. 
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The most prominent event took place on 19 April 1995, when Timothy McVeigh, a member 
of the Michigan Militia, blew up a government building in downtown Oklahoma City. The 
hard core of the militia movement comprises approximately 20,000 people. It sees its main 
raison d’être in fighting the federal government who they consider as oppressive. They see in 
the armed people a legitimate balance to the power of the government. In their view bearing 
arms is a precondition for the separation of powers.317 
On this point the chain of arguments of the right wing militia meets again the standard NRA 
position, as Heston has argued in his speech at the 128th Annual Meeting of the NRA 
Members in Denver on 1 May 1999: “Let me be absolutely clear. The Founding Fathers 
guaranteed this freedom because they knew no tyranny can ever arise among a people 
endowed with the right to keep and bear arms.”318 By upholding the tradition of the civil 
rights movement, Heston even considers himself as a follower of Martin Luther King.319 The 
NRA sees the right to bear arms as a prevention measure against crime and as the inherent 
right of the weak:  
To imagine a world with no guns is to imagine a world in which the 
strong rules the weak, in which women are dominated by men, and in 
which minorities are easily abused or mass-murdered by majorities. 
Practically speaking, a firearm is the only weapon that allows a 
weaker person to defend himself from a larger, stronger group of 
attackers, and to do so at a distance.320 
The NRA was principally an organization for hunters and sports-shooters some thirty years 
ago. But during the 1990s the more radical wing gained more and more influence and 
streamlined the Association’s fundraising and lobbying activities.321  
                                               
317  Keep and Bear Arms, 2000, “The Arkansas Republic: Declaration of Sovereignty, Independence, and 
Allegiance,” News and Editorials <http://www.keepandbeararms.com/newsarchives/XcNewsPlus. 
asp?cmd=view&articleid=904> (last checked March 2003); Christian Guide to Small Arms even criticizes 
that “NRA has time and again failed to protect the right to keep and bear arms.” 
<http://www.frii.com/~gosplow/cgsa.html> (last checked March 2003). 
318  Charlton Heston, 1999, Speech at the 128th Annual Meeting of the NRA Members, Denver, CO, 1 May 
1999 <http://www.tsra.com/Heston2.htm> (last checked March 2003). 
319  Charlton Heston, 1999, Winning the Cultural War, Speech at the Harvard Law School, 16 February 1999 
<http://www.nrahq.org/transcripts/harvard.asp> (last checked March 2003). 
320  Dave Kopel, Paul Gallant and Joanne Eisen, 2003, A World Without Guns, America’s First Freedom, One 
on One Column <http://www.nrahq.org/publications/tag/feature1.asp> (last checked February 2003). 
321  The Economist, 2000, In the Cross-Hairs, 6 July 2000, 53. 
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After a sequel of hate crimes and assassination with firearms, there were serious tensions 
between fundamentalist gun-lobbyists on the one hand and moderate NRA members and 
majority of the gun industry on the other hand, which increasingly feared claims of 
compensations similar to the tobacco industry.322 While the moderate wing would accept 
higher restriction to dampen public pressure, the hardliners, however, see no connection 
between gun regulation and reduction of gun casualties – even though resulting in 30,000 
deaths annually in the United States.323 In their view, even weak gun laws are depicted as 
another step on the slippery slope towards state tyranny. As Randy Gibson, executive director 
of the NRA’s affiliate organization in Texas, puts it, “The gun-control laws are just steps 
towards law-abiding citizens losing all their rights to own weapons.”324 They argue that 
people kill and not weapon. This means that a higher spread of weapons does not necessarily 
result in higher casualty rates; and recalling traditional and religious values could mitigate the 
problem.325 
The more fundamentalist and radical wing has gained the upper hand over the NRA’s agenda 
with the election of the current executive vice president, Wayne LaPierre. He has put 
enormous pressure on the more moderate NRA members to follow his tougher line or to keep 
a low profile in public.326 LaPierre has long warned the NRA about the evil ways of the 
liberal political elite and has denounced the Million Mom March as “a big, stinking, 
dangerous, Al Gore lie.” In a fund-raising letter he accused agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, the federal agency responsible for gun law enforcement, of being 
“jackbooted thugs.”327 
This rude political tone provoked an exodus of several moderate NRA members, including 
George Bush senior. They were worried about the image of the Republican Party, since there 
are close links – both financially and personally – between the GOP and the NRA. Shortly 
after Columbine high school shooting in April 1999, the NRA was on the defensive. Yet, by 
                                               
322  Lorenz, Kummer, 1999, “Waffenhersteller unter Druck,” Zürcher Oberländer 19 February 1999, 3. 
323  On casualties see Walter Niederberger, 2003, “Die miesen Tricks der Waffenlobby,” Tages-Anzeiger 11 
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organizing a more coherent lobbying effort in Congress, the NRA was able to prevent any 
stricter gun regulations on a federal level. 
Part of its strength stems from the fact that the NRA belongs to the best-organized and well-
funded lobby groups in the United States.328 Its immense organizational infrastructure and 
financial resources provide the NRA an enormous leverage to promote its interest. It has 
almost 4.5 million members and an annual budget of more than US$ 200 million.329 The NRA 
has a specially designed professional lobby organization: The NRA Institute for Legislative 
Action (NRA-ILA). The NRA provides a highly developed Internet service with an integrated 
fundraising tool that allows acquiring new members and collecting donations online. The 
NRA-ILA website informs about current political debates related to gun control issues. 
Furthermore, with a click of a mouse, it allows putting pressure on representatives in the US 
Congress who are not in line with the NRA position. 
The ability to mobilize collective action and pressure are crucial resources of the NRA. It is 
embedded in a wide network of local gun activist groups, mostly in rural areas.330 It has a 
tailor made marketing strategy for different target groups both online and based on other 
activities such as public events and speeches. There are specialized web-zones and journals 
for young and female shooters, hunters, sport shooters, weapons collectors and many more. In 
the run-up to the UN Small Arms Conference, the NRA has intensified the international 
cooperation with other gun lobby groups and shooting organizations. The NRA is a founding 
organization of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA) which 
was established in 1997. There is not much information available on the WFSA that seems to 
be an obscure collection of weapons producers, collectors, and lobbyists.331 
The NRA is deeply embedded into the political system of the United States and particularly 
close to the GOP. This conjunction allows influencing the US government position on the 
small arms issue on the international arena. This was particularly the case during the UN 
Small Arms Conference. Any new gun restriction is an unacceptable measure against NRA’s 
                                               
328  See Judy Sarasohn, 2001, “Fortune: NRA is No. 1 on Capitol Hill,” Washington Post 17 May 2001, A21. 
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core belief.332 Kenneth Janda, political scientist at Northwestern University, considers the 
NRA to be the most influential lobby group in the United States. 
Table 7.6: Long-Term Contribution Trends from Gun Rights Lobby Groups 
Elec-
tion 
Cycle 
Rank† 
Total 
Contri-
butions 
Contributions 
from 
Individuals 
Contribu-
tions from 
PACs333 
Soft Money 
Contri-
butions 
Donations 
to 
Democrats 
Donations to 
Republicans 
2002  67 $2,550,209  $57,995  $1,552,616  $939,598  $169,150  $2,378,761  
2000  63 $4,297,645  $508,947  $1,964,176  $1,824,522  $311,050  $3,978,145  
1998  62 $2,529,500  $317,628  $1,861,872  $350,000  $317,665  $2,207,295  
1996  70 $2,003,877  $129,596  $1,786,556  $87,725  $284,240  $1,719,637  
1994  56 $2,354,239  $77,242  $1,973,497  $303,500  $435,438  $1,918,338  
1992  63 $1,883,455  $52,375  $1,831,080  $0  $646,592  $1,236,863  
1990  68 $788,887  $20,700  $768,187  N/A  $293,752  $495,135  
Total 65 $16,407,812 $1,164,483 $11,737,984 $3,505,345 $2,457,887 $13,934,174 
Contributions by Gun Control Groups in Election Cycle 2002   
2002 80 $120,656  $2,800  $117,856  $0  $121,525  ($869)  
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics: http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=Q13 and 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=Q12 
†These numbers show how the industry ranks in total campaign giving as compared to more than 80 other 
industries. Rankings are shown only for industries (such as the Automotive industry) -- not for widely 
encompassing ‘sectors’ (such as Transportation) or more detailed ‘categories" (like car dealers).  
Methodology: The numbers on this table are based on contributions of $200 or more from Political 
Action Committees (PACs) and individuals to federal candidates and from individual and soft money 
donors to political parties, as reported to the Federal Election Commission. While election cycles are 
shown in charts as 1996, 1998, 2000 etc. they actually represent two-year periods. For example, the 2002 
election cycle runs from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2002. Data for the current election cycle were 
released by the Federal Election Commission on 13 January 2003. 
The legislators in Congress are well aware of the fact that the NRA informs its members 
about the senators’ and representatives’ positions vis-à-vis current gun legislation debates. 
They also know that their position on gun issues will influence their ‘attractiveness’ for NRA 
members, i.e. potential and influential voters as well as financial contributions, in the 
elections. The NRA not only monitors the behavior of the politicians, while they sit in the 
legislative body, but also tries to influence the outcome of the election by recommending 
specific candidates and giving donations to the political parties. From a rational choice 
perspective, especially conservative legislators try to diminish the uncertainty and fall in line 
with the NRA position. If a congressman seemed to be wavering, the NRA can immediately 
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333  Political Action Committee or PAC is a popular term for a political committee organized for the purpose of 
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start a ‘naming and shaming’ campaign by mobilizing several hundred or thousand NRA 
members and sympathizers. 
The NRA not only threatens to cut off funding, but also to back the candidate’s opponent as 
well as to damage his image with negative commercials. In the past decade alone, the NRA 
has spent almost US$ 12 million on advocacy advertising.334 Based on a survey where 
congressmen, civil servants and other lobby groups have participated, Fortune Magazine 
placed the NRA on the top position of all US lobby groups.335 
The political power of the NRA has partly stemmed from the disorganization of its opponents. 
The focus on just one issue, i.e. the prevention of legislation that prevents gun ownership, 
strengthens the NRA much more than other lobby groups who have a much broader agenda 
and, therefore, have to make much more compromises with their constituency. The NRA is an 
important supporter of and donor to the Republican Party. Between 1991 and 2000 it has 
spent almost US$ 9 million for direct election support for political parties and individual 
candidates. Four-fifths of this money went directly to the GOP. In the mid-term elections 
2002, well above nine-tenths of the total contributions by gun lobby groups went to the 
GOP.336 In that sense, it is not surprising, that the Republicans in Congress have mainly been 
responsible for blocking gun-control legislation. Based on its embedded network, especially 
in rural and suburban areas, the NRA has similar grassroots mobilizing effect for the GOP as 
labor unions have for the Democratic Party. The NRA had a key impact in the 1994 Congress 
elections in at least 12 precincts that are normally held by Democrats.337  
The NRA played an important role both in the Presidential Election 2000 and the mid-term 
elections 2002. The NRA was particular interested in having a US President with good NRA 
credentials, since it is up to him to appoint the new members of the US Supreme Court. This 
is a crucial point when federal gun law has to be interpreted. For that reason, the NRA has 
invested several million US$ alone to support George W. Bush during his presidential 
                                               
334  The Economist, 2000, In the Cross-Hairs, 6 July 2000, 53. 
335  See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, 2001, “Washington Power 25: Fat and Happy in DC,” Fortune 14 May 2001. 
336  In 2002, the main lobbyists were the NRA, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, Gun Owners of 
America and the Arena PAC. Together they contributed a total of US$ 2,6 million to the Republican Party. 
In the same period, the Democrats received a total of US$ 172,500 from the same group. Center for 
Responsive Politics (Open Secrets): Gun Rights: Top Contributors <http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ 
contrib.asp?Ind=Q13&Cycle=2002>. For a detailed account on NRA’s contribution see 
<http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000082>. (last checked March 2003) 
337  Robert Dreyfuss, 2000, “Notfalls die reine Lehre opfern,“ Freitag: Die Ost-West-Wochenzeitung 24 
<http://www.freitag.de/2000/24/00241101.htm> (last visited March 2003). 
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campaign. Thinking about a possible victory of Governor Bush excited many NRA front 
lobbyists. 
During a closed meeting, the NRA Vice President, Kayne Robertson, was so thrilled to allege 
that with a victory by George W. Bush the NRA would be in a position “where we work out 
of their office.” He expected “unbelievably friendly relations” with a Bush White House.338 
This would create quite a different atmosphere than with President Clinton at that time. The 
relationship between the NRA and the White House during the Clinton years was very tense. 
Wayne LaPierre even insinuated that President Clinton needed a certain amount of violence in 
the United States. He would accept a certain amount of homicide to promote his own political 
agenda – to introduce tougher gun legislation.  
Table 7.7: Top Contributors of Gun Lobby Groups in the Election Cycle 2000 
Rank Organization Amount Democrats GOP 
1  National Rifle Association $3,079,346  8%  92% 
2  National Shooting Sports Foundation  $330,000  0%  100% 
3  Safari Club International  $275,500  13%  86% 
4  Gun Owners of America  $83,618  6%  94% 
5  Arena PAC  $18,356  5%  95% 
6  SHOT-PAC  $11,000  5%  95% 
Contributions by Gun Control Groups in Election Cycle 2002   
1 Handgun Control Inc $375,614  97%  3% 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics: http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q13&Cycle=2000 and 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q12&Cycle=2000 
From this perspective, the NRA would have actually even benefited if Al Gore had been 
elected – as long as the Republicans would remain in control of the US Congress.339 Al Gore 
would have been a perfect target and scapegoat if he wanted to introduce tougher domestic 
gun regulations and promote a small arms policy on the international level that would 
generate some binding norms and restrictions. 
But the often intolerant rhetoric and the danger of being hijacked by the NRA agenda made a 
lot of leading Republicans nervous. Presidential candidate Bush and Republicans running for 
a seat in US Congress tried to keep some distance towards the NRA, even though a Gallup 
poll showed in May 2000 that a slight majority of the US population thinks favorably of the 
NRA. 
                                               
338  John Mintz, 2000, “Gun Lobby’s No. 2 Officer Brags of is Close Ties to Bush,” Herald Tribune 5 May 
2000, 3. 
339  The Economist, 2000, In the Cross-Hairs, 6 July 2000, 53. 
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Figure 7.1: Contradicting Positions on Domestic Gun Regulation and NRA Support340 
 
However, Osha Gray Davidson, a professor at the University of Iowa and an expert on the 
NRA, argues that for the first time a block of voters is forming to elect candidates on the basis 
of a single issue: their support for gun control. The same Gallup poll showed that a majority 
of more than 60% supports stricter gun regulations. This ambivalent voters’ preference341 was 
quite confusing for a targeted message on this issue. 
The Presidential campaign had be to sensitive on the issue and favor the introduction of some 
‘soft’ gun-control rules, such as penalties for people who fire guns in church, and dissociating 
himself from too extreme NRA members, but on the other hand keep good relations with the 
general notion with more moderate NRA members. Bush’s sidling was very successful and 
the NRA support was crucial in winning three states that normally elect the Democratic 
Presidential candidate. If only one state would have voted for Gore he had won the 
Presidency.342 But in the end, it is difficult to assess with any precise certainty how influential 
the gun control vs. gun right debate really was in deciding the very tight and contentious 
outcome of the election, since also the Democrats could profit from this topic with reversed 
effects in urban electoral districts.343 
The Bush Administration decided several times in favor of the NRA’s preferences in its first 
two years. Attorney General John D. Ashcroft stopped the Gun-Buy-Back program from the 
Clinton era stating that it does not belong to the ‘core missions’ of the US Department of 
                                               
340  The Economist, 2000, In the Cross-Hairs, 6 July 2000, 53. 
341  ABCNews, 1999, ‘Ambivalence on Gun Control,’ 8 September 1999. <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/ 
politics/DailyNews/poll990908.html>. (Last checked March 2003). 
342  See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, 2001, “Washington Power 25: Fat and Happy in DC,” Fortune 14 May 2001. 
343  See E. J. Dionne, Jr., 2001, “Guns and Votes,” Washington Post 13 February 2001, A21. 
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House and Urban Development.344 Ashcroft’s letter to the director of NRA-ILA in early 2001 
fiercely sparked debate over Second Amendment that was long interpreted as applying only 
collectively. But Ashcroft also included an explicit individual right to bear arms.345 One year 
later, Ashcroft officially informed the US Supreme Court that the US government has 
changed its position. It was the first time that a top-level government representative officially 
promoted individual gun ownership.346 
This Supreme Court filing completely reversed past government policy. By adopting the view 
that the Constitution confers an individual right on each American to own a gun, the Justice 
Department has put the government's opinion on a reading of the Second Amendment that 
enjoyed little support from courts or legal commentators until relatively recently.347 The NRA 
knew that it had the federal government on this central issue on its side. But the high mood of 
the NRA was dampened by a federal appeals court ruling in defense of a decision by the state 
of California to ban assault weapons. The court thereby rejected the new Justice Department 
policy asserting that the Second Amendment affords individuals, not just state militias, broad 
rights to carry guns.348 
From the analysis above, it is clear that the NRA will not accept any regulation negotiated in 
the UN framework and would passionately defend the right to bear arms. In the run-up to the 
UN Small Arms Conference, the NRA criticized at the first panel report meeting of the World 
Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA) that the UN process would mean 
the end of sport shooting activities in many countries. The NRA perceived the UN Small 
Arms Conference as a serious threat to its very existence. They feared a direct link between 
newly established global small arms norms and regulations on the one hand and national 
firearms legislation on the other hand. Binding international small arms arrangements would 
create more pressure domestically to tighten US gun legislation. 
The NRA had an own representative, Thomas Mason, accredited during the UN Small Arms 
Conference. He, together with an international group of weapons producers, collectors and 
gun right activist, lobbied the United States and delegations from other countries during the 
                                               
344  See Ellen Nakashima, 2001, “Administration Calls Halt to Gun Buybacks,” Washington Post 26 July 2001, 
A23. 
345  Dan Eggen, 2001, “Ashcroft: Gun Ownership an Individual Right,” Washington Post 24 May 2001, A13. 
346  Edward Walsh, 2002, “U.S. Argues For Wider Gun Rights,” Washington Post 8 May 2002, A01. 
347  Charles Lane, 2002, “Gun Ownership – New, Old View: U.S. Adopts ‘Individual Rights’ Theory of 2nd 
Amendment,” Washington Post 9 May 2002, A07. 
348  Rene Sanchez, 2002, “Stance on Guns for Individuals Rejected,” Washington Post 6 December 2002, A19. 
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whole negotiations. They closely watched the developments and even had a representative of 
the US Congress, Bob Barr (Rep, GA), as an official member of the US delegation who could 
report back from the closed negotiation sessions whether the United Nations was in violation 
of the Conference mandate and whether the US delegations waved their flags where 
necessary. 
On the issue of international regulation, the Executive Director of the NRA’s Institute for 
Legislative Action, Tanya Metaksa, wrote a letter to US Senator Jesse Helms (GOP) stating 
that “[a]ny ‘harmonization’ would inevitable [sic!] mean tightening controls on loosely 
regulated US gun business, and would be opposed by the NRA and other US pro-gun 
organizations.”349 In a rather short speech, but with clear intentions, Thomas Mason, the 
NRA’s representative during the UN Small Arms Conference, stressed that the Programme of 
Action would infringe the right of US citizens to bear arms. Enigmatically, he stated that 
“[s]ome [countries] assure us that the end result [of the UN Small Arms Conference] will 
have no impact on lawful civilian ownership, others propose that it could, should, must and 
will.”350 
Interesting enough, there are no detailed statements about the drafts or the final Programme of 
Action on the NRA-website that usually provides a plethora of information. But from the 
other public statements of both the NRA and the US government it can be derived that the 
following points of the draft version L.4/Rev.1 were particularly opposed:  
· General postulation: The Conference topic should strictly be reduced to 
illicit trade and not expanded to other topics such as civilian firearms 
possession; 
· Statement that the uncontrolled and excessive accumulation of small arms 
could have a destabilizing effect and should therefore be reduced; 
· Marking and tracing of small arms as well as destruction of unmarked 
weapons; 
· Prohibition of unrestricted trade and private ownership of small arms 
specifically designed for military purposes;  
                                               
349  Letter from Tanya K. Metaksa, Executive Director of the NRA’s Institute for Legislative Action, to Senator 
Jesse Helms, 11 January 1996. Quoted in Nathalie J. Goldring, 1997, “Links Between Domestic Laws and 
International Light Weapons Control,” Workshop on Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons, 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 
Washington, DC, 11-12 December 1997. Published on BASIC Publications <http://www.basicint.org/ 
WT/plw/97-links_between.htm> (last checked February 2003). 
350  National Rifle Association, 2001, Statement of the NRA at the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects <http://www.shaw.co.za/UN_NRA.htm> (last visited February 
2003).  
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· Notion to undertake national awareness programs to reduce the demand of 
small arms. 
Defining the subject of a negotiated document is always controversial – but also very crucial 
for successfully dealing with the problem. Governments – and also scholars –argue that a 
program requires a shared understanding of the problem. On the other hand, delegations 
opposed to any treaty or program would just as soon tie up the process in definitional 
arguments. 
Three different ways of dealing with the definitional problem had been offered: 1) Specific 
definitions by the United States and the EU that limited the weapons to strictly military types; 
2) a broad, enumerative definition developed by the 1997 Panel; and 3) no reference at all to 
any definition. 
The differences arose from the interest of specific countries in tailoring the Programme of 
Action to the types of small arms and light weapons of greatest concern to them. For example, 
India, Sri Lanka, and some African states insisted that the Programme also address 
ammunition and explosives. 
The United States was under pressure from the NRA to ensure that the Programme did not 
mention or even cover civilian weapons. In the first draft, the solution proposed was to simply 
refer in a footnote to the definition developed by the 1997 Panel, a three-page section of that 
report. The option adopted at the final session of the Conference was to have no definition at 
all. Proponents of this approach explained that precision was not necessary in a political 
document. The issue melted away in the final days of the Conference. Nowhere in the 
Programme is there a definition of small arms and light weapons. 
As has been shown in this chapter, but also in also Chapter 7.4 there are clear indications that 
the NRA as most prominent gun lobby group could substantially influence the position of the 
US delegation and also the outcome of the UN Small Arms Conference. This highlights once 
more the importance of domestic constituency in the negotiation process as has been 
described by Putnam (1988). 
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8 Case Study II: SWITZERLAND 
 
 
Switzerland […] attaches great importance to the 
implementation of the programme of action, which should 
not be allowed to remain merely fine words. 
Implementation is crucial and must be tackled promptly by 
the community of nations in co-operation with the United 
Nations, regional organizations and NGOs.351 
─Ambassador Raimund Kunz, Head of Swiss Delegation, 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Statement at Ministerial Session of the 
UN Small Arms Conference, July 11, 2001. 
 
8.1 Domestic setting: Militia tradition and Tell’s sons 
In the second half of the 19th century arms manufacturing became an important industrial 
sector in Switzerland. Switzerland’s tradition of armed neutrality and the modest domestic 
demand resulting from its relatively small size pushed the government into creating and 
managing a defense industry to secure domestic supplies for its armed forces and promoting 
exports of military goods. To understand the particular dynamics of the Swiss small arms 
industry and its international role, the years following World War I are important. The 
development of Switzerland’s weapons production capabilities is closely linked to the fate of 
Germany and its defense industry. The Treaty of Versailles brought the manufacture of 
weapons in Germany to a complete halt. Germany’s Rheinmetall engineers appeared on the 
payroll of Bührle which instantly became an international supplier of heavy machine guns as 
well as sophisticated fuses, grenades and other arms.  
                                               
351  Statement by Ambassador Raimund Kunz, Head of Swiss Delegation, Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministerial Session of the UN Small Arms Conference, July 11, 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/ 
cab/smallarms/statements/swissE.html> (last checked December 2004). 
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Following World War I, the knowledge of German engineering was either converted to 
produce for the civilian market or migrated abroad to continue their trade in countries like 
Switzerland (Bührle), Spain (Santa Barbara), France (Manurhin) and Argentina (Fábrica 
Militar). To the extent that the existing patents were internationally honored, the respective 
owners were eager to sell licenses. As an example, Hämmerli in Switzerland produced 
Walther pistols under license while production was forbidden in Germany. It also continued 
to do so after the ban was lifted with Germany’s entry into NATO. 
But the Swiss small arms industry is not entirely focused on military and police weapons. 
Sport and hunting weapons as well as personal weapons mainly for the American market 
make an important contribution to the turnover. Immediately after 1945, products for the 
military market, like the assault rifle in the case of SIG, constituted a core business. Some of 
these products remained part of the production program until the late 1970s. The total ban of 
firearm production in Germany immediately after World War II drove the production of many 
German companies into Switzerland. Even after the ban was lifted again in the 1950s, the 
production mainly remained in Switzerland. What follows is a short overview of the most 
important small arms companies in Switzerland. 
RUAG Ammunition was founded in 1863 and expanded into a substantial government-owned 
company producing a wide range of infantry weapons and equipment. Another important 
private company active in the production of military equipment focusing on small arms and 
ammunition was SIG (Schweizerische Industrie-Gesellschaft; Swiss Industrial Company). 
After World War II, the Swiss arms manufacturing sector grew and exported its products with 
little constraints. At the time, not even embargoes of the United Nations were observed. 
Under the label of ‘courant normal,’ Switzerland as a neutral country did not feel particularly 
obliged by international restrictions. But increasing political pressures from inside against this 
exploitation of sensitive markets in combination with international pressures to comply with 
international embargoes led to a steady decline of exports by the arms industry in Switzerland 
– most obviously after the end of the Cold War. The military production of Oerlikon-Bührle 
including Contraves (formerly Oerlikon-Bührle) and SIG resulted in heavy losses by the mid-
1990s. In the absence of a national industrial policy to maintain domestic capacities, German 
companies eventually absorbed most of the private military factories in Switzerland in their 
effort to consolidate the sector on the European level. 
In the case of Sauer a long-standing co-operation led to a consolidation of small arms 
production between Switzerland and Germany. Shortly after the World War II, Sauer sold a 
 Case Study II: Switzerland 
 139 
license to Hämmerli in Lenzburg (Switzerland) to produce small caliber sport weapons of 
Sauer design. In the 1960s, when the German border guards (Bundesgrenzschutz) procured 
the SIG P 210 pistol, Sauer produced it under license. This co-operation was eventually 
converted into a complete take-over of Sauer by SIG (Schweizerische Industrie-Gesellschaft). 
This take-over was reversed when new German owners acquired Sauer. They also took over 
SIG’s small arms segment in 199. Rheinmetall controlled SIG’s other military sections 
(ammunition) (Lock 2000). SIG pistols are considered to be among the best weapons on offer 
for police forces and the military as well as a high quality personal weapon.  
In the mid-1990s, Sauer purchased the trademark of Mauser from Rheinmetall. With this 
purchase, Mauser aimed at the lower priced end of the American market for personal 
weapons. Later on, in its drive to strengthen its position as a dominant supplier of infantry 
weapons in Europe, Rheinmetall took over Mauser. The sales of SIG Arms and Oerlikon 
Contraves to German companies reflected additional consolidations of existing capacities in 
Europe. Against this background, the transfer of Swiss orders from SIG Arms production to 
Rheinmetall must be seen as a strategic step in the on-going process of transnational 
consolidation of small arms manufacturing. 
 
8.2  Decreasing Swiss arms industry 
It appears reasonable to assume that currently exports of small arms in Switzerland are tightly 
controlled and of declining importance. Therefore, most companies focus on sport and 
hunting weapons or on expensive specialized weapons like sniper guns produced only in 
small numbers. Though, almost the only volume market appears to be the private American 
market. Additionally, at least for producers of specialized pistols, the demand by American 
police and private security services is also growing. 
Apart from official procurement and purchases, it is obvious that a considerable part of the 
customers of Swiss small arms consists of collectors who behave not unlike stamp collectors. 
Like the postmaster issuing special stamps to mark a certain event, renowned manufacturers 
of small arms cater this market with the production of limited editions of certain pistols and 
rifles.352 However, no reliable survey appears to exist, from which it might be feasible to 
estimate the collector’s share in the total demand for small arms. The passion of collecting 
                                               
352  For example, Hämmerli has produced an anniversary edition of its rifles in 1988. 
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arms has produced a whole library of literature.353 The sheer number of collectors in wealthy 
countries has helped to turn collecting guns even into a relatively safe way of storing one’s 
wealth. For stamps and small arms alike the value increases with antiquity and singularity. 
But also specific former ownership of a weapon can boost the price, particularly if the weapon 
has been customized for the original owner. 
Critical segments of the international demand are regular exports in cases where the import 
licenses might be falsified. Apparently, this has often been the case in the past with exports to 
Paraguay. However, in recent years, the export control, also for conventional weapons and 
small arms, is tighter. Exports from Switzerland to Venezuela have already been stopped on a 
unilateral basis in March 2001.354 On the other side, if access to small arms is easier in one 
country, the danger of diffusion into neighboring countries with stricter regulations is more 
likely. But also transfers to more distant conflicts are feasible. In the early months of the 
armed conflict in Bosnia, sales of ‘demilitarized’ (i.e. neutralized automatic feeding) 
automatic rifles suspiciously surged to about 5,000 in a Swiss canton where the regulations 
allow Swiss citizens to purchase such weapons without limits or obligatory registration. It is 
more than likely – and there is also some evidence on the ground – that some of the weapons 
sold in Switzerland ended up in Bosnia.355 For the time being, however, such tedious 
acquisition procedures are not required, since large quantities of (cheap) surplus weapons 
appear to be readily available on the international black market. With huge surplus stocks and 
production capacities inherited from the Cold War, international markets have turned into 
buyer’s markets. Additionally, most governments are forced to exercise financial discipline 
and cannot any longer maintain their own national small arms production. As a result, the 
market for small arms factories has become more competitive.  
                                               
353  H.L. Blackmore, 1965, Guns and Rifles of the World, London: B.T. Batsford; C. Blair, 1968, Pistols of the 
World, New York: Viking Press; John Delph, 1991. Firearms and Tackle Memorabilia: A Collector's 
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Verlagsgesellschaft; A. Hoff, 1969, Feuerwaffen I und II, Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann; A. Hoff, 
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The level of small arms technology procured by the military is rather low. This reflects the 
fact that marginal performance improvements are of little interest in the context of today’s 
fighting scenarios. Special intervention forces and special police squads are an exemption to 
this rule. Currently, price and sufficient performance appear to be the prevailing criteria in the 
international procurement market in the small arms segment. Since the life-cycle of standard 
rifles ranges between thirty and fifty years, replacement imperatives are also not likely to 
enliven demand for new models. As a result, real technological competition focuses on the 
civilian demand for small arms. 
The precision engineering and techniques to produce sport weapons and customized personal 
weapons clearly exceed the standards required for military procurement. And it is in these 
fields where the Swiss producers attempt to play out the traditional excellence of the machine 
tool and metal working manufacturing. By doing so, they can prevail in a competitive 
international private market rather than in a tight military procurement abroad and at home 
(Lock 2001). 
However, the situation is somewhat more complicated as the civilian market pays a premium 
for weapons used by the police. In Europe only license-free weapons like small-bore pistols 
have a significant market share. It appears that in the category of small caliber weapons 
imitations of weapons in service with the police or the military are particularly popular.356 
Additionally, the upper market segment of the civilian market where real profits can be made 
is very trade-mark conscious, thus Swiss designed Tuma pistols produced in the Czech 
Republic had little chances so far to penetrate this market segment.  
Individual small arms producing companies in Switzerland 
Switzerland holds a fairly significant domestic small arms industry, which has traditionally 
been supported by the structure of its militia army. The major ammunition producer is 
Oerlikon Contraves. The company, formerly part of Oerlikon Bührle (renamed to Unaxis), is 
100% owned by the German Rheinmetall and employs approximately 2,400 people (Jane’s 
World Defence Industry, 2000). The Swiss Ammunition Enterprise (SM) and the Swiss 
Ordnance Enterprise (SW), both located in Thun (Canton of Berne), are important domestic 
producers of grenades, mortars, and machine guns. Both operate as independent companies 
within the state-owned RUAG Suisse Group (Military Technology, May 2000). 
                                               
356  From a police perspective, this trend creates problems because a policeman cannot be sure with what kind 
of weapon he is confronted with in a hostage taking or a bank robbery for example. 
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The Swiss Industrial Company (SIG) based in Neuhausen (Canton of Schaffhausen, Northern 
part of Switzerland), produces a wide range of pistols, rifles, and grenade launchers, including 
the famous Mauser and Sauer brands. In 1999, the latest replacement cycle of the standard 
infantry weapons in the Swiss army was concluded with the delivery of the SIG Arms assault 
rifles. The company has facilities in Germany (SIG Arm Sauer in Eckernförde), Switzerland, 
and the United States. In October 2000, the small arms division of SIG, which employs over 
700 people, was sold to two private German investors.357  
Until recently, Switzerland has had a well-developed domestic arms industry, including a 
number of companies producing small arms.358 However, two of its most important producers 
of small arms, SIGARMS and Oerlikon-Contraves, are now owned by foreign companies and 
investors. This reflects the absence of a national industrial policy to maintain and foster 
domestic defense capacities. Yet, the companies are continuing the tradition of German-Swiss 
cooperation in small arms production, while at the same time mirroring the European-wide 
consolidation of defense production. 
The major domestic producer of small arms for the military market is the SIGARMS Group 
(formerly SIG Arms), which was purchased from SIG by German investors in late 2000.359 
The ‘new’ SIGARMS Group has subsidiary companies and production facilities in 
Switzerland (SAN Swiss Arms AG, Hämmerli AG), Germany (JP Sauer & Sohn GmbH and 
Blaser Jagdwaffen GmbH), and the United States (SIG Arms Inc.). The company’s 
production facilities in Switzerland will probably be closed down in the near future and 
production activities rationalized in Germany (at JP Sauer & Sohn in Eckernförde) and the 
United States (at SIG Arms Inc. in Exeter, New Hampshire). The company has about 400 
employees worldwide. It produces a wide range of small arms for the military market, 
including pistols and rifles. It owns the trademarks for Mauser, Blaser, Hämmerli, and JP 
Sauer & Sohn, and will continue to use the SIG name on the P210 pistol. The SIG name will 
also be used in conjunction with Sauer on all SIG-Sauer handguns (e.g. P220 pistol).360  
The SIG-Sauer 9mm P226 pistol is used by many armed forces, including the US Coast 
Guard, UK armed forces, and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. More than 400,000 
have been sold word-wide. The SIG 540 series rifle is officially in service in more than 20 
                                               
357  See Agence France Press, 4 October 2000. 
358  Information on Switzerland’s small arms producers from Peter Lock, 2001, Small Arms Production in 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland, Background Paper, Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 
359  See Agence France Press, 4 October 2000. 
360  See <http://www.gunnery.net>. 
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countries (including 10 in Africa). It has been produced under license in Chile, France, and 
Portugal.361 The German company Rheinmetall DeTec is now in control of the ammunition 
section of the former SIG Arms. This reflects the European-wide consolidation of small-arms 
ammunition production (Lock 2001). SIGARMS also produces a wide range of weapons for 
the civilian market, mainly through its subsidiaries Hämmerli AG and Blaser Jagdwaffen 
(hunting rifles). 
Table 8.1: Swiss companies involved in small arms production 
Name of company Products Number of 
employees  
Remarks 
Rheinmetall in control 
of former Oerlikon-
Bührle military 
production 
M, AHS, AM, CM 10,000 (1990) 
2,500 (1998) 
Includes also non-small arms 
production of company. The 
contraction continues and the 
remaining workforce includes 
also civilian production. 
RUAG ammunition AM N.A. Joint venture with state 
holding 
Sauer in control of 
former SIG military 
production 
M N.A. Fast reduction of workforce 
Brügger & Thomet AG 
Spiez 
M, H, S, AM 5 Founded in 1992 
Grünig & Elmiger AG 
Malters 
H, S N.A. Additional production of 
medical and high-precision 
mechanical tools 
Hämmerli AG 
Lenzburg 
H, S 95  
Miltec SA 
Genève formerly Tavaro 
Technologies 
C, AM 130 (1996) 
down from 
600 
Ammunition, ignition devices 
Waser Mechanik AG 
Stans  
MT 5-10 Machine tools for ammunition 
production 
Martin Tuma 
Engineering 
M, P N.A. Links to the Czech production 
 
Key to products:  
AHS = Ammunition for hunting and sport weapons M = Military and Police weapons 
AM = Ammunition for Military and Police weapons MT = Machine tools 
C = Components and accessories (sights etc.) P = Firearms for the civilian market 
H = Hunting weapons S = Sport weapons 
 
                                               
361  See Terry Gander and Charles Cutshaw, 2001, Jane’s Infantry Weapons: 2001-2002, Coulsdon: Jane’s 
Information Group. 
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The company Brügger and Thomet is mainly involved in the production of accessories (e.g. 
sights) for small arms for the military and law enforcement services. It also acts as an agent 
for a number of foreign producers (e.g. Heckler & Koch). In 2000, it had total sales of CHF 
15 million (US$ 9.3 million). Other Swiss producers of small arms, mainly for the hunting 
and sporting market, include Grünig & Elmiger and Martin Tuma Engineering (Lock 2001). 
The state-owned RUAG Suisse Groupe includes both the Swiss Ammunition Enterprise and 
the Swiss Ordnance Enterprise. It was ranked as the 50th largest arms producing company in 
the OECD and developing countries in 1999 (SIPRI 2001: 309). According to company 
information, RUAG had total sales of CHF 941 million (US$ 584 million) and 3,843 
employees in 2000. Swiss Ammunition Enterprise, which has plants in Altdorf and Thun, is 
the major domestic producer for small arms ammunition for both the military and civilian 
markets. In 2000, it had total sales of CHF 270 million (US$ 168 million) and employed 
1,092 people.362 
8.3  Pro Tell takes aim 
Swiss gun owners can point to a long and distinctive tradition – with roots in the armed 
neutrality and militia system of the military services. But unlike many countries with 
widespread firearms ownership, Switzerland keeps itself comparatively covered concerning 
firearms possession and distribution. The Swiss federal government does not keep 
comprehensive records on private gun ownership. Although, all Swiss private gun owners 
must be licensed and many cantons require firearms registration, records are only maintained 
at the cantonal level. There is no central database on small arms ownership that can be 
accessed by law enforcement agencies. The major exceptions to this rule are the small arms of 
the Swiss Armed Forces. 
According to figures provided by the General Staff of the Swiss Armed Forces, the nation’s 
military currently has a total of 695,000 rifles and pistols in its inventories. However, rifles 
and pistols that are handed over to the retired (militia) soldiers – several hundred if not 
thousands a year – are not included in this figure. 
 
                                               
362  See Graham & Whiteside Ltd. 2001. The Major Companies Databese 2001. Leverett, MA: Rector Press. 
Additional information see <http://www.nisat.org/database_info/country.asp?Key=166> (Last checked 
March 2003). 
 Case Study II: Switzerland 
 145 
Table 8.2: Swiss Small Arms Stocks363 
Type of Weapon Numbers 
Stgw 90 (5.6mm) rifle 450,000 
Stgw 57 (7.5mm) rifle364 175,000 
Rifle subtotal 625,000 
Pist 75 (9mm) pistol 50,000 
Pist 49 (9mm) pistol 20,000 
Pistol subtotal 70,000 
Total 695,000 
 
However, this list is even more incomplete, since it does not include sub-machine guns, 
machine guns, grenade launchers, and other typical military firearms. Those numbers remain 
classified. Using orthodox multipliers to estimate the number of these weapons – but not other 
kinds of small arms like grenades, mortars, and shoulder-fired anti-tank rockets – the country 
would be expected to have a total of approximately 1,040,000 military firearms in its armed 
forces inventory.365 These figures might seem high for a country with armed forces of just 
4,000 full-time military personnel and 29,000 conscripts in basic training every year. In 
reality, most of these weapons are for the country’s militia armed forces, consisting of 
420,000 citizens (including 70,000 reservists) serving regularly as soldiers every other year 
for three weeks. The small arms for this total force of 453,000 personnel are stored in depots, 
unit arsenals, and under a special system of regulations in the homes of the country’s 
militiamen. 
With approximately 2.3 military-owned firearms for every man who can be called into 
uniform, the Swiss Armed Forces have an arsenal proportionally larger than most NATO 
countries – which typically have 1.3 to 2.5 firearms per soldier – but lower than most other 
countries relying heavily on reservist forces (in which category Switzerland also belongs to) – 
who typically have 3.5 or many more small arms per soldier.366 
Another distinctive aspect of the Swiss military system is the widespread distribution of 
military firearms among its militiamen, who are required to keep weapons and ammunition in 
locked storage at home. This is a procedure used by few other countries, of which Israel is 
                                               
363  Indicates actual figures supplied by the General Staff of the Swiss Armed Forces. Correspondence with the 
General Staff of the Swiss Armed Forces, 5 December 2001, 21 December 2001, and 1 February 2002. 
364  These rifles are designated for liquidation. 
365  Estimates by Small Arms Survey (2002, 78). 
366  Examples of other countries with a similar military system with reservist forces are Norway and Israel. 
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probably the best known other exception. But also Norway applies a similar procedure. Even 
more distinctively, Swiss militiamen are allowed to keep their small arms upon retirement 
from the military service. These weapons are specially marked and converted for semi-
automatic fire only. Former military small arms in the hands of ex-conscripts are not included 
in the inventory of the Swiss Armed Forces, although records of such transfers are kept for 
ten years and shared with cantonal police forces. 
The Swiss example shows how vital it is to include the number of militiamen and reservists 
when evaluating the small arms of a nation’s military establishment. The total figures offer 
insights into a distinctive military structure. As revealing as they are, these figures do not 
include police weapons or privately purchased firearms. Until data on these categories is 
systematically collected, the total number of small arms in a particular country cannot be 
established. Several countries are gradually developing estimates for their civilian weapons 
inventories. In Switzerland, for example, a picture is emerging through a combination of 
official disclosures and public polling. Swiss federalism makes the total national firearm 
ownership difficult to ascertain.367 The scale of total private gun ownership in the country was 
estimated by a survey in 2001. It reported that 35% of all Swiss households have at least one 
gun.368 While these estimates are not sufficient to establish the total number of civilian 
firearms in the country, it ranks Swiss public gun ownership per capita higher than other well-
armed countries like Australia and Canada, in which one out of four households has a gun, but 
below the United States, where over 40% of households have at least one gun. 
The wide-spread distribution and possession of small arms is also mirrored in the presence of 
various hunting and sport shooting associations. Most of these groups are associated with 
“Pro Tell”369 an umbrella organization similar to the NRA in the United States. On its 
website, “Pro Tell” hosts information on the relevant gun law, has a Q&A section on specific 
gun issues and provides model contracts for the private resale of guns and rifles.370 Even 
though, “Pro Tell” is not so professionally organized and funded as the NRA, it plays a 
                                               
367  Anne-Beatrice Clasmann, 2001, “Why are the Swiss armed to the teeth?” Deutsche Presse-Agentur 25 
August 2001. 
368  Swiss Crime Survey, 2001. Possession d’armes a feu en Suisse: Evolution et rapport de situation. 
Lausanne: Swiss Crime Survey. 
369  “Pro Tell” draws its name from the legendary Willhelm Tell who – according to a popular saga – killed 
Reeve Gessler – symbolizing the Habsburg tyranny – to preserve the independence of the emerging 
Switzerland in the Middle Ages. 
370  See “Pro Tell’s” website for further information on this association in German, French and Italian: 
<http://www.protell.ch>. 
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similar role in Switzerland’s domestic politics. It also regularly also rallies against new 
domestic gun legislation and also has a watchful eyes on international developments. 
Its strong political power with its members and associated groups makes it possible for “Pro 
Tell” to collect enough signatures to ask for a referendum on a newly introduced law.371 
Already the prospect of a referendum has tremendous influence on Swiss legislation, but also 
on Switzerland’s negotiation position in an international context. In an unrelated area to the 
gun-issue, this domestic-international link could clearly be seen in the protracted ‘bilateral’ 
negotiations between Switzerland and the EU in the 1990s. It was again an issue during the 
‘second bilateral’ negotiations when the Schengen agreement with the EU also had 
consequences on Switzerland’s domestic gun legislation. In the relations with the EU, this 
domestic ‘hostage’ situation could be used by the Swiss negotiators as a threat that they could 
not move more in the direction of the EU (reduced win-set). This seemingly domestic 
weakness could be used in the international negotiations as a strength.372  
Quite conversely, this domestic situation severely weakens the international negotiation 
position and credibility if the negotiators themselves want to achieve an international 
agreement on an issues where they – risk to – face domestic resistance. This constellation was 
actually apprehended by the Swiss government when they have started to think about 
launching an international marking and tracing initiative in the framework of the UN small 
arms process. How the Swiss government has tried to reduce this risk of domestic resistance 
will be further analyzed in the following section. 
8.4  Switzerland’s activities before and during the 
UN Small Arms Conference 
Switzerland’s arms control policy was almost a ‘non-event’ up to the mid-90s. This low-key 
attitude clearly changed in the last decade. Already in the negotiations leading to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty, Switzerland played a more active 
role. In the first domain it participated to defend the interest of its own chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry, in the second to live up to its humanitarian tradition. In the area of 
small arms control, Switzerland has already started several international and domestic 
                                               
371  On the federal level in Switzerland, it is necessary to collect 50,000 signatures from Swiss citizens to call 
for a referendum that can block a new federal law. “Pro Tell” would even be enough powerful to collect 
100,000 signatures to launch a federal initiative. The prospects, however, to also win an initiative are 
usually rather dim. 
372  See Putnam on domestic political institutions and their impact on the win-set. Robert D. Putnam, 1988, 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 43(3), 
Summer, 427-460. 
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activities well before the actual UN process leading to the 2001 Small Arms Conference. It 
was mainly active in four areas: 
· Organization of workshops and conferences to foster norm creation; 
· Elaboration of technical means to restrict misuse; 
· Development of export criteria; and 
· Support of practical disarmament and stockpile management. 
Switzerland, as a highly industrialized country, mostly participates with technical 
contributions and know-how in arms control endeavors. To raise its leverage in international 
negotiation processes it highly depends on coalitions with other like-minded states – 
supplemented by NGOs. This was particularly true, before it joined the United Nations in fall 
2002. Being outside of the European Union, Switzerland also has to build coalitions outside 
of Europe. To strengthen the commitment to its humanitarian tradition, Switzerland plays an 
active role in the Human Security Network (HSN). It hosted the second meeting of this 
informal group of states373 in Lucerne (May 2000). 
This HSN meeting was partially inspired by the success achieved through international 
cooperation on the landmines campaign. The network originally grew out of a bilateral 
arrangement between Canada and Norway — the ‘Lysøen’ partnership of 1999. During the 
event in Lucerne, NGOs were also allowed to actively participate in the discussions. The 
informal, flexible mechanism of the network provides a framework for a range of several 
topics related to human security. It plays a catalytic role by bringing international attention to 
emerging issues. The network stresses the crucial role of NGOs as key non-state actors 
partners in advocating, building and implementing human security. It also addresses the 
challenge of engaging non-state actors, such as armed groups, in complying with international 
humanitarian and human rights law. Related to the small arms issue, the network issued a 
statement at the end of the 3rd Ministerial Meeting held in Petra, Jordan, in May 2001. On 
behalf of the network participants, the Jordan transmitted the statement to the Chair of the UN 
Small Arms Conference, Camilo Reyes. 
The other main pillar of Switzerland’s small arms control activities is nourished by its 
technical expertise and know-how. In the run-up to the UN Small Arms Conference, 
                                               
373  The Human Security Network is an informal arrangement of small states and middle powers. Even though, 
there are no strict rules regulating membership, as of March 2003 there are 12 active members (Austria, 
Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand) 
and one observer state (South Africa). <http://humansecuritynetwork.org/members-e.php>. 
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Switzerland tried to get the domestic gun lobby and industry on board as soon as possible to 
reduce the reservations of these actors against new international regulations. This was an 
important step to build a domestic consensus in order to get international agreements easier 
ratified and implemented. Since the gun lobby and the industry were also involved in 
developing new technologies in marking and tracing of SALW, this internal networking also 
helped to create a platform of technical expertise. An important first workshop took place in 
the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program from 28 to 30 June 1999 and was 
co-organized with Germany.374 Relevant industrial aspects of the small arms problems were 
discussed and concerns by the producers brought up. The workshop was an important event 
for sharing information and reducing skepticism of pro-gun lobby and small arms industry.  
The Swiss government applied an even broader approach when it established an informal 
‘Mixed Working Group on Small Arms.’ The working group was organized by the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs and held its first session in August 1998. It brought together 
representatives from the Swiss gun lobby (Pro Tell), humanitarian and gun control NGOs, 
governmental representatives from the Federal Department Justice and Police and the Swiss 
Federal Office of Foreign Trade.375 At the early stage, the Federal Department of Defence was 
hardly involved in this group, since it was more involved with practical steps such as 
stockpile management and destruction of small arms. 
This mixed group was considered to be a useful platform for information exchange among the 
different domestic actors involved in the small arms issue in Switzerland. Interestingly 
enough, some NGO representatives pointed out, that Switzerland, due to its own domestic 
legislation, may have a credibility problem when trying to address the small-arms issue at 
international. Government officials have taken this objection very seriously.376  
In that sense, it is not surprising that Switzerland rather focuses on technical aspects in 
international fora than on questions of civilian possession of small arms. But nevertheless, it 
tried to get a high profile on the international small arms agenda and did not hold back its 
criticism of the slow progress of the development in the framework of the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. 
                                               
374  Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, 1999, “International meeting with 
representatives from the defense industry,” Press Release Bern, 24 June 1999. 
<http://www.admin.ch/cp/d/3771f6fd.0@fwsrvg.bfi.admin.ch.html>. (Last checked March 2003). 
375  The Federal Office of Foreign Trade belongs to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs and was 
reorganized and renamed to State Secretariat for Economic Affairs in July 1999. It is responsible for 
licensing the export of defense material and small arms. 
376  Interviews with Swiss government official, Bern, 10 January 2001. 
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The CD is the most influential and primarily responsible UN body on disarmament issues, but 
for many years it has been paralyzed by conflicting views on the negotiation agenda. Even 
though conventional weapons have been on its agenda for years, it has never established a 
negotiating committee that is responsible for this issue. Switzerland, a non-UN member at 
that time, but party to the Conference on Disarmament, has even warned the United Nations 
that the CD should be a leading organization in the field of disarmament again: 
In our view, the Conference on Disarmament must end the phase of 
reorientation and deliberation and return to the path of genuine 
negotiations based on common political will. If it does not do so, it 
will quite simply run the risk of being sidestepped by the international 
community, which would then look for other ways to reach its 
objectives in the area of international security.377 
The United Nations was criticized that it was too slow and would not be able to coordinate the 
different efforts of the UN subgroups and regional organizations.378 There was considerable 
displeasure by NGOs as well as Switzerland and other mid-size states, already active in 
banning landmines, about UN’s inactivity and blockade by the great powers. In a group of 
like-minded states, which is larger, but partially overlaps with the HSN, Switzerland was one 
of the main promoters of action on small arms issues. Being aware of the multi-
dimensionality of the problem, the involved states applied the concepts of division of labor 
and burden sharing.379 When division of labor and burden sharing is applied, the expected 
collective action problem could be dampened by the complementary contributions of the 
different states.380 In theory, the individual contributions optimally complement each other 
since they cannot be easily substituted due to the specific advantage and know-how of the 
                                               
377  Swiss ambassador Erwin H. Hofer, UN General Assembly, 1st Committee, 4th meeting, October 14, 1997, 
New York, A/C.1/52/PV.4, p. 26). Even though, the CD is not primarily responsible for negotiation in 
conventional weapons this statement is symptomatic for the frustration of mid-size states that the CD is 
blocked by major power games. This blockade still holds in late 2003. 
378  Paul Lansu discusses the role and activities of several regional and international organizations in a paper. 
Paul Lansu, 1998, Light Weapons the Question of International Regulations, and the Role of both Global 
and Regional Institutions, Brussels, November 1998. 
379  See for a discussion of the different contributions of the members of this group Stefan Brem, 2003, “Too 
much too soon? NGOs and Middle Powers in Need for More Coordination on Small Arms Activities,” 
Stefan Brem, Richard Matthew, Ken Rutherford, eds. The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation 
on International Security Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 39-62, esp. 49-53. 
380 These activities and initiatives have the features of weakest link technology as described by Todd Sandler. 
The institutional structure is more effective when based upon a technology of public supply. Todd Sandler. 
Collective Action: Theory and Application. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, pp. 36-7, 95, 105-6. 
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different contributors. To varying degrees, each of these states has embraced the Ottawa 
process of government–NGO collaboration.381  
Switzerland launched its marking and tracing initiatives quite early in the UN process on 
small arms. During a BASIC-sponsored seminar at the United Nations in New York on 
September 25, 1998, Jacob Kellenberger, the State Secretary of the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs, said that Switzerland was focusing on marking and transparency measures. 
Its efforts had started with identification tagging of commercial explosives, but then 
concentrated more on small arms and light weapons. The goal was to establish an 
international transparency regime that consisted of “an obligation to mark small arms; an 
obligation to register and declare production, stockpiling and transfer of small arms; an 
obligation not to import or export unmarked small arms, and, if so wished, an obligation to 
destroy them [i.e. the unmarked small arms].”382 In 1999, Switzerland organized two 
workshops bringing together governmental officials and representatives from the industry, 
gun lobby and humanitarian NGOs to discuss marking and traceability of small arms and light 
weapons.383 
During a workshop at the Hague Appeal for Peace conference in May 1999, Ambassador 
Raimund Kunz announced that Switzerland welcomed and supported a UN conference on the 
small arms issue. He mentioned that Switzerland would be ready to hold the Conference in 
Geneva in 2001.384 But the UN members could not agree whether to accept this offer. It was 
not decided until the whole process with PrepCom sessions has already started. 
It was not clear whether this continued postponement was a specific tactic by other states to 
get a better deal out of the Swiss offer or whether it was just regular bureaucratic turf battle 
                                               
381  Lora Lumpe mentions Belgium, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and 
Switzerland as participants in the core group of states. Lora Lumpe, 1999, “Curbing the Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Security Dialogue 30(2) June, 152. Margherita Serafini even defines a 
larger group of 108 countries supporting several UN resolutions on SALW and especially on the UN 
conference in 2001. Serafini, Margherita. Small Arms: The Emerging Coalition of States for the UN 
Conference in 2001. Research Paper. Program on Security and Development (SAND). Monterey Institute 
of International Studies Monterey, California, March 2000, 5. <http://sand.miis.edu/research/ 
serafini/paper.pdf> (Last checked February 2003). 
382  Speech by Mr. Jakob Kellenberger, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland. Presented at 
BASIC's Seminar International Initiatives to Stop the Spread and Unlawful Use of Small Arms, New York, 
September 25, 1998 (http://sand.miis.edu/projects/2001database/fulltext/IANSASwitzerland092598.pdf). 
383  Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999, “Report on Workshop on Small Arms,” Geneva, 
February 18-20, 1999. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999, “Chairman’s Report on 
Workshop on Small Arms Monitoring and Control,” Geneva, November 22-23, 1999. 
384  Transparency and Common Standards on Arms Transfers. Speech by Ambassador Raimund Kunz, Head of 
the Political Division III, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, upon the occasion of the workshop on 
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within the United Nations. Hence, the Swiss government was, in essence, offering to fund 
travel and support for representatives form states not already represented in Geneva, most of 
which were affected by the small arms problem. This would have allowed for the 
participation of experts from capitals, no just permanent representatives in the New York UN 
mission. Nevertheless, a majority of states felt they would be better represented in New York. 
States not keen on widening the Conference beyond arms control and disarmament also 
pushed to hold it in New York, within the framework of the First Committee process. This 
was particularly frustrating for the involved NGOs and small-arms affected countries which 
hoped that the negotiations in Geneva would be more fruitful and less politically poisoned. 
They particularly hoped that a broader approach could be pursued. No decision could be 
reached on this subject during the first PrepCom session in early 2000. 
In November 2000, frustrated about confusing signals from the UN headquarters and some 
UN members with a traditional, state-centric approach to the small arms issue, the Swiss 
government abandoned plans, to host the Conference in Geneva in July 2001. Officially, 
Switzerland put forward “financial and technical considerations,” even though it had received 
wide support from several NGOs to host the conference in Geneva.385 A true reason might 
have been that the Swiss government was afraid of losing the referendum on UN accession 
which was planned for March 2002. The pessimistic scenario was that the UN Small Arms 
Conference would attract much more domestic attention if it is to be held in Geneva that in 
New York. This would be particularly damaging if the outcome of the conference would be 
disappointing or if Switzerland came under pressure from the international community due to 
its conflicting agenda – promoting international action to control SALW trade and pursuing a 
liberal domestic firearms policy. 
Increased transparency in Switzerland’s small arms exports 
More and more, Switzerland also lives up to the standards of transparency it tries to promote 
on the international level. An important instrument is the annual arms export report. In 
February 2003, Switzerland has published its most transparent report on arms exports to date. 
Over the last ten years, the quality of the report has tremendously increased. Starting with a 
short press release in 1989 that indicated only the value of exported defense material to 
individual countries, the implementation of the new law on defense material in 1998 has also 
                                                                                                                                                   
„Establishing Codes of Conduct on Arms Exports“ at the Hague Appeal for Peace conference, The Hague, 
May 13, 1999 (http://www.iansa.org/documents/gov/gov9.htm). 
385  Interviews with Swiss government official, Bern, 10 January 2001, and with NGO representatives in 
Geneva, 18 January 2001. 
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brought more transparency. The introduction of this law also meant a transfer of responsibility 
with regard to export control and publication of the annual reports from the Federal 
Department of Defence to the Federal Office of Foreign Trade within the Federal Department 
of Economic Affairs. 
Starting in 2001, the report lists the value of arms exports by category and importing country 
for the precedent year. There is also a graphic showing the percentage of the value of arms 
export by weapons category. In 2000, handguns, for example, accounted for six percent of 
Swiss arms exports, small arms and light weapons other than handguns accounted for over 
24% and ammunition for 22% of total value. As shown in figure 8.1, exports have 
tremendously declined from the peak in 1985/7 of CHF 550-580 million to less than CHF 300 
million in 2002. The exports have reached their lowest point in 1995 with a value of 
approximately CHF 150 million. This seems to be astonishing given the fact that the Swiss 
Federal Department of Defence sold part if its material during this period. But the annual 
report does not cover (surplus) arms exported by the Swiss Federal Department of Defence or 
other government bodies. From time to time, this still causes some resentment by human 
rights and arms control NGOs, especially since the Swiss army has been tremendously 
downsized by manpower and material since the end of the Cold War.  
Figure 8.1: Export of war material and relative share of total Swiss exports, 1983-2002 
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The annual report – published in German and French – is available on the State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs (seco) website.386 Swiss arms export laws and regulations are also 
published on this website. The report lists the value of arms exports by category and by 
importing country in Swiss Francs – a level of specificity matched by few countries. 
The report also contains graphics listing the percentage of exports by weapons category and 
by importing countries. The categories are in accordance with the Swiss law on arms 
exports387 and partially coincide with the Wassenaar Arrangement’s weapons classifications. 
For example, in the year 2002, handguns (category KM1) accounted for nearly six percent of 
Swiss arms exports. Small arms and light weapons other than handguns (KM2) accounted for 
16 percent of Swiss arms exports, and ammunition (KM3) accounted for another 23 percent.  
Table 8.3: Top ten of recipients of Swiss war material388 
Country Value of exported 
war material 
Germany 66,754,453 
Austria 33,460,476 
United States 30,813,511 
Ireland 22,063,503 
United Kingdom 18,196,961 
France 17,386,418 
Sweden 16,266,938 
Singapore 12,058,035 
Italy 11,861,990 
Romania 10,491,534 
 
By continent, 77 percent of Swiss arms exports went to Europe, 12 percent to America,389 ten 
percent to Asia and one percent to Africa. The report also lists the value of total Swiss arms 
exports to each importing country. Additionally, the report from 2003 also charted for the first 
                                               
386  Seco website: <http://www.seco-admin.ch> (Last checked March 2003). First go to “news – current 
events”, then to “press releases”, and then to the press release of 13 February 2003. Earlier export reports 
can be found by browsing in the directory. 
387  A federal law (Kriegsmaterialgesetz, KMG, 1996) and a decree (Kriegsmaterialverordnung, KMV, 1998) 
regulate Swiss arms exports. The latter can be changed more easily and adapted to changing circumstances. 
See seco website “Exportkontrolle - Kriegsmaterial” to find the texts in German and French. 
<http://www.seco-admin.ch/seco/seco2.nsf/dieSeite/AWP_ExpKont_KM?OpenDocument&l=de&Haupt 
Ressort=4> (Last checked March 2003). 
388  This list includes all the war material and does not only represent small arms and related components. For 
more information on this report see also <http://www.seco-admin.ch/seco/pm.nsf/ZeigePM_IDString/ 
KMWH_130203>. (Last checked March 2003). 
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time the Swiss arms exports from 1983 to 2002 in Swiss Francs and as a share of total exports 
from Switzerland. 
In terms of deficiencies, the report does not list the licenses granted for arms export. This 
means that there is little public oversight of Swiss arms exports until after the exports have 
already taken place. In addition, the report only covers commercial exports by private 
companies licensed to export through seco. Exports by the Swiss Federal Department of 
Defence and other government institutions are not reported. However, the latest reports 
provided vast improvements in transparency compared to previous Swiss reports, which only 
listed the value of total arms exports by importing country. 
Launching the marking and tracing initiative 
With regard to marking and tracing, some states wished to go beyond what was accomplished 
in the UN Firearms Protocol and establish a uniform and mandatory marking system for all 
small arms. Switzerland and France belonged to the main promoters of this idea. Particularly, 
Switzerland never got tired to continue its activities in the area of small arms marking and 
tracing. At the second PrepCom from 8 to 19 January 2001 in New York, Switzerland 
together with France submitted a working paper on establishing a tracing mechanism to 
reduce excessive accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons.390 
In the run-up to the UN Conference in July 2001, Switzerland organized a workshop on 
marking and tracing of small arms in Geneva on 12-13 March. Along with representatives 
from the United Nations and other IGOs, technical experts, and committed NGOs, officials 
from more than 90 states participated at this workshop. The idea was to trigger the initiative 
on the establishment of an international mechanism to trace small arms, build a coalition 
around this initiative which should finally create more transparency in the international small 
arms trade.391 
During the actual Conference, the fate of marking and tracing measures was more critical than 
most other initiatives, especially for the main promoters, Switzerland and France, which had 
tabled a plan to establish a marking and tracing regime. This was the major and most-
                                                                                                                                                   
389  In this list, the exports are not broken down on a country level. In this context, America means the whole 
continent and not just the United States. 
390  Working paper by Switzerland and France on a tracing mechanism. A/Conf.192/PC/25, 10 January 2001. 
391  Chair’s Summary. Franco-Swiss Workshop on Traceability of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Tracing, 
Marking and Record-Keeping. Geneva, 12-13 March 2001. 
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developed initiative presented during the Conference to significantly help to reduce and 
prosecute the illicit trade in small arms.392 
The concept itself was not controversial, as indicated by the strong language in support of 
national marking that had gone unchallenged since the first draft of the Programme of Action 
(L.4) in December 2000 as well as the already negotiated UN Firearms Protocol which covers 
essentially illicit non-state weapons transfer. However, the controversy initially surrounded 
the goal of a universal marking system, which disappeared early in the process. 
This disagreement was followed by reservations on negotiating a legally binding instrument 
on marking and tracing. The Arab group, China, and the United States weighed in heavily 
against such plans. China had held such a view since negotiations to develop the UN Firearms 
Protocol started in the mid-1990s, and objected to negotiate a legally binding marking and 
tracing system at the global level. US opposition reflected a desire to see efforts to eradicate 
the illicit trade in small arms focused on the regional level, and, if global, placed in the 
criminal context exemplified by the UN Firearms Protocol. 
The United States also opposed such a commitment as it opposed any reference to any legally 
binding UN disarmament action on small arms. The text that did make it into the final 
document urged the strengthening of “the ability of States to co-operate in identifying and 
tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.” 
In the end, calls for a universal and legally binding marking standard were not included in the 
final text. There was only weak support for language calling for a unique, appropriate, and 
reliable marking on each small arm as a part of the production process. Due to concerns of 
states such as China and the United States as well as the successful lobby activities of the 
small arms industry and pro-gun NGOs, the final text only calls for a UN study on the 
feasibility of developing an international tracing instrument. Despite the absence of an 
                                               
392  France and Switzerland, 2000, Food-for-Thought Paper: Contribution to the Realisation of an International 
Plan of Action in the Context of the 2001 Conference: Marking, Identification and Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons. Reproduced in UN document A/CONF.192/PC/7 of 17 March March 2000. 
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/files/2001confpc7e.pdf>; France and Switzerland, 2001, 
Working Paper by Switzerland and France on Establishing a Tracing Mechanism to Prevent and Reduce 
Excessive and Destabilizing Accumulation and Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Reproduced in 
UN document A/CONF.192/PC/25. 10 January 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/files/ 
2001confpc25e.pdf>; France and Switzerland, 2001, Letter dated 21 March from the Permanent Mission of 
France and the Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the 
Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a Summary of the Franco-Swiss Seminar on the 
Traceability of Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in Geneva 12 to 13 March 2001. Reproduced in UN 
document A/CONF.192/PC/38, 23 March 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/files/ 
2001confpc38e.pdf>. 
 Case Study II: Switzerland 
 157 
agreement on international legal instruments, the final Programme of Action contains a range 
of operational measures at the national and global levels on marking and tracing. 
Even without a strong global mandate, Switzerland and France as main advocates of a 
marking and tracing regime, believed that this paragraph, along with a much stronger 
commitment393 to national action was enough to begin developing support for an international 
mechanism, even prior to the completion of the feasibility study called for in the follow-up 
section of the Programme.394 
8.5 Switzerland’s small arms policy after the Conference 
Switzerland remained committed to the small arms issue after the 2001 UN Conference. In 
the transatlantic framework of NATO/PfP, it organized several regional conferences and also 
provided financial and technical support to several initiatives, particularly on stockpile 
management and surplus destruction. Beyond that, it continued to promote the idea to 
establish a global marking and tracing system for small arms and light weapons. During the 
2001 Conference, this issue was one of the most critical problems to be addressed in the 
global efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The Programme of 
Action adopted by the Conference reflected this concern by recommending to the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) “to undertake a United Nations study, within existing 
resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable 
States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light 
weapons.”395 
Accordingly, the United Nations General Assembly established the Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and requested 
the Secretary-General to undertake a UN study, commencing during the 
fifty-six session of the General Assembly, within available financial 
resources and with any other assistance provided by States in a position to 
                                               
393  “To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each 
small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique 
and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national 
authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned 
can identify and trace each weapon” (UNGA, 2001, A/CONF.192/15, section II, para 7). Emphasis added. 
394  “To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of 
developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner 
illicit small arms and light weapons” (UNGA, 2001, A/CONF.192/15, section IV, para 1(c)). 
395  See Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All its Aspects, Section IV, paragraph 1(c). 
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do so, and with the assistance of Governmental Experts appointed by him 
[the Secretary-General] on the basis of equitable geographical 
representation, while seeking the views of States, to examine the feasibility 
of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and 
trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons 
and to submit the study to the General Assembly at its 58th Session.396 
At the invitation of the Secretary-General, 23 countries appointed representatives to the 
GGE.397 The first session of the GGE was held in Geneva from 1 to 5 July 2002. The Group 
elected Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on 
Disarmament, as its Chairman. Switzerland appointed Stefano Toscano to the GGE.398 During 
the whole Conference and also afterwards, the Swiss delegation tried to create a coalition of 
committed states to broaden the initiative from a bilateral proposal to a multilateral endeavor.  
At the outset of the first session, the GGE agreed on the two main guidelines that would 
govern its deliberations: 
1. the GGE should focus on its precise mandate, and refrain, to the extent 
possible, from discussing other issues, which may be important in their own 
right, but are peripheral to the task at hand. 
2. the GGE was not intended to negotiate an international instrument, but 
rather, was tasked with reporting on the feasibility of developing such an 
instrument.399 
Given this traditional and reserved UN language, the GGE’s freedom of action was quite 
limited. But the first session was an important platform for information exchange and 
coordination. During the course of this meeting, the GGE heard presentations by civil society 
representatives from the Quaker UN Office in Geneva, the Small Arms Survey Project, 
Geneva, the Group de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP), Brussels, 
                                               
396  See United Nations General Assembly GA resolution 56/24 V, paragraph 10. 
397  Representatives were appointed by Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, France, India, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Thailand. See also 
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/docs/trcngexperts/Listofexperts.pdf> (Last checked March 2003). 
398  Stefano Toscano, a Swiss diplomat, has worked on the small arms issue for several years at the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the Swiss delegation in the PrepCom sessions and the 
UN 2001 Small Arms Conference. There, he was a key promoter of the Swiss-French marking and tracing 
initiative. 
399  Information on the Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit SALW and its progress can be found 
at <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-tracingexperts.html> (Last checked March 2003). 
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and Computer Science, Bern. Representatives from the governments of France and 
Switzerland also made presentations on their joint initiative on tracing illicit small arms. 
In seeking to define the scope of its task with the necessary precision, the GGE examined the 
issue of definitions such as what constitutes ‘illicit SALW.’ What are the main components of 
an international tracing system, namely marking, record keeping, and international co-
operation as well as information exchange, and their respective technical and political 
dimensions? The discussion profited from the comparison of the relevant national regulations 
and regional experiences. However, there was no agreement reached during the first session. 
Some governmental experts, mainly from the United States, already thought that the GGE had 
overstretched its mandate. Others, such as Egypt, argued that the UN General Assembly 
would never accept a completed negotiated arrangement. Still others, primarily Switzerland, 
argued that they were free to propose an international instrument on marking and tracing 
measures and it was up to the General Assembly do decide whether it would accept it or not. 
They also argued that too much time had passed since the topic was first presented on the 
international agenda. At this stage, another report that just outlines that such an instrument is 
‘feasible’ in principle would not be enough. The report should also outline how it could be 
done and propose a binding instrument and a plan how to achieve it. 
Between the first and second session there have been a couple of informal meetings where a 
draft proposal for a binding instrument has been elaborated. This proposal will be discussed 
during the second session scheduled to take place from 24 to 28 March 2003 in Geneva. 
Before the GGE submits a final report to the 58th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly it will formally meet again for a third session from 2 to 6 June 2003 in New York. 
As an additional measure to fulfill its commitment under the Programme of Action, 
Switzerland appointed the head of the Peace Policy and Human Security Section of the 
Political Division for Human Security in the Department of Foreign Affairs as a National 
Point of Contact (PoC).400 He is responsible for the coordination of the Swiss activities in the 
framework of the Programme, but also for the information sharing with other PoCs.  
In other areas, Switzerland continued and strengthened its financial support for the Geneva-
based Small Arms Survey. This research group has launched its first yearbook during the 
2001 UN Small Arms Conference. The yearbook and other publications as well as the online 
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database are important means to enhance international transparency and sharing information 
on small arms issues.401 During the UN Small Arms Conference, the yearbook has already 
been tagged the ‘SIPRI yearbook for small arms.’ Given the general lack of information from 
other sources, this praise is certainly merited, but there is still more room for improvement, 
particularly with regard to data on official and illicit small arms transfers. 
At the beginning of 2002, the Small Arms Survey started a research project to evaluate the 
possibilities and consequences of a small arms tracing mechanism. The Swiss and French 
governments financially supported this study as a follow-up contribution to their joint 
marking and tracing initiative. Preliminary results of this study have been presented during 
the first session of the GGE.402 The study highlighted difficulties in three key areas impeding 
the establishment of an effective system – marking, record-keeping and tracing arrangements 
– and sketched out the necessary steps to establish such a system.403 
From 7 to 8 February 2002, 36 experts from national governments, research institutes, NGOs 
and the United Nations met in the context of the Geneva Forum404 to discuss further steps to 
facilitate the implementation of the Programme of Action and compile an overview of the 
ongoing small arms initiatives. Switzerland chaired a working group which compared 
different small arms documents (such as UN Programme of Action, 1999 OSCE Document, 
Firearms Protocol) with regard to their compatibility and to establish best practice 
procedures.405 Sharing information on experiences related to the prevention of illicit small 
arms trade, with a particular reference to organized crime, was another key point on the 
agenda. 
Switzerland also continued its efforts in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program 
to establish standards for small arms stockpile management. In a follow-up workshop 
organized by the Swiss Ministry of Defense, Switzerland has invited military experts to a 
                                                                                                                                                   
400  The Programme of Action asks the countries in several paragraphs to establish national points of contacts to 
coordinate action related to the implementation of the Programme. See UN Document 2001, 
A/CONF.192/15, Part II, para. 4, 5, 24. 
401  See the Small Arms Survey’s website (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/) for further information. 
402  A summary of the preliminary findings on the SAS-UNIDIR project presented to the GGE can be found 
<http://disarmament.un.org/cab/docs/trcngexperts/sasspeech.pdf>. (Last checked March 2003). 
403  Owen Green et al., 2003, The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, UNIDIR and Small Arms Survey: Geneva. 
404  See the Geneva Forum’s website (http://www.geneva-forum.org/) for further information. 
405  The Geneva Forum: Summary Report, 7-8 February 2002. <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/activites/pdf2-
act197.pdf> (Last checked March 2003). 
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training seminar on the control and management of small arms.406 Participants welcomed the 
course’s practical approach that was based on easily implementable tools. There was an 
explicit interest in standards in the field of collection and destruction as well as stockpile 
management. 
In general, the Programme of Action had no direct consequences on Swiss domestic 
legislation concerning small arms. The federal law on war material, introduced in December 
1996, already covers most of the relevant issues mentioned in the Programme.407 This law 
goes much beyond the narrow term of small arms and light weapons. It covers weapons, 
weapons systems, ammunition and military explosives as well as equipment specifically 
modified for the conduct of combat. Also the ordinance on war material from February 1998 
is more comprehensive than the agreed measures of the Programme of Action. It particularly 
lists export criteria for war material. Export authorizations must be based on the following 
considerations: 
· Maintenance of peace, international security and regional stability; 
· Situation in the country of destination, especially with regards to the 
respect of human rights and renunciation of child soldiers; 
· Swiss efforts in the area of development cooperation; 
· Attitude of the destination country towards the international 
community, in particular with regard to the respect of international 
law; and 
· Attitude of other members of international export control regimes with 
regards to possible export authorization.408 
 
To establish a list of export criteria was hotly debated during the UN Small Arms Conference. 
But there was no explicit link made to human rights and international law. The paragraph on 
transfers to non-state actors was even completely cancelled in the final Programme of Action. 
The export criteria in the updated Swiss ordinance on war material from November 2001 are 
much more restrictive. Export authorization for transfers to non-state actors, i.e. other than 
                                               
406  International Training Course on the Management of SALW, 16-28 June 2002, Speaking notes 
<http://www.vbs-ddps.ch/internet/groupgst/de/home/peace/rustungskontrolle/kleinwaffen/aktivit.Par.0009. 
DownloadFile.tmp/Speaking%20Notes%20für%20AdHoc%20WG%20on%20results%20TC.050702.doc> 
(Last checked March 2003). 
407  An unofficial translation of the Swiss Federal Law on War Material (LWM) is provided by the State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs <http://www.seco-admin.ch/seco/seco2.nsf/Atts/AWP_ExpKont_ 
ExpKontRecht/$file/Law13_12_96.pdf> (Last checked March 2003). 
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foreign governments and duly authorized entities, is only granted if the exporter is in the 
possession of end-user certificate from the importing country.409 
The authorization mechanism of the Law on War Material regulates export, import, domestic 
purchase, production, transfer and re-export and certain aspects of possession.410 However, 
armament companies belonging to the Swiss government and those related to war material 
acquisition for the Swiss Army are exempted from these regulations. The manufacture, 
purchase, sale, brokerage or any other form of trade of war material must be recorded in 
registers. The documents have to be stored for at least ten years. The central Office of the 
Public Ministry, which is part of the federal police, is responsible for the prevention of illegal 
transactions of war material. However, since the constitutional structure of Switzerland does 
not leave much power and competences to the federal police, efficient law enforcement is 
quite difficult in this area.  
But it is fair to say that Switzerland has already implemented a lot of items that are part of the 
Programme of Action and has actually incorporated some goals of the ‘wish list’ in its small 
arms policy that were not included in the Programme. Taking into account that the 2001 UN 
Conference was rather the beginning of a whole process and the continued commitment of a 
group of like-minded states, the efforts to tackle the small arms problems will remain on the 
international agenda – and also a key foreign and security policy issue of Switzerland as a 
prominent middle power – for some time.  
                                                                                                                                                   
408  An unofficial translation of the Ordinance of 25 February 1998 on War Material (OWM) can be found on 
<http://www.seco-admin.ch/seco/seco2.nsf/Atts/AWP_ExpKont_ExpKontRecht/$file/Law25_2_98.pdf> 
(Last checked March 2003). However, modifications from November 2001 are not considered. 
409  Ordinance on War Material, Article 5a. Modification made to the ordinance in November 2001. 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/514_511/a5a.htm> (Last checked March 2003). 
410  Law on War Material, Article 2. Main aspects of civilian possession of firearms are regulated by the federal 
law on weapons, weapon parts and ammunition which is in force since January 1999. 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c514_54.html> (Last checked March 2003). Currently, this law is under 
complete revision, but has not been approved by March 2003.  
  163 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It was not the aim to negotiate a treaty on small arms, but 
to achieve a global political consensus on a program of 
action that describes the problem and identifies various 
national, regional and global measures to alleviate it. 
There will be no treaty to be signed or ratified.411 
─Jayantha Dhanapala, United Nations, 
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, 
July 2001. 
 
Do middle powers and NGOs matter in framing an international action framework for small 
arms control? The evidence provided in the empirical part of this thesis gives both mixed and 
yet affirmative answers. That NGOs can have an impact was particularly clear in the case of 
domestic US NGOs, but not necessarily in the direction pro-regulation NGOs would have 
expected it. Yet, the influence of the NRA helps to explain both the US position during the 
international negotiations and also the actual outcome of the UN Conference. 
But where do we stand and where will we go to in international security policy in general and 
in small arms control in particular? Which role can middle powers and NGOs play in the 
future? Are they pushed to the sidelines and will their impact be diminished in a unipolar 
world dominated by one superpower or will they find a niche to shape international affairs? It 
is not only a question of size, power and characteristics of the actors. Also the nature of their 
interaction determines international affairs. Cooperation is needed more than ever, and the 
role of middle powers as ‘honest brokers’ and NGOs as ‘good social conscience’ are real 
assets in the current international security debate. 
To further elaborate on these questions, this concluding chapter will – by summarizing the 
key findings – assess 1) the outcome of the UN Small Arms Conference, 2) the impact of the 
                                               
411  Letter to the Editor of The Washington Times from Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for 
Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, July 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/letter.html>. 
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NGOs and private companies in negotiating the Programme of Action, as well as 3) the role 
of the United States and 4) Switzerland during the UN small arms negotiations in 2001. 
Furthermore, I will evaluate the conditions for successful NGO-middle power cooperation 
and develop scenarios for the future role of middle power and NGOs. I will conclude with 
some thoughts on directions for further research. 
Summary of findings 
The Conference and its aftermath 
Starting with the admission by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, 
Jayantha Dhanapala, that it was not the aim of the conference to negotiate a treaty on small 
arms – or even a ban of them as some of the pro-gun lobby groups insinuated – but to 
“achieve a global political consensus on a program of action that describes the problem and 
identifies various national, regional and global measures to alleviate it”412 the stated goal can 
certainly be considered as fulfilled. 
The UN Small Arms Conference was important for at least three reasons: 
· First, it generated an international debate on the small arms issue and forced 
states to go on record with their views on the causes and consequences of the 
problem, as well as on the action they supported. Those governments and NGOs 
preparing to take the issue forward now have a much better idea of which 
countries might be part of any coalition of ‘like-minded states’ that could 
provide leadership. 
· Second, the Conference generated two weeks of high-level international media 
attention and as such raised awareness of the various dimensions of the small 
arms issue. 
· Third, the Conference helped to build partnerships amongst civil society groups, 
and between NGOs and government delegations. These partnerships will be 
crucial for future efforts to address the different dimensions of the small arms 
issue. 
There is reason to assume that the follow-up meetings and conferences – as long as they are 
hold under the auspices of the same forum, will see the same arguments raised again by the 
same delegations with the same narrow national security and arms control focus. As long as 
                                               
412  Letter to the Editor of The Washington Times from Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for 
Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, July 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/letter.html>. 
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they are no clear priorities set, the usual set of issues will be debated, mainly among 
governmental arms control experts, without resolution, and with NGOs and international 
organizations very much on the margins. The marking and tracing initiative might be an 
important exception of this margins. What has been the impact of the NGOs and private 
companies during the negotiation process and on the national governments of the United 
States and Switzerland in particular? 
The role of the NGOs: IANSA and the pro-gun lobbies 
In general, NGOs appear to have exercised their influence in at least four different ways: 
· by raising the level of awareness and expertise that states can bring to the 
negotiating table; 
· by broadening the stakeholder base at the domestic and international level; 
· by pushing governments to develop policies where none existed before; and 
· by exerting pressure through ‘naming and shaming’ to make governments shift 
their national small arms policies. 
The relatively broad nature of IANSA as the leading umbrella network in the SALW 
campaign is a direct result of the different interests and orientations of the various 
stakeholders. This wide approach has both advantages and disadvantages: It provides the 
opportunity to launch a large number of different policy initiatives. Its strength stems from the 
mobilization capacities of some large NGOs that have not hitherto devoted a great deal of 
attention to ‘security’ issues – with the exception of the landmines campaign. 
However, these groups had to establish an explicit link between light weapons and conflict as 
well as to the group’s core mandate. This shift or partial reorientation sometimes also caused 
frictions within these NGOs since resources had to be reallocated away from their core 
competence. The NGOs associated with IANSA also framed the issue of small arms and light 
weapons in a slightly different way. The different ways of framing the problem generated 
very different visions and agendas for international action. As a consequence, those various 
agendas affected the effectiveness of the coalition to achieve a coherent strategy and, 
ultimately, common objectives. 
Ultimately, IANSA was dependent on large, resource-rich and established NGOs (such as 
Saferworld, BASIC, International Alert, Federation of American Scientists, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, World Council of Churches, Oxfam and others) to steer 
the debate and establish a policy framework. As a counter-move, those NGOs were very 
reluctant to give IANSA too much power, resources and – ultimately – leadership. 
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Whether IANSA will have a similar impact as the ICBL in the landmine case remains to be 
soon. It is rather doubtful – given the complex and multi-faceted structure of the problem and 
the opposition from influential weapons producers and pro-gun lobbyists – however, that it 
will share ICBL’s fate in helping to establish a legally binding treaty to regulate small-arms 
trade or to even ban their use.413 Yet, to profit from its huge reservoir of expertise and know-
how, IANSA needs to further streamline and prioritize its campaign goals and closely 
coordinate its activities with interested like-minded states. 
Even though the 2001 UN Conference could not meet the high own expectations of the broad 
network of NGOs and committed governments, this movement is far from dead. The Ottawa 
process was also born out of frustration with the permanent blockade in the UN negotiating 
framework. 
Perhaps ironically, the clearest case of NGO influence was the impact of the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) and various other groups from the US firearms lobby on the US position 
at the UN Conference. US Congressman Bob Barr (Rep, GA), a member of the NRA Board 
of Directors, was part of the official US delegation to the Conference. The US position on 
civilian possession of firearms was clearly linked to the importance of these domestic lobby 
groups for the Bush administration. The NRA presence during the Conference was a clear 
watchdog function rather than active influence. The US delegation has already incorporated 
NRA’s position before the start of the Conference. The small arms industry was also present 
during the Conference and made its influence felt primarily through the lobby activity of the 
NRA and the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities. 
The role of the United States 
It is obvious that the United States was the most powerful player before and during the UN 
Small Arms Conference. Even though it has a very active small arms policy and supports 
various regional activities, particularly in South America and Africa it was very 
uncompromising and firm during the actual negotiations. From the very beginning, it 
announced several reservations, but was most aggressive in trying to delete the language on 
the civilian possession of small arms and the small arms transfer to non-state actors from the 
Programme of Action. It also raised other ‘red flags’ with regard to definition of small arms, 
scope of the Conference, constraints on legal trade and legal manufacturing, promotion of 
international advocacy activity by IOs or NGOs as well as follow-up and review process. 
                                               
413  Stefan Brem and Ken Rutherford, 2001, “Walking Together or Divided Agenda? Comparing Landmines 
and Small-Arms Campaigns,” Security Dialogue 32(2), 169-186, esp. 181-3. 
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Some of the items have also been included in the original ‘red list’ to trade them in at a very 
late stage in the Conference to at least give the impression that the US government would also 
be interested in a negotiated Programme of Action. The establishment of a review process – 
however very weak and without additional resources and institutionalization – was such a 
tradable good, while a compromise on the civilian possession of small arms and the small 
arms transfer to non-state actors was absolutely taboo. 
The US position was heavily influenced by the domestic gun lobby (both SALW producers 
and owners). The US government not only shared – in principle – the view of the NRA, but 
also included a member of the NRA Board of Directors in its conference delegation. He could 
report back from the closed negotiation sessions to the accredited lobby groups whether the 
United Nations was in violation of the Conference mandate and whether the US delegations 
actively waved their red flags to prevent language that was in violation of the supporters’ 
interest. 
Even though the United States continues to pursue an active small arms policy – similar to its 
engagements against landmines without signing the Ottawa treaty – it almost seems to be 
‘fearful’ of UN dominance, but especially of additional binding rules and financial 
commitments. 
The role of Switzerland 
The situation of Switzerland in the run-up to and during the Conference was much more 
complicated than that of the United States. Similarly to the United States it has also a very 
active small arms policy. Contrarily, it tried to play a much more active rule in the negotiation 
process itself – without the backing or even against a strong domestic constituency. The 
domestic constituency – “Pro Tell” – is certainly not as professional organized as the US 
counterpart – the NRA – but the political system in Switzerland gave them additional weight 
that had to be factored in before launching an international marking and tracing initiative. 
Actually, the Swiss government was quite successful in preparing the domestic turf by 
organizing roundtables where it invited representatives from different interest groups. It 
brought together representatives from the Swiss gun lobby, humanitarian and gun control 
NGOs, governmental representatives from the Federal Department Justice and Police and the 
Swiss Federal Office of Foreign Trade. It has provided useful platform for information 
exchange among the different domestic actors. It also allowed to reduce reservations by the 
gun lobby and the industry against new international regulations. The inclusion of the small 
arms industry and engineers also nourished the Swiss initiative with additional technical 
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expertise and know-how. This was particularly useful for the development of new 
technologies in marking and tracing of SALW. 
This preparation was the main reason why Switzerland has presented the most advanced and 
specific proposal during the Small Arms Conference. To launch the international initiative on 
marking and tracing of SALW it also effectively created a partnership with France – a 
powerful and influential EU country and permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
Despite the absence of an agreement on international legal instruments, Switzerland used the 
call in the Programme of Action for a UN study on the feasibility of developing an 
international tracing instrument – along with a much stronger commitment to national action 
–to strengthen its activities in establishing an international marking and tracing mechanism, 
even prior to the completion of the feasibility study. 
Conditions for successful NGO-middle power cooperation 
How can these findings and the outcome of the Conference be explained and generalized? In 
the introductory chapter I have identified the intuition that middle powers are entering 
creative partnerships with coalitions of non-state actors. Those partnership can have a 
significant impact on international affairs. 
Yet, in the case of small arms and light weapons I would argue that we are rather at the 
beginning of a long process and that the necessary relationship still has to be built and 
strengthened – even though in some areas there is already a sound cooperation. It would be 
therefore too early to write off this emerging cooperation between like-minded middle-powers 
and committed NGOs. When we compare the process of coalition-building in the realm of 
small arms with other areas of international security affairs we can identify conditions under 
which a successful partnership is more likely to emerge. The following factors are the most 
relevant in this respect; each is supplemented with a specific comment relevant to the small 
arms issue:  
· Negotiations and cooperation are easier if there is a shared 
understanding of the problem: This is a very crucial starting point. It 
seems that there is still a lack of common understanding of the 
problem – both within the involved NGOs who are actively lobbying 
for more regulations as well as with the ‘like-minded’ states. 
· State-NGO campaigns are more successful when they focus on a 
very specific problem: This seems to be the core problem of IANSA. 
It has still far too many objectives and goals that weaken a coherent 
and prioritized strategy. Its broad approach distinguishes IANSA 
both from the much more successful ICBL which focused on the ban 
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of antipersonnel landmines, but also from the various pro-gun lobby 
groups who fights basically any activities aimed at restricting their 
access to small arms.  
· It is important to provide a frame for the issue that draws out its 
humanitarian, environmental, or other dimensions so that a 
connection can be fostered to an existing transnational activist 
community: This frame is actually given by the establishment of 
IANSA. But as has been described above, the network lacks the 
necessary focus and priorities. It seems that there is a converted U-
turn relationship where the linkages with too many dimensions can 
actually inhibit successful lobby activities. 
· It is also crucial to attract key middle states that have sufficient 
international status to ensure that the issue moves to the treaty 
negotiation phase: Some of the NGOs have actually engaged with 
key middle states and started to foster working partnerships. In some 
cases, the countries seem even more active in this relationship. The 
inclusion of NGOs in the national delegations during the UN Small 
Arms Conference has certainly helped to build trust between the 
middle powers and the NGOs and to strengthen their partnership. 
This collaboration could also successfully prolonged in the actual 
marking and tracing negotiation after the 2001 Conference. 
· The prospects for successful cooperation can be improved by 
widening participation to states beyond the immediate core group of 
committed middle powers: Already Switzerland’s partnering with 
France was testimony of this enhancing factor. A further widening of 
the core group seems only be advisable if the other conditions 
mentioned above (in particular a shared understanding and focused 
approach to the problem) are met. 
· NGOs receive legitimacy from international organizations such as 
the United Nations by, for example, providing credible, independent, 
first hand knowledge of a subject: This mutual support has existed 
from the beginning of the process. The pro-regulation NGOs as well 
as the United Nations have expressed their reciprocal respect and 
have worked closely together. The United Nations has in particular 
appreciated the NGO’s active support and research capacities. 
· Using a non-traditional framework for negotiation may be very 
useful, but in these situations it may be just as important to find a 
way to later embed the agreement in an established institutional 
framework that can facilitate implementation: At this rather early 
stage, compared with for example the landmine ban process, the 
negotiations will still remain for the foreseeable future within the UN 
framework. Raising frustration by those actors – both governments 
and NGOs – who want to see more progress might lead to a creation 
of a non-traditional negotiation framework. As long as there is no 
shared understanding within a larger than the current core group of 
like-minded countries and a lack of clear priorities and objectives a 
non-traditional framework would neither change the substance nor 
the outcome of the negotiations.  
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As can be seen from this research, most of the conditions are not (yet) met. It would have 
been rather astonishing, if the NGO-middle power cooperation, with Switzerland as an 
important representative of this group, had achieved more in tackling the small arms problem. 
It remains to be seen in the future, whether this partnership will have more success when the 
general setting is more benevolent. In the meantime, it is up to the actors involved to engage 
in productive activities to tackle the small arms problem more on a practical level as long as 
the strategic level seems to be blocked. 
Future role of middle powers and NGOs in arms control  
As this study has shown, state-NGO cooperation is not always easy but increasingly important 
in international security affairs. Committed middle powers and NGOs have urged the 
international community to recognize the problems of uncontrolled small arms trade during 
the UN Small Arms Conference in 2001. But can they do more than that? Success would have 
been impossible in negotiating the landmine ban treaty and establishing the International 
Criminal Court. 
It seems that private actors and NGOs not only can bring security issues on the public and 
political agenda, but that they can also make important contributions – even in the realm of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Probably the most prominent, yet underestimated 
privately organized and partially publicly funded endeavors are the Green Cross International 
and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
The first was founded by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1993. It is a non-
governmental, non-profit organization that builds on the ideas of sustainable development and 
safe environment of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It conducts programs to build 
trust of local population in the former Soviet Union where the destruction of chemical 
weapons stockpiles is planned, and to facilitate destruction process safe for public health and 
the environment. Furthermore, it promotes base clean-up and conversion as well as the 
environmentally sound destruction of weapon inventories. Finally, it studies the effect of the 
military use of radioactive substances on the environment and on public health and advocates 
clean-up priorities. These programs are mainly financed by the Swiss and Swedish 
governments and receive additional funding by other governments and private foundations.414 
The other private group active in promoting and supporting the reduction of WMD threats is 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative, co-founded by Ted Turner and former Senator Sam Nunn, 
                                               
414  Information on the Green Cross International can be found at http://www.gci.ch/. 
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established in January 2001.415 In the first year of operation, the group has spent roughly $37 
million on projects such as securing nuclear material storages in Russia, helping to create a 
revolving fund to respond quickly to infectious disease outbreaks and, most prominently, 
moving highly enriched uranium from a poorly guarded research reactor in Belgrade to a safer 
site in Russia in the summer of 2002. 
The accomplishment of the ‘Project Sapphire,’ that transferred 100 pounds of weapons-grade 
uranium from an aging nuclear reactor, was severely in jeopardy until the group provided 
additional money to close the deal. A congressional directive, that strictly limits the use of 
money dedicated to nonproliferation efforts, forced the US State Department to raise 
alternative funding.416 In the end, the US government only had to pay $2 million for 
transportation and related expenses. Almost $5 million were provided by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative to clean up the reactor site and keep the scientists employed in alternative research 
programs. 
But since the original investment by the CNN founder Ted Turner has been made in AOL 
Time Warner stocks ($50 million a year for the next five years), it is not sure whether the 
group can actually finance disarmament and awareness programs as generously as planned.417 
In early October 2002, Warren E. Buffet, second wealthiest man of the United States and 
owner of the investment company Berkshire Hathaway, announced to contribute additional 
$2.5 million over the next five years. Former senator Sam Nunn hopes that Buffet’s 
involvement with the initiative would not only be valuable in further fund-raising activities, 
but also in persuading pharmaceutical and biotech companies that it is worth investing in 
research and development efforts that rely on skills of former Soviet scientists.418 This would 
support the efforts started in the former Soviet Union by the United States and other donor 
countries to ensure that scientists with deadly know-how in the WMD production can be 
employed on civilian research projects.419 
                                               
415  Vernon Loeb, „Turner, Nunn Unveil ‚Nuclear Threat Initiative’,“ Washington Post, 9 January 2001, A18. 
Information on the Nuclear Threat Initiative can be found at http://www.nti.org/. 
416  Joby Warrick, „Risky Stash of Uranium Secured,“ Washington Post, 23 August 2002, A01. 
417  For the year 2002 it was planned to spend $30 million and $25 million in 2003. Between January 2001 and 
October 2002 the stock declined by 77.9%. 
418  Judith Miller, „Warren Buffet Moves to Help Group Trying to Reduce Nuclear and Biological Threats,“ 
New York Times, 4 October 2002. 
419  Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine,” in Thomas Bernauer, 
and Dieter Ruloff (eds.). The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control. Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999, 111 – 156, esp. 131. 
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These two privately initiated programs clearly highlight the ability and potential of 
organizations created by individuals (or groups) in areas previously reserved for states. But it 
also shows the problems related with private initiatives: They are more vulnerable to an 
economic decline or stagnation than states which receive and can (re-)distribute regular tax 
revenues. It is also dangerous that nonproliferation efforts and disarmament programs is 
dependent on the goodwill of private donors who can easily switch to another, more publicity 
prone topic. Well funded, long-term oriented and diligently conducted programs by private 
actors can only supplement public efforts by nation states which still bear the principal 
responsibility in international security affairs. 
Directions for further research 
This thesis concludes with suggestions for two broad directions for future research. The first 
follows directly from what I have done in this study. It strongly suggests that the political 
dynamics of middle power / NGO cooperation can help to explain much of what is going on 
in international security policy. Further research into these processes and their effects on the 
security environment is therefore called for. Under which conditions can middle power / NGO 
cooperation emerge and when are they successful? Evidence suggests that the end of the Cold 
War boosted the number and activities of NGOs. Also the willingness of like-minded middle 
powers to use the expertise and credibility of NGOs has generally increased. However, 
cooperation was only successful in a couple of cases and was able to reach the original goals 
of the campaign – as in the case of the landmine ban. In others, it seems that there is still a 
long way to go – maybe because the process just has started, as in the case of small arms. In 
this particular case, also structural factors – as described earlier in this concluding chapter – 
may reduce – at least in the short term – the effectiveness of the middle power / NGO 
cooperation. 
Further insights could be gained by including other cases from the security area (e.g., role of 
private industry and NGOs in reducing the chemical and biological weapons threats) or by 
broadening the focus to other research areas (environment, human rights, trade). In doing so, 
patterns of cooperation and conditions for success could be analyzed and compared across 
different fields and actors. 
The second direction recognizes that the current use of the term NGOs is too crude and 
unsystematic. On the one hand, the term has to be more differentiated and structured. On the 
other hand, it has to be demystified as something that only represents the ‘good world’ of civil 
society versus the ‘bad world’ of nation states. Additionally, the analytical focus has to be 
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expanded to other actors of the private sphere. In such an expanded analytical framework non-
state actors like private business and industry (also private military companies in the realm of 
security studies), NGOs that are not primarily considered as part of the ‘good’ civil societies 
(National Rifle Association in the gun control discussion), rebel and guerilla groups and even 
terrorists have to be included.420 
This enlargement creates new possibilities of partnerships between public and private actors. 
On the one hand, the small arms producing and exporting industry can be included to mark 
and keep records of their weapons or banks as well as insurance and shipping companies can 
be encouraged to cooperate with law enforcement in tackling illicit activities.421 On the other 
hand, terrorists or other violent non-state actors can be excluded by freezing their financial 
assets. The private sector has a comparative advantage that governments sometimes lack. 
They can reach people in areas and domains where governments sometimes have no access or 
control. 
 
                                               
420  George E. Shambaugh, Statecraft and Non-State Actors in an Age of Globalization, Paper prepared for the 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 24 – 27 March 2002. 
421  In 2001, the Fund for Peace, a Washington-based NGO, has issued a report (Expanding the Net: A Model 
Convention on Arms Brokering) and a model convention on arms brokering (Model Convention on the 
Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms Brokering). They also include 
recommendations on how banks, insurance companies and arms manufacturers can prevent unlawful small 
arms transfers. In a broader context on the role of insurance companies see also Virginia Haufler, 1997, 
Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and the Management of International Risk, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press. 
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Appendix: Programme of Action 
 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
(UN Document A/CONF.192/15) 
I. Preamble 
1.     We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, having met in New York from 9 to 20 July 
2001,  
2.     Gravely concerned about the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms 
and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions 
of the world, which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and 
pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable 
development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels,  
3.     Concerned also by the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,  
4.     Determined to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons in all its aspects and to enhance the respect for life and the dignity of the human 
person through the promotion of a culture of peace,  
5.     Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects 
sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, 
undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,  
6.     Gravely concerned about its devastating consequences on children, many of whom are 
victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the negative 
impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the special session 
of the United Nations General Assembly on children,  
7.     Concerned also about the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in 
drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and 
stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade 
simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective,  
8.     Reaffirming our respect for and commitment to international law and the purposes and 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of 
States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, non-intervention 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of States,  
9.     Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with  
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,  
10.   Reaffirming also the right of each State to manufacture, import and retain small arms and 
light weapons for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity to participate 
in peacekeeping operations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,  
11.   Reaffirming the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the 
particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign 
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occupation, and recognizing the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. This 
shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples,  
12.   Recalling the obligations of States to fully comply with arms embargoes decided by the 
United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,  
13.   Believing that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating 
and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, 
accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems associated with such trade 
and find ways of resolving them,  
14.   Stressing the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, including 
financial and technical assistance, as appropriate, to support and facilitate efforts at the local, 
national, regional and global levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects,  
15.   Recognizing that the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, and 
acknowledging that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in 
all its aspects is multi-faceted and involves, inter alia, security, conflict prevention and 
resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions,  
16.   Recognizing also the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental 
organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, combat and 
eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,  
17.   Recognizing further that these efforts are without prejudice to the priorities accorded to 
nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament,  
18.   Welcoming the efforts being undertaken at the global, regional, subregional, national and 
local levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and 
desiring to build upon them, taking into account the characteristics, scope and magnitude of 
the problem in each State or region,  
19.   Recalling the Millennium Declaration and also welcoming ongoing initiatives in the 
context of the United Nations to address the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects,  
20.   Recognizing that the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, establishes standards and procedures that 
complement and reinforce efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects,  
21.   Convinced of the need for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to 
promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, 
reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects 
as a contribution to international peace and security,  
22.   Resolve therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects by:  
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(a)    Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional and 
national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, combat and 
eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;  
(b)    Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat and 
eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons;  
(c)    Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an end 
and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms 
and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently;  
(d)    Mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to prevent and 
combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all their aspects, 
to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character and seriousness of the 
interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these 
weapons;  
(e)    Promoting responsible action by States with a view to preventing the illicit export, 
import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons. 
II. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects 
1.    We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind the different situations, 
capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects: 
At the national level 
2.    To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons 
within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such 
weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and 
light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.  
3.    To adopt and implement, in the States that have not already done so, the necessary 
legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the 
illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within 
their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such activities can be 
prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.  
4.    To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination agencies or bodies and 
institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts 
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, 
brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction of small arms and 
light weapons.  
5.    To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of contact to act as liaison 
between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.  
6.    To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in the illegal manufacture, 
trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit small 
arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against such groups 
and individuals.  
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7.    To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable 
marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. 
This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also 
provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the 
manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each 
weapon. 
8.    To adopt where they do not exist and enforce, all the necessary measures to prevent the 
manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked 
small arms and light weapons.  
9.    To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the 
manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their jurisdiction. 
These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate 
information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities.  
10.   To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the 
State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.  
11.   To assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations 
and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the 
existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in 
particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, to establish 
or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as 
well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, 
with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.  
12.   To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures 
to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons, 
including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement 
measures. 
13.   To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices, without prejudice 
to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have previously 
imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements 
before the retransfer of those weapons.  
14.   To develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the 
activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legislation or 
procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization 
of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities 
performed within the State's jurisdiction and control.  
15.   To take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against any 
activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
16.   To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons are 
destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal 
prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and 
provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.  
17.   To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that the 
armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons 
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establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and 
security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, inter alia, 
relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to 
stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security, accounting and 
control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized 
personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss.  
18.   To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective constitutional and legal 
systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, police 
and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national 
authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the 
responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and 
implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.  
19.   To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated for destruction, taking into 
account, inter alia, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of 
destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 
November 2000.  
20.   To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public 
awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including, where appropriate, 
the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of small arms and light 
weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, 
with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.  
21.   To develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction 
of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, unless another form 
of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons have been marked and the 
alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to include, where applicable, 
specific provisions for these programmes in peace agreements.  
22.   To address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular the 
reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropriate 
rehabilitation.  
23.   To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that impact on the prevention, 
combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects 
and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international organizations and in 
accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia, (a) small arms and light 
weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information 
such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition that can contribute to the eradication 
of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. 
At the regional level 
24.   To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact within subregional and 
regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the 
Programme of Action. 
25.   To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant 
legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in 
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small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully 
implement them.  
26.   To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed by the 
States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or subregions on the 
transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes 
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or action programmes and 
cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof, including through 
technical assistance and other measures.  
27.   To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular trans-
border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, 
border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating 
the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.  
28.   To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional action on illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, 
implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.  
29.   To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in 
particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, 
where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard.  
30.   To support, where appropriate, national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the measures 
agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.  
31.   To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures 
to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects. 
At the global level 
32.   To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the effective implementation of 
arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
33.   To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within existing resources, 
through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and 
information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on 
implementation by those States of the Programme of Action.  
34.   To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament and 
demobilization of ex-combatants and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, 
including providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this 
section, of collected small arms and light weapons.  
35.   To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by-case basis, 
the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.  
36.   To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely and 
reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.  
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37.   To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as well as other relevant 
organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization 
(Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to proceed against 
them in accordance with their national laws.  
38.   To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments 
against terrorism and transnational organized crime.  
39.   To develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the problems 
related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to preventing, 
combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.  
40.   To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to facilitate 
the appropriate cooperation of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in 
activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in 
this area.  
41.   To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as appropriate, education 
and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society. 
III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance 
1.    We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that the primary responsibility 
for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close international 
cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.  
2.    States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy 
in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the 
global, regional, subregional and national levels and to encourage the establishment and 
strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among international and 
intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations 
and international financial institutions.  
3.    States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so 
should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, 
including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to 
support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade 
in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.  
4.    States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the affected 
States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by the parties 
concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and 
international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the 
pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes.  
5.    States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, cooperate, 
develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.  
6.    With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and 
international and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested States, 
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upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appropriate 
legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and 
security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection and exchange of 
information.  
7.    States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and 
training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control 
officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects.  
8.    Regional and international programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile 
management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate 
international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these 
programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate 
international or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this 
area.  
9.    States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate, including by providing relevant 
information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol's International 
Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database that may 
be developed for this purpose.  
10.   States are encouraged to consider international cooperation and assistance to examine 
technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technologies.  
11.   States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant 
existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and 
arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and 
intergovernmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular 
by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.  
12.   States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national 
marking systems on small arms and light weapons.  
13.   States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to enhance, according to their 
respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other forms of 
cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.  
14.   Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position 
to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus 
stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.  
15.   Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position 
to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.  
16.   Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional and 
international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate programmes 
related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.  
17.   With regard to those situations, States should make, as appropriate, greater efforts to 
address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account existing 
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and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the rights of the States 
concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.  
18.   States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health 
and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and 
civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action-oriented research aimed 
at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the 
problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. 
IV. Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
1.   We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly the 
following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Conference:  
(a) To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the 
implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the fifty-
eighth session of the General Assembly;  
(b) To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and 
global implementation of the Programme of Action;  
(c) To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the 
feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a 
timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons;  
(d) To consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating 
and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.  
2. Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:  
(a) Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional 
organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Programme of 
Action;  
(b) Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the 
implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in their 
implementation of the Programme of Action;  
(c) Further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as 
appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to 
implement the present Programme of Action. 
 
Source: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html 
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Excellencies and distinguished colleagues, it is my honor and privilege to present United 
States views at this United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All its Aspects. 
The abstract goals and objectives of this Conference are laudable. Attacking the global illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) is an important initiative which the 
international community should, indeed must, address because of its wide ranging effects. 
The illicit trade in SA/LW can be used to exacerbate conflict, threaten civilian populations in 
regions of conflict, endanger the work of peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid workers, 
and greatly complicate the hard work of economically and politically rebuilding war-torn 
societies. Alleviating these problems is in all of our interest.  
Small arms and light weapons, in our understanding, are the strictly military arms – automatic 
rifles, machine guns, shoulder-fired missile and rocket systems, light mortars – that are 
contributing to continued violence and suffering in regions of conflict around the world. We 
separate these military arms from firearms such as hunting rifles and pistols, which are 
commonly owned and used by citizens in many countries. As U.S. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft has said, “just as the First and Fourth Amendments secure individual rights of 
speech and security respectively, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep 
and bear arms.” The United States believes that the responsible use of firearms is a legitimate 
aspect of national life. Like many countries, the United States has a cultural tradition of 
hunting and sport shooting. We, therefore, do not begin with the presumption that all small 
arms and light weapons are the same or that they are all problematic. It is the illicit trade in 
military small arms and light weapons that we are gathered here to address and that should 
properly concern us.  
The United States goes to great lengths to ensure that small arms and light weapons 
transferred under our jurisdiction are done so with the utmost responsibility. The transfer of 
all military articles of U.S. origin are subject to extremely rigorous procedures under the U.S. 
Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations. All U.S. exports of 
defense articles and services, including small arms and light weapons, must be approved by 
the Department of State. Assurances must be given by the importing country that arms will be 
used in a manner consistent with our criteria for arms exports: they must not contribute to 
regional instability, arms races, terrorism, proliferation, or violations of human rights. Arms 
of U.S. origin cannot be retransferred without approval by the United States. To ensure that 
arms are delivered to legitimate end-users, our government rigorously monitors arms 
transfers, investigating suspicious activity and acting quickly to curtail exports to those 
recipients who do not meet our strict criteria for responsible use. In the past five years, the 
United States has conducted thousands of end-use checks, interdicted thousands of illicit arms 
shipments at U.S. ports of exit, and cut-off exports entirely to five countries due to their 
failure to properly manage U.S. origin defense articles.  
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All commercial exporters of arms in the United States must be registered as brokers and 
submit each transaction for government licensing approval. Our brokering law is 
comprehensive, extending over citizens and foreign nationals in the United States, and also 
U.S. citizens operating abroad.  
Believing that it is in our interest to stem the illicit trade in military arms, the United States 
has avidly promoted and supported such international activities as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Bilaterally, we offer our financial 
and technical assistance all over the world to mitigate the illicit trade in SA/LW. We have 
worked with countries to develop national legislation to regulate exports and imports of arms, 
and to better enforce their laws. We have provided training, technical assistance, and funds to 
improve border security and curb arms smuggling in many areas of the world where this 
problem is rampant. And in the past year, we have instituted a program to assist countries in 
conflict-prone regions to secure or destroy excess and illicit stocks of small arms and light 
weapons.  
We are proud of our record, and would hope that the Program of Action would encourage all 
nations to adopt similar practices. Our practical experience with these problems reflects our 
view of how best to prevent the illicit trade in SA/LW. Our focus is on addressing the 
problem where it is most acute and the risks are highest: regions of conflict and instability. 
We strongly support measures in the draft Program of Action calling for effective export and 
import controls, restraint in trade to regions of conflict, observance and enforcement of UNSC 
embargoes, strict regulation of arms brokers, transparency in exports, and improving security 
of arms stockpiles and destruction of excess. These measures, taken together, form the core of 
a regime that, if accepted by all countries, would greatly mitigate the problems we all have 
gathered here to address.  
There are, however, aspects of the draft Program of Action that we cannot support. Some 
activities inscribed in the Program are beyond the scope of what is appropriate for 
international action and should remain issues-for national lawmakers in member states. Other 
proposals divert our attention from practical, effective measures to attack the problem of the 
illicit trade in SA/LW where it is most needed. This diffusion of focus is, indeed, the 
Program's chief defect, mixing together as it does legitimate areas for international 
cooperation and action and areas that are properly left to decisions made through the exercise 
of popular sovereignty by participating governments:  
· We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade and legal manufacturing 
of small arms and light weapons. The vast majority of arms transfers in the world are 
routine and not problematic. Each member state of the United Nations has the right to 
manufacture and export arms for purposes of national defense. Diversions of the legal 
arms trade that become “illicit” are best dealt with through effective export controls. 
To label all manufacturing and trade as “part of the problem” is inaccurate and 
counterproductive. Accordingly, we would ask that language in Section II, paragraph 
4 be changed to establish the principle of legitimacy of the legal trade, manufacturing 
and possession of small arms and light weapons, and acknowledge countries that 
already have in place adequate laws, regulations and procedures over the manufacture, 
stockpiling, transfer and possession of small arms and light weapons.  
· We do not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or 
non-governmental organizations, particularly when those political or policy views 
advocated are not consistent with the views of all member states. What individual 
governments do in this regard is for them to decide, but we do not regard the 
international governmental support of particular political viewpoints to be consistent 
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with democratic principles. Accordingly, the provisions of the draft Program that 
contemplate such activity should be modified or eliminated.  
· We do not support measures that prohibit civilian possession of small arms. This is 
outside the mandate for this Conference set forth in UNGA Resolution 54/54V. We 
agree with the recommendation of the 1999 UN Panel of Governmental Experts that 
laws and procedures governing the possession of small arms by civilians are properly 
left to individual member states. The United States will not join consensus on a final 
document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear arms. We 
request that Section II, para 20, which refers to restrictions on the civilian possession 
of arms to be eliminated from the Program of Action, and that other provisions which 
purport to require national regulation of the lawful possession of firearms such as 
Section II, paras 7 and 10 be modified to confine their reach to illicit international 
activities.  
· We do not support measures limiting trade in SA/LW solely to governments. This 
proposal, we believe, is both conceptually and practically flawed. It is so broad that in 
the absence of a clear definition of small arms and light weapons, it could be 
construed as outlawing legitimate international trade in all firearms. Violent non-state 
groups at whom this proposal is presumably aimed are unlikely to obtain arms through 
authorized channels. Many of them continue to receive arms despite being subject to 
legally-binding UNSC embargoes. Perhaps most important, this proposal would 
preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal 
government. Distinctions between governments and non-governments are irrelevant in 
determining responsible and irresponsible end-users of arms.  
· The United States also will not support a mandatory Review Conference, as outlined 
in Section IV, which serves only to institutionalize and bureaucratize this process. We 
would prefer that meetings to review progress on the implementation of the Program 
of Action be decided by member states as needed, responding not to an arbitrary 
timetable, but specific problems faced in addressing the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons. Neither will we, at this time, commit to begin negotiations and reach 
agreement on any legally binding instruments, the feasibility and necessity of which 
may be in question and in need of review over time.  
Through its national practices, laws, and assistance programs, through its diplomatic 
engagement in all regions of the world, the United States has demonstrated its commitment to 
countering the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. During the next two weeks, we 
will work cooperatively with all member states to develop a final document which is 
legitimate, practical, effective, and which can be accepted by all nations. As we work toward 
this goal over the next two weeks, we must keep in mind those suffering in the regions of the 
world where help is most desperately needed and for whom the success of this Conference is 
most crucial.  
 
 
Source: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements/usE.html 
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Mr. President, 
At the outset, my delegation wishes to welcome Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Columbia as 
Chair of the Conference and to assure him of our full cooperation and support. We would also 
like to commend you, Ambassador Donowaki, on your continued engagement in the field of 
small arms and your contribution to this Conference.  
Mr. President  
We all know very well the reasons why we are gathered here:  
More than 550 million small arms and light weapons are now circulating around the world 
and their production ranges wider every year. Small arms and light weapons are widely 
obtainable, cheap, easy to use and to transport, and lethal. They cause 500,000 deaths per year 
and up to double-digit percent losses in annual GDPs.  
These are, indeed, indicators of a problem which is spreading rapidly beyond control, which 
imperils human security and development as well as humanitarian efforts in many zones, and 
to which nobody is immune.  
It is therefore imperative that we find solutions and that we act upon.  
The issues on which we must concentrate are proliferation and misuse of small arms and light 
weapons. To tackle the problem in an efficient and credible way, the following measures 
should be taken at different levels:  
· Regulating legal activities, such as production, stockpiling, and 
transfer of small arms and light weapons, since licit and illicit 
activities are closely linked;  
· tracing, marking, and record-keeping;  
· reinforcing and consistently applying export criteria;  
· combating illicit brokering;  
· improving stockpile management and security;  
· identifying and eliminating weapons surpluses;  
· reducing arms through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programs;  
· enhancing transparency.  
The nature and scope of these measures demand international co-operation and assistance, 
both of them are indispensable to ensure efficient implementation.  
Mister President,  
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This Conference provides us with a unique opportunity to address these points and to take 
necessary action. To be sure, this Conference is not going to adopt binding norms and 
measures for immediate use.  
However, the Conference must adopt a programme of action that acknowledges the 
complexity of the problem and identifies what needs to be done in order to deal with it in a 
comprehensive and sustainable way, and with the urgency that it deserves. It must also 
provide for follow-up mechanisms for implementation and review, as well as timelines. And, 
last but not least, the Conference should add a global component to what has so far largely 
been a national and regional-based undertaking. To be sure, certain aspects of the problem are 
and will remain nation- and region-specific. Others, however, like brokering or tracing, are 
global in nature and require global action.  
We have now before us a draft programme of action – document L.4/Rev.1 – which, if looked 
at from the perspective just mentioned, seems not too far away from where we should be 
going. We wish to take this opportunity to thank the Chair of the Preparatory Committee, 
Ambassador Dos Santos, for his excellent work.  
Mister President,  
Switzerland has been making substantial contributions to the preparation of the Conference. It 
has held seminars and contributed to deeper knowledge on topics like tracing and marking 
arms, global criteria for exports, and management and security of arms stocks. Finally, the 
publication of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva has given us a tool to improve transparency 
in the small arms sector. We are particularly happy about the timely launch of its first edition.  
Tracing, marking and record-keeping are among those elements of the programme of action to 
which we attach particular importance. As you know, France and Switzerland have launched 
an initiative on this subject. Its prime aim is to establish a tracing mechanism enabling States 
to identify and trace small arms and light weapons that contribute to proliferation and illicit 
trade. Let me take this opportunity to re-state that it is not the objective of this initiative to 
make possible comprehensive monitoring of the legal sources and flows of small arms. In any 
future negotiations on this matter, it will be important to clarify the circumstances in which a 
State that is concerned about certain small arms has a right to expect co-operation in its efforts 
to trace them. Let me also stress that preventive measures such as marking and record-
keeping will remain a national prerogative.  
Switzerland also attaches great importance to the implementation of the programme of action, 
which should not be allowed to remain merely fine words. Implementation is crucial and must 
be tackled promptly by the community of nations in co-operation with the United Nations, 
regional organizations and NGOs.  
We hope that the Geneva-based “Small Arms Survey” and its network of partners will be 
instrumental in this context.  
To conclude, Mr. President,  
The Conference should aim at adopting a meaningful programme of action to raise awareness, 
to mobilize political will and resources, and to draw a road map for concrete action at various 
levels. This is a great opportunity for all of us to turn words into deeds. Let's not waste it.  
Thank you, Mr. President  
 
 
Source: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statements/swissE.html 
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